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Articles

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THE COMPETENCE VIEW OF INTUITIONS – A SHORT SKETCH

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Abstract:
This paper proposes an outline of a view concerning intuitions, tying them to our basic cognitive competences, or virtues-capacities, a view that is here called The Moderate Voice-of-Competence view. This view claims that intuitions form a kind, albeit a relatively superficial one, united by their phenomenal appearance, but linked to capacities for understanding various domains. Further, intuitions are extroverted, turned towards the items they are explicitly about, and normatively answerable to them; they teach us about things "outside", not merely about our representation(s) of them. This view also takes seriously the actual dialectics of having intuitions: asking (or being asked) a question, imagining a scenario, giving a simple, preliminary answer to the question, formulating the immediate intuition which is often developed by considering other examples, and so on. This work involves more than mere inference following rules of logic. Further, this view is for the most part committed to realism about the objects of intuitions, and is very keen on their explainability. Finally, this view offers a complex answer about the normative epistemic status of intuitions, tilted towards a posteriority: although intuitions are prima face a priori, their reflective justification has a rich structure in which a posteriori elements play a crucial role.

Key words: cognitive competences, virtues-capacities, intuition.

1. Intuitions and competencies: Formulating the view

What are intuitions in general and philosophical intuitions in particular? They are products of human competence(s), they speak with the voice of competence that produces them; indeed many of them are products of basic, fundamental competences humans have, say linguistic, logical, spatial. Linguistic intuitions are the voice of our innate linguistic competence; Chomsky has been famously arguing for this view for half a century. I would like to extend the proposal to other intuitions, in particular to philosophical ones. I will call my line "the Moderate Voice-of-Competence view", **MoVoC** for short, since it takes competence as basic, but allows that many opinions that people voice as their "intuitions" contain a lot of material not produced by, and therefore not revelatory of, the pure competence, linguistic, logical, spatial, or whatever. What about the normative status of intuition: are they a priori or a posteriori? Both. Their justification is a structured one, featuring elements from both categories. This is the view I would like to expound in this paper. I am not going to offer any explicit defense against competing views for want of space. My excuse for doing so is that I think that a sketch of one's view, even if ultra-programmatic, as the present one is, might be useful for offering to the reader the general outline, often obscured in detailed discussions of particular points (I shall be referring, with apologies, to my papers in which I do the more detailed work).

Let me start at the beginning. In philosophy and science one encounters a lot of imaginative thought experiments, (in what follows I will shorten "thought experiments" to "TEs"). For instance, in the Ship of Theseus thought experiment, we imagine a ship A with parts being replaced, the resulting ship B, still traveling, and the emergence of a ship C built on discarded original parts of A. Is A identical to B or C, we are asked. Next, we opt for one of them, say B, and in the good case we seem clearly to be aware of a state of affairs that seems obvious to us: B is identical to A. In the "intuition jargon", we have an intuition that this is the case. We might test it on similar items, say a (Hobbesian) knife, that survives through a series of changes of its handle and sheath. The general conclusion is that continuity makes for identity through time.

The prime use of the term "intuition" is for the clear seeming and/or conviction.[1]

TE's are also used in science, say in physics, to elicit intuitions that serve as guides for both experimentation and theory. Simon Stevin's TE, for example, enables one to 'see' the truth of a conclusion concerning weight resting on a plane. It involves a chain draped over a prism-like pair of inclined (frictionless) planes of unequal slope. Imagine you link the chain, adding links at the bottom. The closed loop "would rotate if the force on the left were not balanced by the force of the right. Thus we would have made a perpetual motion machine, which is presumably impossible" (Brown, 1991:4.). Stevin's TE is akin to problem solving in geometry by visual imaginative means, in the examples featuring simple geometrical configurations, like in the famous geometrical tasks in Plato's *Meno*. The simplest case might be claims like the one that by folding a square over one of its diagonals, the opposite sides will come to coincide, In such geometrical TE's the cognizer is invited to imagine some spatially salient situation and is lead to "see" the necessary regularities which govern it:



Finally, there is a standard procedure in linguistics that is often, and I think rightly, assimilated to TEs. The linguist asks the native speaker questions about a string of sounds or letters. (Often, the linguist is asking herself questions about strings of sounds in her own language.) First, is this a sentence of your language? If it is, further questions are in order. Suppose the linguist looks at issues like co-reference. The question might then concern who is doing what to whom according to the assertion; for instance, if the sentence is "John shaves himself", who is being shaved? The context, like in TEs, is primarily cognitive, not practical, and the point is to elicit a spontaneous judgment of the speaker, who finds a state of affairs obvious and compelling which then serves as the starting point of further theorizing. These are "linguistic intuitions".

So, the states we call "intuitions" vary in regard to their topic, but they share their phenomenal properties classically described by Descartes in terms of "clear and distinct cognition", of being "present and apparent to an attentive mind." [2] This should make intuition into a phenomenal kind, at least.

Next, we have to introduce a few distinctions concerning various uses of the word "intuition". We have taken it to refer primarily to cognitive states (those of 'seeing' that some proposition holds). It also denotes the contents of intuitive judgment (e.g. "John has this strange intuition that eating vegeta-

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[1] The meaning of the word "intuition" is tied to obviousness and immediacy. Indeed, the original philosophical meaning of the word has been applied to the cases of a clear insight, "intuitio" meaning simply "seeing". (The word appears in the Middle Ages, in optics, in theories about immediate perception and in the religious context of "seeing God".) Descartes has made it famous, linking it to "clear and distinct cognition" in his "Regulae" and "Principles". He speaks of that

> which is present and apparent to an attentive mind, in the same way as we assert that we see objects clearly when, being present to the regarding eye, they operate upon it with sufficient strength (Principle XLV).

A slightly different way of understanding the term "intuition" comes from the Kantian tradition, and has also been prominent in the writings of German mathematicians, and others who have followed their usage. It focuses upon quasi-perceptual awareness, of the kind illustrated below with the folding of a square. You can "see" the result in your imagination, and this kind of exercise is often categorized under the rubric of "intuitive geometry". Kant suggested the Latin term "intuition" as a translation of his "Anschauung", encompassing both perception and quasi-perceptual imagination. Hilbert talks about "intuitive geometry" meaning exercises like the one above.

[2] L.J. Cohen proposes that "...an intuition that p is just an immediate and untutored inclination, without evidence or inference, to judge that p" (1981: 318). Similarly, the S. Blackburn's *Oxford dictionary of philosophy*, speaks of "immediate awareness, either of the truth of some proposition, or of some object of apprehension such as a concept" (1994, 197).

Michael Ayers –commenting on Locke, and apparently endorsing his general stance–describes the intuition of necessity in the following way:

> " …the perception of necessity is something like seeing, but is more like ordinary cases of the intelligent apprehension of the significance of what we see, such as the realization how this (actual or depicted) gear works" (1991: 299)

bles is morally wrong."). Moreover, philosophers have hypothesized that there is a capacity for having intuitions and have extended the use of the term to cover that capacity. So the term "intuition" has at least three meanings:

1) intuition-state, i.e. either inclination to judge that p (with the feeling of obviousness and irresistibility), or the judging itself,
2) intuition-content, i.e. the judged proposition that p,
3) intuition-capacity, i.e. the hypothetical capacity producing and underlying the intuition-state.

We should add to these standard meanings the process producing intuition that is occasionally described as "intuiting that p."

INTUITION STATE		**INTUITION-CONTENT**	
STATE SPECIFI-CATION	**STATE-FEATURES**	**MODAL SPECIFI-CATION**	**CORE CON-TENT**
I believe I "see" I intuit	certainly clearly obviously/that indubitably-compellingly	necessarily	*continuity determines identity of material objects.* *2+5=7* *if* p and q *then* p.

Let me now reiterate my claims in relation to the main categories in the table. I would defend a pro-intuitionist view that there are intuitions-dispositions and judgments, which form a distinct group of phenomena, and there is an intuition-capacity, the capacity to use our imaginative and judgmental competencies in an off-line fashion. It is the voice of competence – linguistic, spatial-geometrical, metaphysical, moral, and so on. Intuitional data are thus the minimal "products" of tentative production by the thinker (or speaker-listener) and not their opinions about the data. The data involve no theory and very little proto-theory. Although there might be admixtures of guesswork in the conscious production of data, these are routinely weaned out by theoreticians (philosophers, mathematicians, linguists).

Why go for competencies, and why suppose they are partially innate? Well, even authors like Devitt (1996), who are not friendly to competentialism, have recognized the usefulness of procedures like the following when dealing with intuitions: first, grouping similar intuition-contents by their domain into larger (candidate) content-kinds, and grouping the intuition-states supporting them into larger state-kinds (for example, intuitions about numbers, or those about physics, or about the composition of things). Second, assuming that a given state-kind (e.g. linguistic intuitions) is produced by a single kind of capacity pending massive evidence to the contrary. And finally, searching for the set of basic features that the hypothetical kinds – both state-kind and the capacity-kind – should have (e.g. the basic features of states of having linguistic intuitions and of the underlying hypothetical linguistic capacity). The advice is indeed a piece of methodological commonsense.

The competentionalist line of answer is best introduced by considering big families of intuitions outside the narrow domain of theoretical philosophy, and we shall start from these clearer cases. The whole competentialist story began with language and linguistics: the complexity of syntax, its early acquisition, as well as neurological evidence, point to a specialized, relatively modular competence that is answerable both for ordinary linguistic activities and for having linguistic intuitions.[3] Similarly with arithmetic: cognitive research points to a relatively modular numerical competence, innate in its basic form, modular in its functioning, as well as in the case of malfunctioning; the issue is not any more if such a "number sense" exists, but only what its precise structure is. Geometrical intuitions point to a spatial competence, again relatively modular, of prime importance for our dealing with the environment (and probably philogenetically important for the survival of our species).[4] Inference, both deductive and inductive, demands relatively specialized apparatuses. Psychologists debate about their relation to the two "official" branches, and the relation is obviously quite complex. Be that as it may, these competences are relatively clearly delineated, and not very dubious. Further, there is a widespread agreement that the human ability to deal with complex physical environments involves "naïve physics", grounded in an implicit understanding of material objects, relatively fixed, and impressive both in its achievements and in its limitations and

[3] See for the defense Miscevic, 2006 b.
[4] See Miscevic, forthcoming.

straightforward mistakes. [5]It is natural to suppose that our naïve understanding of our physical surrounding involves some premises that would on the professional library arrangement end up on the shelf of "metaphysics": assumptions about the basic structure of material objects, perhaps some naïve essentialist assumption, and assumptions about identity through time.[6]

If one wants a general theory of intuitions and intuition-capacity the appeal to specialized competences will be unavoidable. Their unity and simplicity will strongly suggest not to separate theoretical philosophical intuitions from the rest. Moreover, the practical sphere also seems to depend on a relatively specialized sensitivity to moral issues, if not to moral properties. What is the particular form of this moral competence is an open and exciting issue, but its existence is way less open to doubt.

This leaves open the issue of epistemological intuitions; there is little evidence for a special competence for them. However, if every other area is best accounted for in competentialist terms, it seems reasonable to postulate an ability to gauge and understand cognitive achievements, of oneself and of others. The ubiquitous and perpetual need to rely on others for information gives important practical value to gauging their testimony, and it is plausible to suppose that humans have developed a common treasure of means for achieving this. Cultural variety might have led to diversity in detail, but it is better to assume a fundamental unity, unless the evidence to the contrary is really overwhelming.

Also, our innate endowment might explain at least the very origin of the intuition-capacity and the initial stages of the formation of our intuition-states with their contents. For instance, it might consist of innate structures, some corresponding to concepts and some to inner, spatio-temporal "frames", responsible for an innate spatial-geometrical know-how to. This explains some of the objective validity of our intuitions. But nativism should be restricted to the origin of the system and to the relatively initial stages of processing. An intelligent nativist-adaptationist should allow for a wide margin of influence from individual empirical learning, which may overthrow even some deeply ingrained pre-conceptions to the contrary. And most importantly, intuition is doubly fallible. It can misrepresent the contents of our cognitive apparatus, and is thus internally fallible. But, the contents themselves–including their core, innate assumptions–are also fallible, yielding the external fallibility of intuitions. Our innate geometry might be false, our possibly innate folk-physics certainly is. No deep or strong apriority is involved in their deliveries. In short, we can admit an important role of intuitions, and preserve some of their special status, intimated by their phenolmenology, without falling into dangerous traps of classical Cartesianism. Finally, to stay in the normative realm, the appeal to competences nicely fits virtue epistemology, which sees well-functioning competences as epistemic virtues-capacities (Sosa, 2007).

Let me briefly sketch the main features of MoVoC. First, intuitionism: there are intuitions-dispositions and judgments, which form a distinct group of phenomena, and there is the intuition-capacity, the capacity to use our imaginative and judgmental competencies in an off-line fashion. It is the voice of competence, most often a discrete one. Intuitional data are thus the minimal "products" of tentative production – linguistic, philosophical, moral or mathematical – by a naïve thinker (or speaker-listener) and not his opinions about the data. The data involve no theory and very little proto-theory. Although there might be admixtures of guesswork in the conscious production of data, these are routinely weaned out by linguists.

Second, extroversion or referentialism: intuittions are concerned with their external objects, the domain of items and facts, rather than with concepts. Concepts often play a role in the process, but they are not the object of intuitions, and their role is subordinate to the role played by the external referential domain.

[5] And it probably involves manipulating mental models. Many problems, particularly those involving spatial relations, are much easier to solve in mental models then verbally. Manipulating mental models gives the thinker a kind of "view" of changes of situation. It is close to experience, not only in respect of its "feel", but, much more importantly, in respect of its concreteness, specificity and spatial character. The solution of the problem is "imaged" (or "seen"), and this is just due to the peculiarity of the medium.

[6] Here is a quotation from Herbert Simon, that nicely captures the essential point:

> "The mind represents information in various ways, in this case, in the form of a mental picture. We have available certain processes, or operators – some of them conscious some not – for operating on and drawing conclusions from this information. In the case at hand, the subconscious operator applied is one called seeing. It is available for extracting information from both external visible displays and pictures in "the mind's eye'" (Simon, H., 1992, 125).

Third, the primacy of the concrete. TEs and the intuitions they produce are rather scenario-based than inference-based. Imagining scenarios, typically particularized ones, plays the main cognitive and justificatory role, whereas inference typically plays a subordinate role. I shall leave this aspect out of the present debate. On the psychological side this points to "mental models" and similar items with quasi-concrete representational features, rather than to pure reasoning (see Miscevic, 1992).

Fourth, explanationism: intuitions require an explanation, of having them and of their reliability,and if possible a causal explanation. The heart of philosophy is the question "how possibly" (as famously noted by arch-apriorist Kant), and in typical descriptive matters the question is naturally read as demanding a general causal account of the phenomenon in question. My own favorite line is summarized in the following paraphrase of J. L. Austin (where his term "words" is replaced with "cognitive inclinations"): the stock of our deepest cognitive inclinations embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connections they have found worth making, in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up on the spot ("A Plea For Excuses", in *Philosophical Papers*, p. 182). This accumulated wisdom then allows the philosopher to anticipate the experience from the armchair. At the same time, the double fallibility of these intuitions accounts for the limits of philosophical autonomy: armchair research should be open to corrections from empirical science. [7]

Fifth, moderate and structured aposteriorism: concerning the justificatory status of intuitions, where the stress is on a posteriori rather than on a priori. Mere acceptance of the "voice of competence" does not land us in any objectionable Cartesianism: it is compatible with naturalism and with distrust of a priori philosophy. I will have more to say about this in the penultimate section of the paper.[8]

Each of the proposed views requires substantial arguing. As I said, I will point to my published papers for further reading; here I just want to summarize the view, in the most programmatic manner possible. Let me now place my proposal on the map of views. Let me contrast the firmly aprioristic views with non-aprioristic ones, and place MoVoC with the latter. The traditional aprioristic view is epistemic Platonism, nowadays defended by authors like J. R. Brown (1991), and Lawrence Bonjour (1998). According to such direct access epistemic Platonism we have a capacity, intuition or insight, which offers us direct access to the domain we think about, in this case abstract objects and properties. It is basically the capacity to "see" the domain with the eye of one's mind. The problems for such view, made famous in our time by Benacerraf's proposal of an unpleasant dilemma, have reduced its popularity.

The most fashionable recent family of aprioristic views is tied together by the idea that armchair truths are typically (or even exclusively) conceptual truths, i.e. truths which express constitutive relations between concepts. Let me call the claim "conceptualist" and the whole family "conceptualism" [9] (The most prominent authors are Christopher Peacocke (see e.g. his 2004), Frank Jackson (1988), and Paul Boghossian (2008). Conceptualism continues the line made famous by early modern empiricists who, in their reaction to problems facing rationalism and Platonism in general, accepted that there is some a priori knowledge, but account for it by switching to concept-like (or even image-like) entities, our ideas, and then turning this idea against its empiricist proponents. Recent conceptualists are still being faithful to the empiricist notion that the a priori is grounded in "relations of ideas" (although they prefer formulating their proposal in terms of "conceptual knowledge", and some of them prefer to quote Frege rather than Locke). Their reversal consists in combining two claims: our a priori knowledge is conceptual, and/but it is still factual-substantial. [10]

On the opposite, anti-aprioristic side, let me distinguish two broad options. One is MoVoC. The other is the family of views claiming that the presumed intuitional source of beliefs is "nothing special", that what philosophers describe as intuitions are just ordinary beliefs. The so-called philosophical intuitions are not exceptional in any way, they are very, very ordinary beliefs. Since a term is needed, I propose the term "ordinarism". The view has a long tradition. For instance, British Intuitionists, prominently A. C. Ewing, have

[7] For further elaboration, see Miscevic, 2007.

[8] And there is more in Miscevic, 2004

[9] See the classical papers in Boghossian and Peacocke, 2000.

[10] I critically discuss these views in Miscevic, 2005.

proposed that seemingly immediate armchair judgments and beliefs are in no way special; they are just ordinary judgments, often derived from reasoning.

> An intuition must be regarded as a rational judgement, though one not based on argument, even if capable of confirmation by it, and not as a mere feeling ... The best and most reliable intuition comes after reasoning and not before. (1953:137)

Similar views have been proposed more recently by Michael Devitt (2005, 2006) in connection with linguistic intuitions and intuitions in general, as well as by Soren Haquist (1996), and to some extent Roy Sorensen (1992). Norton has been a long time defender of a staunchly empiricist treatment of intuitions: they come from experience and reasoning, and TEs encapsulate the latter (2004). Let me add two very recent books, Tim Williamsonn's *Philosophy of Philosophy*(2007*)* and Herman Cappelen's *Philosophy without intuitions*(2012), which want philosophy to get rid of intuitions altogether. This is in fact even outside of ordinarism proper, but is similar in spirit to authors like Williamson, who insists on the ordinary character of the sources of philosophical beliefs.

> One main theme of this book is that the common assumption of philosophical exceptionalism is false. (2007: 3)

Ordinarism is usually combined with three attractive doctrines that MoVoC also accepts. First, referentialism or extroversion (in contrast to conceptualism) : armchair beliefs and similar states are concerned with their external objects, the domain of items and facts, rather than with concepts (as argued by Williamson in his *Philosophy of Philosophy*, chapter 2). Concepts may often play a role in the process, but they are not the object of beliefs, and their role is subordinate to the role played by the external referential domain. Next comes explanationism (in contrast to quietism): armchair beliefs and similar states require an explanation of their being had and their reliability (if possible, a causal one, I would add). Finally, we have anti-apriorism: armchair deliverances are not a priori. (I am using the less standard terms "apriorism" and "anti-apriorism" rather than "rationalism", because of the multiple ambiguity of the latter, and the fact that the term "anti-rationalism" is already pre-empted for a completely different stance in a different area). All of the authors listed are analytic philosophers in the mainstream tradition. A recent development in the area adds to the variety of ordinarism(s). This is "experimental philosophy", in itself a varied and already rich field, in which experimental psychological methods are deployed in order to study intuitions. Here, then, is the map:



Hopefully, MoVoC is sufficiently specific to merit an independent niche.

2. Eliciting an intuition: The stages of a TE

Our sketch has been quite general and abstract, keeping to the minimum of example and concrete analysis. Let me make up for this defect and illustrate the workings of the MoVoC attitude on a kind of example, and indeed one that has not been much discussed in the literature. Thought experimenting goes through stages, and traditionally a philosopher will pick up a particular stage and concentrate upon it, without making fuss about the structure of the whole. I would like to remedy a bit of this deficiency and look at the rich biography that certain kind of intuitions normally have.

Suppose the person, call her Jane, has been told a story (Twin Earth, Gettier, the Ship of Theseus) and is being asked for an opinion. Call this stage zero of a TE. In short, one can distinguish several steps in the thought process. Jane would normally begin with understanding what she is asked to imagine, namely, to conceive of a state of affairs involving some property P (being water, true justified belief, identity through time). Next she would make an effort of thought and imagination, implementing a particular scenario that involves P. This results in a clear seeing belief or judgment concerning P in the particularized setting (XWZ is not water, Smith doesn't have knowledge, etc.). The next task concerns the passage to generalization. (e.g., in the Twin Earth case noticing that the answer in question generalizes to other stuffs, and finally that it yields the verdict that the constitution of any kind of stuff is essential to it). It thus ends with a general judgment concerning P. Further, reflective people think about their spontaneous reactions and judgments. They can compare them with other judgments, and balance them in their reflection. If the thinker reaches an equilibrium, it is called narrow reflective equilibrium. Also, they might compare the narrow result with what they know from other sources, for instance from science, or social experience, and balance all the components again. Finally, a philosopher may combine several scenarios into a continuous story, as Wittgenstein does with his questions about builders in the first roughly thirty paragraphs of *Philosophical Investigations*. Let us consider each stage in turn.

First, understanding the task.

The way in which the subject understands the question often determines the rest, and ill-understood or misunderstood questions might at the end of the day result in theoretical disasters. This stage one is now being made prominent in several lines of discussion. One line of discussion comes from experimental philosophy, where theorists often use procedures from the methodology of psychology in order to control variables that might influence subject's understanding of the question. The other is strictly philosophical, and has to do with the nature of questions asked in philosophy examples, like the Ship of Theseus or the Gettier problem.

Second, the stage of tentative simulation-production

We next pass to the subject's search for an answer. In discussions about philosophical intuitions one usually talks about subject's conceptual competence and/or her basic theory of the domain involved. There is little debate about whether the working of the competence is more conscious and situated at the personal level, or if it is rather non-conscious and sub-personal. However, in the case where a naïve subject is asked the question "Which of the two ships is identical to the original one?" it is plausible to suppose that she does not have conscious knowledge of the principles for identity through time. So, at least part of her search for an answer is better ascribed to a sub-personal capacity. In this case it is probably the logic of competence that tells her, at the end, that, for instance, things have a property or don't, and she therefore calculates that the right answer is Yes.

It is important here for the subject to be going through the actual scenario of the thought experiment, for instance imagining the history of the Ship of Theseus, simulating the situation of Smith in the Gettier example, imagining the falling objects in Gallileo's TE, or reproducing and parsing the sentence proposed in the testing of linguistic intuitions. I like the scenario and simulation approach, stressing the importance of actual simulation and imagining of the scenario as presenting the exercise as being irreplaceable; for these the unconscious inference is a mere auxiliary operation. Kant has probably been the fiercest advocate of this special nature of intuition, as against his rationalist predecessors, especially against Leibnizian inferentialism-logicism. I am very much with this line. (On the opposite side, there are those who stress the role of inference and logic, reducing thought experiments to reasoning, like Norton (2004).)

At this point one should note an interesting contrast concerning the generality of the approach: theoreticians that limit their research to philosophical intuitions tend to be divided equally between simulation-scenario and logic-inference approaches, whereas those who focus on linguistic or geometrical intuitions cannot but stress the specific role of simulation and imaginative scenarios. So, generality is on the side of the latter: if we want to offer a more uniform account, we cannot get rid of simulation and scenarios; but once we introduce them, there is no reason not to rely on their importance wherever needed.

Third, arriving at the verdict

After a brief period of time, a normal subject typically arrives at the verdict, the clear seeming and belief, e.g. that the still sailing ship is identical to the original one, that Smith does not have knowledge, and the like. Since MoVoC enjoins us to think about competencies, and since there is some evidence that various forces come together in a subject's arriving at the verdict, let me hypothesize three distinct sub-stages in this process. In many cases it is a specialized mechanism, say a "moral module", or a "geometrical module" that does the job. Whether or not we have a "metaphysical module" for the Ship of Theseus type of problem is an open question. We may assume that the module comes up with the verdict, either in the form of affirmation, or of a mere seeming. (Ernest Sosa, for instance, in his (2007) stresses the pull of the seeming, and in fact reduces the seeming to the attraction to believe.)

Next, the general cognitive capacity (or capacities) together with memory, general knowledge and motivational structure kick in. Let me give you an example (from Nichols, and Knobe (2007)). We know, thanks to experimental philosophers, that people, when presented with a general deterministic description of a universe, judge that the agent in such a universe is not responsible for his deeds. However, if you make the deed very bad (killing one's family in a cruel way in order to elope with one's pretty secretary), they judge the doer to be responsible. One way to account for this discrepancy would be that the first judgment, the no-responsibility verdict, reflects our general moral competence of judging people's actions. With the murder of the family scenario added, a strong indignation comes in and overturns the initial intuition.

We can imagine a parallel, less dramatic story with the Ship of Theseus TE. Jane, after imagining the history of the Ship, and the three items figuring in the story, the initial vessels A, the continuing vessel B, and the rebuilt vessel C, has opted for one of them, say B. To her it seems obvious that the still sailing vessel B is in fact the same thing as the original Ship of Theseus. The thought, or more precisely the content of her thought, is attractive and compelling to her. This is stage four, with its intuitional seeming or "attraction". At this point in the TE various factors might intervene. For instance, Jane might remember helping in the restoration of an old church in her home town, and the art historian present complaining that "most of the parts are new and not original, and the church is 'not really the same any more'", and, driven by analogy, she might start doubting that a rebuilt ship can be the same as the original one. However, if nothing such intervenes, Jane will normally assent to the seeming, and thus form the (intuitional) belief that B is identical to A. This is the stage of the verdict. The two states, of seeming and of having belief are classically described as "having an intuition that…". This stage has been the favorite of recent meta-philosophers. But, we are far from being done.

Four, varying and generalizing (intuitive induction)

The intuition resulting from stage five is particularized: in the Ship story it says that the ship B is identical to the ship A. Most people do not need another analogous story, say of a knife, to conclude that the morals are generalizable. Similarly, in Twin Earth thought experiment one first judges that XWZ is not water, and then generalizes to the view that composition is essential for stuffs. Roderick Chisholm (1989) usefully distinguishes three stages in coming to see the truth of the general proposition: first, the accumulation of instances, second, the inductive inference from the instances to the general statement, and third, the 'sudden' intuitive insight that the general statement is necessary.

The "sudden" character of the insight is itself puzzling (J.R. Brown has been insisting upon this since his earliest book on intuitions (1991)), but we shall leave it to one side for now. So much about the single (particular or general) insight from a TE.

Five, reflective equilibrium, narrow and wide

We now pass to wider interaction. It might start at the level of varying and generalizing, or later. For instance, a person who thinks that the actually functioning ship is identical with the original one in spite of the different matter – planks – from which it is composed, might go through examples of tools, and generalize her insight. But then she might ask herself: Would I consider a gothic church, "preserved" in the same way, by replacement through two centuries of all the ancient bricks with industrially produced fake bricks, to be really "the old gothic church"? If the answer is No, it would clash with the Ship intuition. Both intuitions are strong. One way to balance them would be to claim that artworks have different, much stricter conditions of identity than ordinary material objects. This reflection would yield a fine equilibrium, an example of 'reflective equilibrium', as Rawls has called it.

Such an equilibrium within the "family", i.e. between various intuitions, is often called narrow reflective equilibrium. To give a further example, we might wonder whether our linguistic intuitions are mutually consistent, and weed out those that are inconsistent with the majority of others.

Narrow equilibrium is not sufficient. We want to have an encompassing philosophical view, informed with general knowledge of matters. So, the final stage is the wide reflective equilibrium, bringing in additional empirical information from history, psychology and social science or just ordinary experience. For instance, some of our discordant linguistic intuitions can be explained away by the assumption that they are being "infected" by extra-linguistic social considerations; for instance, we have rejected a completely grammatical English sentence out of snobbery or political correctness. Or, to revert to the Ship example, I might consult the work of anthropologists about the typical judgments from other cultures, in order to avoid being parochial. Once I have all the data, general claims (principles and the like) I go on balancing the intuitions with the rest. If I reach equilibrium in my reflection, it is called wide reflective equilibrium.

Six, from micro- to macro-TE

Until now we have discussed single TEs, or small groups of TEs, and this is what is usually done in the literature. However, there are famous examples of TEs organized in a sequence, so as to yield a consistent narrative, and accompanied by relevant theorizing. In the philosophy of mind, we have a book-length TE from Condillac. In his *Treatise on Sensations* (English translation, 1930) he asks the reader to indentify with a "statue" equipped with a human-like neural apparatus (a human-like robot, we would say nowadays), initially devoid of any contact with the outside world. Its senses are awakened, one by one, and the reader is asked to imagine the reactions of the statue along its way. Also, I have mentioned groups of related micro-TEs integrated into a larger whole in Wittgenstein. The first thirty or so paragraphs of *Philosophical investigations* famously introduce various small "language games" (or proto-language games), commented and organized into an impressive whole, a true macro-TE. But the most dramatic examples come from political philosophy. The first is Plato's *Republic*. Socrates famously suggests at [369a] to first look for justice in states, and only then also examine it in the individual. He then proposes the following: "If, then," said I, "we should in *our argument* / logos / *observe the origin of a state*, we should see also the origin of justice and injustice in it." So, he and his interlocutors proceed to build the just state in their logos, by imagining a series of arrangements. Socrates, for instance, asks about a community of children and whether it is just. His interlocutor, Adeimantos, imagines the arrangement and volunteers the positive answer. Such a small imaginative experience might be treated as a mini-TE. Its counterpart is Rawls's *Theory of Justice*, where the veil of ignorance creates the scenario(s) needed, and an impressive political theory is built from questioning about principles of justice to be agreed to under the veil. So, big, integrative macro-TEs appear in some fundamental classical books of philosophy and are worth studying in more detail [11].

3. Structured pluralism: In defense of impure reason

How should we proceed in justifying intuitions? Insisting on one kind of justification, foundationalist as opposed to coherentist and so on, would guarantee purity and elegance, but would bypass a lot of ways we usually talk about our intuitions. It is better to combine justifications, and in this I would follow the lines of authors like B. Russell (1940) and in our time Ernest Sosa (2007). Properly functioning intuition-producing competences are epistemic virtues-capacities. In line with Sosa-style virtue epistemology (but without following him specifically on intuitions) let me propose a picture that features two stages: the natural, un-reflective use of a thinker 's capacities, and the reflective, meta-cognitive level of reasons she has to trust them. The reflection starts with a thinker asking a question about her belief. She is personally reflectively justified (virtuous) in her belief if she has valid reasons to trust its source. If the source is also de facto reliable, she is meta-cognitively justified (virtuous) tout court. On the meta-cognitive level all the deliverances from the first level capacities might come into play: I thus test the memory by appeal to deliverances of perception and testimony by appeal to deliverances of both.

Let us start with the first level of spontaneous intuitions. Some of their justification is doubtlessly a priori. For instance, elementary logical moves and intuitions are accompanied by luminous understanding, involving insight into the (necessary) soundness of these moves. We accept this as a source of a priori justification, but insist on an account of the reliability of such an understanding. While admitting obviousness and compellingness as a priori prima facie justifiers of spontaneous intuitional beliefs, we can point to some candidate sources of a posteriori justification of the same beliefs, at the immediate, spontaneous level. In typical episodes of eliciting intuitions in TEs, one can separate the contribution of general empirical knowledge from domain-specific (mathematical, moral, and probably epistemological normative, etc.) contribution, which might have an at least prima facie a priori justification. We propose that the resulting intuitional judgments have a structured dual-nature justification. Since justification that is to a large extent affected by aposteriority traditionally counts as being a posteriori, their epistemic status is structured a posteriori.

Armchair beliefs have various origins that tie them to broadly empirical evidence. No wonder, since many intuition-contents seem to be true about physical reality: the mathematical ones apply to collections of things and to interactions in nature, conceptual ones seem to apply across the board. Even if I acknowledge the fallibility of intuition(s), the resulting score is still spectacularly high in favor

[11] For a longer story see Miscevic, in print.

of largely correct intuitions. Kant famously speaks about the “objective validity” of such cognitions, and wonders how the beliefs concerned with items in the world, and which seem not to derive from induction, can be so spectacularly valid in relation to the worldly items. Let me call this claim “validity claim” and distinguish three aspects of “validity”: first, actual truth in application to worldly items (e.g. arithmetic applied to apples); second, actual approximate truth in application (e.g. Euclidean geometry combined with classical mechanics, conjectures about crucial properties of kinds); third, necessary truth (i.e. truth in "all possible worlds"). The first two are straightforwardly testable, and it is from this point that the philosophical puzzle arises.

The empirical origin of correct concepts might yield deep aposteriority, compatible with merely superficial apriority: one can decide not to ask about empirical origin, and thus have apriority by stipulation, but this would be a vanilla apriority, more verbal than real. Assume, with conceptualists, that concepts play an important role in steering our intuitions.Further, consider empirical concepts and concept analyzing, or the analytic propositions they generate, for example, “Whales are animals,” or “Whales are material objects”; to indicate that they are analytic in WHALE I can write “a-Whales are animals”. Such propositions have undoubtedly empirical equivalents which have a posteriori justification; these we can write as “e-Whales are animals”. Now, the justification of “a-Whales are animals” and similar analytic propositions usually proceeds by appeal to the corresponding empirical propositions, in our case “e-Whales are animals” (“It has been scientifically confirmed beyond doubt”, etc.), and never by merely pointing out that “aWhales are animals” analyzes the concept WHALE it is analytic in.

The practice of such justification implies that “a-Whales are animals” inherits its justification from the corresponding “e-Whales are animals”. Therefore, the justification of “a-Whales are animals” and similar propositions is twofold: they can be superficially justified (virtuous) by the appeal to the concept they are analytic in, and they are normally more deeply justified (virtuous) by the justification of their empirical counterpart, which is a posteriori.

Let us summarize the argument pointing out that armchair beliefs have various origins that tie them to empirical evidence, in a general sense, and in particular:

> 1D. Many conceptual beliefs derived from (analysis of) empirical concepts (“e-analytic beliefs” for short) concern propositions (c-propositions) which have undoubtedly empirical equivalents (e-propositions) which have a posteriori justification.
>
> 2D. Justification of such c-propositions usually proceeds by appeal to the corresponding e-propositions, and not by merely pointing out that the c-proposition analyzes the concept it is analytic in.
>
> 3D. The practice of such justification implies that c-propositions inherit their justification from corresponding e-propositions. Therefore
>
> 4D. The justification of such c-propositions is twofold: they can be superficially justified by the appeal to the concept they are analytic in, and they are normally more deeply justified by the justification of their empirical counterpart, which is a posteriori.

On a more speculative side, I also argue that innate, bona fide a priori beliefs might have distant empirical origin. They might be derived from innate (re-)sources, most probably innate mechanisms-programs that have in turn developed from an evolutionary history of trial-and-error, so that their reliability derives from an empirical origin. Empirical origin, even such a distant one, entails a posteriori justification. This justification would be a deep one, compatible with superficial prima facie a priori justification. So, here is a more hypothetical proposal (where “H” stands for “hypothetical”):

> 1H. Simple arithmetical concepts and beliefs, as well as dispositions (and perhaps concepts and beliefs) concerning elementary logic and basic modal reasoning might be derived from innate (re-)sources, most probably innate mechanisms-programs. This view is reasonably supported by psychological and biological research.
>
> 2H. Such innate (re-)sources might have developed from an evolutionary history of trial-and-error.
>
> 3H. If 2H holds, then the reliability of the

(re-)sources might derive from an empirical origin.

4H. Empirical origin, even such a distant one, entails some a posteriori justification. This justification would be a deep one, compatible with superficial prima facie a priori justification. Therefore

5H. The justification of elementary arithmetical, logical and modal beliefs, as well as basic patterns of elementary logical and modal reasoning might be deeply a posteriori.

Let us pass to the second level, the one of metacognitive justification: it is the interplay of (the deliverances of) all capacities that indicates whether a particular capacity, in this case intuition, is reliable. Reflective justification is needed for several reasons: we don't want to rest satisfied with the blind trust in our faculties (and all too easy knowledge thus obtainable), reflection is a part of our normal intuitional thinking, and the need for reflection arises both on internalist and externalist accounts of first-level spontaneous justification. At the reflective level, the most popular and obvious source of apriority is the narrow reflective equilibrium. The sources of aposteriority have to do with (achieving) wide reflective equilibrium. We shall list three candidate sources, and, alas all-too briefly, sketch some reasons why they are indeed respectable.

The first concerns the requirement of total evidence and the opportunity to exploit empirical evidence for many of our intuitions. Reflective justification typically mobilizes and indeed should mobilize capacities distinct from the original capacity in order to enlarge the circle of justification and thus avoid viciousness. In the case of armchair beliefs, reflective justification should revert to empirical considerations testifying to the reliability of intuition and reasoning. Therefore, it will typically combine, in an articulated way, a posteriori elements contributing to thinker's reflective trust in her armchair capacities. On the second level of general coherence justification is partly a posteriori, involving negative and positive support from total empirical evidence.

The support yielding positive coherence is holistic, i.e. partly empirical, and of course, the negative coherence, i.e. absence of undermining, is also holistic. We have argued that reflective justification rightly mobilizes capacities distinct from the original capacity that has produced the belief-candidate for being justified, in order to assess the reliability of the original capacity. It has to go beyond justifiers that are of the same-kind ("homogenous") as first-level immediate ones, in order to enlarge the circle of justification (and thus avoid viciousness), and is, therefore, holistic and coherentist. Reflective justification of armchair beliefs, presumably produced by intuition and some reasoning, should revert to empirical considerations testifying to the reliability of intuition and reasoning. Therefore, it typically combines, in an articulated way, a posteriori elements contributing to a thinker's reflective trust in her armchair capacities. In brief:

1R Pieces of sophisticated belief of thoughtful researchers are typically reflectively justified, in addition to being immediately, first-level justified.

2R Reflective justification typically mobilizes capacities distinct from the original capacity that has produced the belief-candidate for being justified, in order to assess the reliability of the original capacity. It has to go beyond justifiers that are of the same-kind ("homogenous") as first-level immediate ones, in order to enlarge the circle of justification (and thus avoid viciousness), and is, therefore, holistic and coherentist.

3R Reflective justification of armchair beliefs, presumably produced by intuition and some reasoning, should revert to empirical considerations testifying to the reliability of intuition and reasoning. Therefore,

4R. Reflective justification of armchair beliefs typically combines, in an articulated way, a posteriori elements contributing to a thinker's reflective trust in her armchair capacities.

All this helps make the account proposed into a structured aposteriorist one, since on the reflective level it stresses the importance of a posteriori justification, and the insufficiency of a merely a priori one. The holism of reflective justification and its a posteriori component show their bite in two particular areas. First, there are explanation-based reasons against aprioristic purity of justification. Explanation is needed in order to dispel the air of mystery that has been surrounding intuitional knowledge since

Plato. Reflective assessment of armchair beliefs would be incomplete in total absence of explanation of their being held and their reliability. Explanation of their being held and their reliability is a causal explanation or is quite similar to it, e.g. explanation by determination. Therefore, it normally has essential empirical explanatory components, i.e. an important a posteriori component, with a clearly defined role. Of course, one should argue that causal explanation of our reason- and intuition-based beliefs is compatible with their full rational justifiedness.[12] To summarize:

1E. The reliability of armchair beliefs is prima facie puzzling.

2E. Reflective assessment of armchair beliefs is therefore incomplete in total absence of an explanation of their being held and their reliability (by analogy with perceptual beliefs).

3E. The explanation in 2 has to be to some extent causal or causal-like.

4E. Barring a priori theological grounding, any such explanation will involve appeal to an empirically believed assumption.

5E. A priori theological grounding is very dubious. Therefore,

6E. The explanation of being held and reliability will have essential empirical explanatory components. Therefore,

7E. Reflective justification of armchair belief will have essential empirical components. It will have an important a posteriori component, with a clearly defined role.

The final reason for aposteriority has to do with unavoidability and global indispensability of central armchair beliefs and inferential practices for all our cognitive efforts. It starts by agreeing with prominent apriorists about their attempt to justify such beliefs either from naturalistic computationalist considerations of unavoidability (inevitability) (Horwich) or from constitutiveness (Boghossian) or from a global indispensability argument (C. Wright), and then proceeds to argue that unavoidable and indispensable tools provide entitlement/justification for projects if those projects are themselves meaningful. However, we are justified to think that our most general cognitive projects are meaningful, and justified partly on the basis of their up to date success, and this basis is a posteriori. Therefore, the whole reflective justification from compellingness and unavoidability is a posteriori. In brief:

1I. Indispensability of logic and elementary mathematical understanding for any kind of cognitive project, call it global indispensability, is an important reflective justifier of logical and mathematical beliefs and inferential propensities, perhaps the most important one.

2I. Global indispensability can justify the target beliefs and propensities, only if our global cognitive project is a meaningful one, with some chances to succeed.

3I. The issue of the success of our global cognitive project is to a large extent an empirical matter; I am justified in being optimistic about it on the ground of already achieved empirical and empirically detectable success.

4I. The issue of reflective justification of logical and elementary mathematical beliefs and inferential propensities is to be decided to a large extent on the basis of global successfulness of our cognitive effort, which is largely an a posteriori matter. Therefore

5I. Logic and elementary mathematical understanding are reflectively justified a posteriori to a significant degree.

[12] We did it in (2004a) against the anti-naturalist, anti-explanationist line (from Kant to T. Nagel, J. Lear, J.Pust and others) which agrees that we have intuitional or reason-based knowledge and points out that rational certainty and justifiedness are essential for such knowledge. This paper then argues that causal explanation shows that these pieces of knowledge cannot have these features; therefore, causal explanation undermines our rational knowledge. Moreover, since causal explanation depends on a lot of rational knowledge, it undermines itself by undermining it. One can either explain intuitions or justify them, but not both. We argued against them that explanation of intuitions does not eliminate their essential features. We briefly sketched a justificational structure that should be acceptable to both parties in the dispute, and shows that giving a causal explanation of beliefs does not collide with justifying them.

In short the justification of our intuitional armchair beliefs is plural and structured, with a priori and a posteriori elements combined in a complex way. It seems thus that the a priori/a posteriori distinction is useful and to the point. What is needed is refinement and respect for structure, not rejection. Alvin Goldman is right to point to the complexity of matters: Warrant is just a complex and multi-dimensional affair, he writes (1999:28). But if it is complex and multi-dimensional, then the a priori/a posteriori distinction should be refined along all the dimensions available, not rejected.[13]

What then is the final verdict? Traditionally, the following principle was held sacrosanct: If justification contains a posteriori elements, then it is ultimately a posteriori. So, if it is mixed and contains one important a posteriori element, it is "infected" by it, and is ultimately a posteriori. For example, the traditional syllogism used to establish that Socrates is mortal contains important a priori elements, ingeniously and famously detected by Aristotle. But its two premises are a posteriori, so the conclusion is itself a posteriori as well. I propose to abide by this principle, and this explains the title of the paper: since reflective justification is shot through with a posteriori elements, it is ultimately a posteriori. Those who do not accept the traditional principle, and do not care for purity of a priori justification, might go a different way, and see the reflective justification proposed as being a simply structured justification, partly a priori and partly a posteriori. The difference between them and me will be mostly verbal-rhetorical, and I am not very much opposed to their choice. Finally, a caveat. Most of what we have tried to show has only a conditional value: if you accept the need for reflective justification, it might persuade you. The staunch opponent of reflective justification will, of course, remain unmoved. It would be a useful exercise to go through the alternatives that are left to them, and try to find out which of our considerations might still apply in the purely first-order setting. But this has to be left for another occasion.

4. Conclusion

The sketched Moderate-Voice-of-Competence view tries to steer a middle course between conceptualist apriorism on the one hand, and its ordinarist contrary on the other. We sketch a version of modest intuitionism according to which intuitions are voices of competence(s). As against full-scale ordinarism, which sees armchair thinking as a holistic matter, we stress particular competencies: logical, linguistic, arithmetical, geometrical, moral. We agree with apriorists about the voice-of-competence line, but disagree about their exclusivity: for them the one and only relevant competence is the conceptual one. This is linked to our acceptance of scenario-based thought experiments versus purely inference-based pictures. We agree with ordinarists that intuitions are concerned with, and epistemically ultimately answerable to items in their domains: geometrical ones to triangles and squares, arithmetical ones to numbers or number-properties. This is referentialism as opposed to narrow conceptualism that takes the realm of sense, not reference, as the crucial instance to which intuitions are epistemically answerable. We defend traditional explanationism against fashionable quietism(s).

On the normative side, regarding the contrast of aposteriorism and apriorism I argue that there is very little or next to nothing in our knowledge that is purely a priori. Most of it, including such star items as mathematics and conceptual knowledge, admits of or even requires a mixed justification. Again, this MoVoC proposal takes a middle way between two prominent contemporary lines of thought concerning the normative status of intuitional beliefs. The first is rationalist-aprioristic, characterized by stressing the specific nature of armchair intuitions, the (presumably) non-holistic nature of their origin and justification, which seems to guarantee them a priori status, and, most importantly, their (alleged) grounding in human conceptual abilities. The opposite ordinarist line denies the specific nature of intuitions, (rightly) divorces intuitions from purely conceptual considerations but (wrongly) insists purely on holistic non-a priori justification (either a posteriori or of an un-

[13] Let me put MoVoC proposal on a wider map:

		A PRIORI	A POSTERIORI	MIXED-STRUCTURED
INTERNALIST	FOUNDATIONALIST	Chisholm Brown	Mill Kitcher -?	
	COHERENTIST	(Kant?) Bonjour	Quine	
EXTERNALIST	RELIABILIST	Goldman		
	VIRTUE EPISTEMOL.	Greco	—	
COMBINED = 2 LEVEL		Russell Sosa Alston?		THE PRESENT MoVoC PROPOSAL

specified kind). We think that it is the task of the philosopher to analyze and find structure, and that intuitional justification is a highly structured one. Properly functioning intuition-producing competences are epistemic virtues-capacities with richly structured justification, crucially involving some a posteriori elements.

Let me conclude with apologies for brevity and dogmatism: if you, my reader, don't find the program plausible, please take it literally as a program: a list of views for which the proponent would have to argue. And we shall probably agree that arguing is not going to be easy.

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SPECIES ONTOLOGY IN LIGHT OF THE DEBATE ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF LAWS IN BIOLOGY

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Abstract:
In this paper I explore how the discussion about the existence of laws in biology, more specifically laws about species taxa, bears on the issue of whether species are kinds or individuals. One of the main arguments offered in favor of the view that species are individuals is that it explains the lack of laws about species taxa, since laws cannot refer to individuals. My aim in this paper is to question the premise that there are no laws about species taxa and consequently to show that the proposed argument fails. I will argue that even if there are no strict scientific laws about species taxa, still, scientifically interesting, law-like generalizations are made which are used for explaining phenomena and predicting properties of species members. The existence of these law-like generalizations, in turn, suggests that species are, at least prima facie, best conceived of as kinds.

Key words: ontology, laws in biology, species, kinds of individuals.

1. Introduction

There are two main opposed views in the discussion about the ontological status of species in biology: the view that species are individuals and the view that species are natural kinds.[1] One of the main arguments that the proponents of the species-as-individuals view (Ghiselin 1974, 1997, Hull 1976, 1978) offered against the species-as-kinds view is that from the fact that there are no laws about species follows that species are best conceived of as individuals (Hull 1978, 353). In this paper I will focus on Hull's line of argumentation.

Hull claims that the reason for distinguishing individuals as historic entities from genuine classes (i.e. kinds) is the role that each of them plays in science with respect to the traditional analysis of scientific laws:

> Scientific laws are supposed to be spatiotemporally unrestricted generalizations. No uneliminable reference can be made in a genuine law of nature to a spatiotemporally individuated entity (1978, 337).

Hull reasons in the following way: species are spatiotemporally restricted entities, so scientific laws cannot refer to them. In light of this fact it makes much more sense that species are individuals rather than kinds since kinds figure in scientific laws. In other words, since statements that refer to species taxa are not scientific laws, species are not classes, or in Hull's words, they are at least not very important classes. Rather, they are spatiotemporally localized individuals and statements that refer to species are singular statements, and singular statements cannot be laws of nature (Hull 1977, 186).

It is clear that Hull endorses a strict, logical empiricist account of laws according to which scientific laws must be universal, exceptionless and spatiotemporally unrestricted. However, there is no consensus that this is the correct characterization of laws since it seems too demanding even for sciences like physics. In my opinion, Hull unjustifiably presupposes too strict of a view of biological laws from which he then draws conclusions about the nature of species taxa. From such a strict characterization of

[1] It is important to notice that the term species in this paper will refer to species taxa, unless specified otherwise. Species taxa are particular species, i.e. groups of organisms like *Canis familiaris* or *Pinus palustris.* On the other hand, species category is the term that is supposed to refer to all species taxa, in the sense that species category exists if there is something common that all species taxa share and that allows us to have a definition of the species category.

scientific laws it follows that there aren't any laws in biology.

For this reason, I will address the debate about the existence of laws in biology that started with Smart's book *Philosophy and Scientific Realism* (1963) where he argued that there are no laws in biology. This served as a trigger for a whole series of arguments that, on the contrary, tried to establish the existence of laws in biology by weakening the requirements for something to be a law. The discussion about the existence of laws in biology emphasized a distinction that is important for this paper and that was introduced already by Smart (1963): namely, the distinction between laws in the strict sense and empirical generalizations. The authors defending the view that there are biological laws generally tried to show that empirical generalizations in biology are scientifically interesting and law-like in the sense that they play a role that is usually attributed to scientific laws (Lange 1995; Brandon 1996; Waters 1998; Mitchell 2000).

I find this approach convincing because it focuses on epistemological issues about how scientists actually explain phenomena and make inferences about species rather than specifying a very strict set of criteria for something to be a law even if that set of criteria is not applicable in practice. In other words, what is the point of talking about laws and kinds in biology if we have defined them so strictly that nothing can fall under that definition? For that reason, a pragmatic account of laws seems like a promising alternative, as described by Mitchell (2000). A pragmatic account defines as laws those generalizations that play the role of laws in science: generalizations that allow us to make predictions, explanations and successful interventions.

My aim is to show that the existence of law-like empirical generalizations about species suggests that species are better conceived of as kinds rather than individuals. In my opinion, Hull presupposes a too strict account of laws, and from this unjustifiably draws the conclusion that species must be individuals, ignoring the fact that there could be law-like generalizations that refer to species and that there is no reason to assume that law-like generalizations are standardly made about individuals.

Whether we decide to call these generalizations laws or not does not seem to make much difference, what is important for me to show is that the existence of scientifically interesting empirical generalizations about species leads us more naturally to the conclusion that species are kinds, rather than individuals. Of course, one might argue that scientifically interesting generalizations are equally made about individuals. But, if there are such generalizations, they require that the individuals in question exhibit some sort of homogeneity that allows for the making of these generalizations. For instance, in order to be able to make generalizations about some individual, this individual must possess some stable and relatively homogenous properties that serve as a basis for making such generalizations. However, this is not something that the proponents of the view that species are individuals would accept since the supposed lack of homogeneity (similarity among species members and stability of the properties they possess) was one of the main motivations for introducing that view.

Finally, even if someone disagrees that generalizations are standardly made about kinds or classes rather than individuals, it still follows that Hull's argument does not support the intended conclusion since it does not show why we should prefer the species-as-individuals over the species-as-kinds view.

In what follows, I will address the discussion about the existence of laws in biology, starting with Smart (1963) and Beatty's (1995) arguments that purport to show that there are no laws in biology. Their view on laws is relevant for this paper since they offer a strict definition of laws that requires them to be universal and exceptionless. Next, I will present some responses to the arguments against the existence of laws in biology that propose a less strict view on scientific laws. The last part of the paper aims to show that Hull's argument for the species-as-individuals view rests on the assumption that either there are strict, universal, exceptionless laws about species (and in biology in general), or there aren't any scientifically interesting generalizations about them at all. That is why he claims that the fact that there are no laws about species is best explained by assuming that species are individuals. I believe that this assumption is unfounded: species are scientifically interesting classes and law-like generalizations are made about them. If this is correct then it makes much more sense that species are kinds since individuals do not usually figure in scientifically interesting generalizations.

2. Are there laws in biology?

The discussion about the existence of laws in biology started with Smart's book *Philosophy and Scientific Realism* where he argues that there are no scientific laws in biology. Smart endorses a logical empiricist account of laws (e.g. see Reichenbach 1947; Hempel 1965; Carnap 1966) according to which fundamental laws cannot contain local predicates, i.e. predicates that refer to particular times, places and objects. Smart examines the generalization: "albinotic mice always breed true". If we define mice by their place in the evolutionary tree then the term mice implicitly refers to our particular planet – the Earth. In that case the generalization "albinotic mice always breed true" is not a law of nature because it refers to a particular time and place. On the other hand, if we define mice without reference to a particular evolutionary tree by specifying a set of necessary and sufficient properties A1, A2, …, An, then this law is very likely false because it is probable that there is a species with the same properties on some distant planet to which this law does not apply. It is important to notice that Smart does not just think that there cannot be laws in biology concerning species; he thinks that there are no laws in biology. He offers an analogous example of cell division: if we define 'cell' in relation to terrestrial organisms then we do not have a strict law about cells, and if we define it without reference to the planet Earth then any generalization about cells will very likely be false.

Smart makes a distinction between scientific laws in the strict sense and empirical generalizations (1963, 54). In biology there are only generalizations and Smart describes these generalizations by drawing an analogy with laws of engineering. He thinks that there is a similarity in the logical structure of explanations of biology and engineering. While the physicist (and to some extent the chemist) talks about relatively simple and homogenous things, biology and engineering deal with very complicated and peculiar things such as organisms, wireless receivers or radio sets. "Descriptive biology consists in generalisations of natural history, not laws in the strict sense. So while, roughly speaking, radio-engineering is physics plus wiring diagrams, biology is physics and chemistry plus natural history." (1963, 57) Nevertheless, Smart does not think that there is a sharp division between objects of physical sciences and objects of biological sciences; rather there is a non-sharp division that refers to the complexity of structure. This division is reflected in the methodology of these two sciences: physics is interested in laws while biology is interested in the natural history of different structures and in the explanation of the behavior of the parts of the structure.

Hull (1978) shares Smart's view on laws in the strict sense but does not seem to share his view on biological generalizations. Hull (1978, 337) claims that biological generalizations are accidentally true and that even if these generalizations refer to classes, they are scientifically uninteresting classes. While Smart, with his engineering analogy seems to appreciate the usefulness and productiveness of biological generalizations Hull thinks that these generalizations are not useful and are scientifically uninteresting. Also, Hull argues that the fact that biological generalizations refer to scientifically uninteresting classes is the reason why these generalizations are not laws, and Smart thinks that the complexity of the structures that these generalizations refer to is responsible for the fact that they cannot be laws.

However, Hull (1974) does not think that there aren't any laws in biology. Following Ruse (1973) he argues that Smart's argument does not affect the status of biological laws because they do not refer to particular species, rather they refer to things such as recessive genes, epistatic genes, geographically isolated populations, genetic equilibrium, etc. Nevertheless, it seems that the only way to avoid Smart's objection that biological generalizations cannot be true for the entire universe is by defining the latter terms by strictly invoking their physical properties and by calling 'laws' only the generalizations that arise from those physical pro_perties. In this way, anything in the universe with the same physical properties will act in accordance with those laws. But this leads us back to Smart's conclusion that there are no distinctively biological laws because we would reduce them to the laws of physics.

John H. Beatty (1995) offered a widely discussed argument against the possibility of laws in biology that is based on the fact that evolutionary outcomes are contingent. Beatty invokes Gould's (1989) metaphor of evolution being like a videotape, which if it were re-wound and played over again, would always have a different ending. Gould's metaphor emphasizes the contingency of evolutionary outcomes. Beatty argues that all distinctively biological generalizations describe evolutionarily contingent states of nature, which in turn means that there are no biological laws because laws should not be only contingently true. He calls this view the evolutionary contingency thesis:

All generalizations about the living world:

a) are just mathematical, physical or chemical generalizations (or deductive consequences of mathematical, physical or chemical generalizations plus initial conditions),

or,

b) are distinctively biological, in which case they describe contingent outcomes of evolution (Beatty 1995, 46).

Laws of nature should express physically necessary generalizations, while generalizations in biology concern regularities that are only contingent. Beatty offers an example of Mendel's first law according to which diploid sexual organisms form haploid gametes by a 50/50 meiotic division. Beatty thinks that this is not a law because this sort of meiotic division is a contingent outcome of evolutionary processes – it may be true, but there is nothing in nature that necessitates its truth. This means that the conditions that led to evolutionary dominance of some trait can change and along with them the dominance of that trait. Mutation and natural selection are the sources of this contingency.

Many authors agree that distinctively biological generalizations describe contingent states of nature, but still argue that we can treat them as scientific laws in the weaker sense. More importantly, from the fact that biological generalizations describe contingent states of nature does not automatically follow that these generalizations are accidentally true (which is Hull's claim). Authors that defend a weaker account of scientific laws, such as Mitchell (2000), argue that there is no strict distinction between universal exceptionless generalizations and accidentally true generalizations; rather there is a difference in the degree of contingency of these generalizations. Mitchell's view and some other arguments in favor of a weaker account of laws will be presented in the next section.

3. Weakening the requirements for scientific laws

Smart's and Beatty's claim that there are no laws in biology prompted two kinds of reactions by authors who think that there are laws in biology. These reactions are characterized by a weakening of the requirements for something to be a law. For instance, Elliot Sober (1997)[2] argued that scientific laws need not be only empirical but can also be a priori and that evolutionary biology is governed exactly by models that can be known to be true a priori. Since it is clear that laws or generalizations about species cannot be known to be true a priori, this paper will focus on views that weaken the requirements that laws must be universal, necessary and exceptionless. This view on scientific laws was proposed by Lange (1995), Mitchell (2000), Brandon (1996)[3] and Waters (1998)[4].

In response to Smart's claim that scientific laws cannot contain local predicates, Lange argues that even laws in physical sciences include local predicates[5] (i.e. references to particular times and places). According to Lange, no good argument has been offered to show that local predicates cannot figure in statements of natural law. To show that our concept of scientific law does not imply universality; he examines Tooley's (1977) imaginary example of a garden in which all fruits must be apples: if we bring oranges to the garden, they turn into elephants, if bananas are brought into the garden they become apples, while pears cannot even be brought into the garden because some irresistible force prevents that from happening. From this he concludes: "There seems to be a logically possible world governed by a law statement that ineliminably includes a local predicate applying only to this garden" (Lange 1995, 434).

In a similar vein, Mitchell (2000) argues that "dichotomous oppositions like "law vs. accident" and "necessity vs. contingency produce an impoverished conceptual framework that obscures much interesting variation in both the types of causal structures studied by the sciences and the types of representation used by the scientists" (2000, 243). According to Mitchell, in actual scientific practice, we rarely find instances of laws that fit the strict, normativist picture proposed by logical empiricists. So, if the function of laws is to predict and explain phe-

[2] Later Elgin (2007) offered a similar reply to Beatty's view that there are no laws in biology.

[3] It is not clear whether it is justified to put Brandon (1996) on this list since he claims that we should keep the strict, logical empiricist definition of laws, while also acknowledging that not only laws but also contingent empirical generalizations have explanatory power. The motivation for not calling these generalizations laws is to emphasize the distinction between logical and mathematical truths from generalizations whose truth depends on some contingencies in the evolution of life.

[4] Waters, similarly as Brandon, does not use the term laws but talks about causal regularities.

[5] Lange doubts that there is any coherent concept of of what a "local" predicate is, but argues that even if we take the existence of local predicates for granted, it still seems unconvincing that scientific laws should not make reference to local predicates since even laws in physics refer to them.

nomena and to allow us to successfully intervene in the world, and there are not many instances of (strict) laws in science (actually it seems that there are none in biology) then it is not clear how we manage to explain, predict and relatively successfully intervene in the world. Mitchell's answer to this worry is that we need to reinterpret what it means to be a law and adopt a less strict, pragmatic view of laws.

Mitchell makes a convincing case in favor of the claim that all scientific laws (or laws of nature) are contingent, rather than necessary as the strict view of laws requires. Other than the fact that they are logically contingent, they are also contingent in the sense that they depend on whether some other conditions obtain. She offers the example of Galileo's law (2000, 251) of free fall that depends on the fact that the core of the Earth has a specific mass. That the Earth is configured in that way is something that is the result of the origin of the universe and the creation of stars and planets. It seems that we can say the similar thing for all scientific laws: that they are conditional upon some events in the creation of the universe.

However, from this it does not follow that there is no difference between laws of physics and laws of biology. The difference between two different kinds of generalizations is the difference in the degree of contingency. According to Mitchell, there is no dichotomous opposition between accidental truths and laws; it is more plausible to talk about a continuum with accidental generalizations at one end, and contingent, universal and true ideal laws on the other. The difference in degree comes down to the difference in the stability of conditions upon which the truths of these regularities depend: at the end of the continuum are the regularities whose conditions are stable over all space and time.

The pragmatic strategy that Mitchell proposes stresses the importance of the use of scientific laws: "How do they function to allow us to make predictions, explanations and successful interventions?" (2000, 259). The answer is in a multidimensional framework for representing different types of generalizations made in science that has two types of parameters: ontological and representational. The ontological parameters include the continuum of stability of conditions upon which causal relations depend and the continuum of strength that refers to the difference in strength between deterministic and probabilistic laws. The representational parameters include the degree of abstraction, simplicity and cognitive manageability.

I do not wish to enter into the details of Mitchell's pragmatic account of laws. I understand that it might be objected that Mitchell's account is circular in the sense that it does not offer a strict definition of laws but rather says that everything that plays the role of law (or that we could call a law) actually is a law. What is important for this paper is that it seems that the traditional, normativist account of laws is too strict and as such has virtually no instances. From this we can conclude that a less strict account of scientific laws ought to be accepted. Mitchell's account, even if it has its problems, is favorable because it stresses the importance of scientific practice. In my opinion, if some scientific generalizations are explanatory and allow us to make predictions about certain classes of objects, then we can treat them as law-like statements. From this it follows that there are law-like generalizations about species taxa.

The view that there are laws about particular species taxa has already been proposed by Lange (1995) who argues that statements of the form "The S is T" (where S refers to a particular species and T refers to some property of that species) are biological laws. They specify a default assumption about a species, i.e. from the fact that some organism belongs to a particular species we are justified to conclude that it has a property T if we do not have some further information suggesting otherwise.

> Whether 'The S is T' is sufficiently reliable to be true depends upon how reliable it is-for example, on how readily available "information to the contrary" is when an S is not T-and on how tolerant of error we can afford to be when we have the relevant purposes (Lange 1995, 440).

Lange's view is in accordance with the views of authors who defend the claim that species are not individuals but kinds, more specifically Homeostatic Property Cluster kinds. In the next section I will briefly present their views on species and laws about species and try to show that they present convincing arguments that make Hull's claim about the lack of laws about species unconvincing.

4. Species as natural kinds that figure in biological generalizations

Homeostatic Property Cluster theory is, in my opinion, the most prominent theory describing species as natural kinds. According to this theory species are natural kinds, but on a less strict definition of natural kinds. Members of the kind do not need to possess an unchanging essence; it is enough that they share a cluster of similar properties. The cluster of stable regularities is the result of "homeostatic causal mechanisms" such as common developmental programs, common selection regimes, interbreeding, etc.

Proponents of the view that species are HPC kinds argue that species can figure at least in scientific *generalizations* in biology. For instance, Richard Boyd (1999), author of the view that species are Homeostatic Property Cluster kinds, disagrees with the view that there are no laws and no natural kinds in biology. He does not think that natural kinds must figure in laws that are exceptionless and universal; rather he thinks that natural kinds should reflect successful inductive and explanatory inferences. Theory of natural kinds should explain how we identify causally sustained regularities and offer accurate causal explanations of these regularities. These regularities need not be exceptionless or universal in order to have successful explanations and generalizations about them.

Similarly, Paul Griffiths (1999) emphasizes that generalizations in biology, not being exceptionless and universal, still have counterfactual force. This is central to the idea of the law of nature because it explains the difference between laws and mere coincidences. Griffiths explains that a natural kind is "a category about which there are law-like, counterfactual supporting generalizations" (1999, 216). That is why induction can be used to investigate natural kinds – properties connected to the kind are not accidental; rather they are connected to it in a law-like way. Griffiths offers a criterion for judging a minimal *naturalness* of a kind: "a kind is (minimally) natural if it is possible to make better than chance predictions about the properties of its instances" (1999, 216). For instance, we can take a very simple generalization about the mane, which is one of the most distinctive characteristics of the species *Panthera leo:* its darkness indicates nutrition and testosterone production and influences both female choice and male-male competition. More specifically, sexual selection favors males with the densest and darkest mane and its length signals fighting success (West and Packer 2002). From these generalizations about the kind *Panthera leo* we can make better than chance predictions about future instances of this kind: if an organism that belongs to this species has a long, dark and dense mane it will (with a better than chance probability) produce more offspring and have a greater fighting success then an organism from the same species with a lighter and smaller mane.

Also, the values of law-like categories can be estimated with the help of two variables: scope and force. Scope measures the size of the domain of the generalizations and force measures the reliability of predictions made by the generalization. Species category, according to Griffiths, should reliably collect morphological, physiological, and behavioral properties. It should be possible to investigate these properties by studying a few members of the species and then from this we can explain the fact that an individual has certain properties by citing its species (Griffiths 1999, 215).

I agree with Lange, Boyd and Griffiths that there are law-like generalizations about species. In my opinion, generalizations about species are law-like if:

1) They support explanations – for instance, if we know what the characteristic properties of species members are and what causes these features and how they developed, then we can explain the behavior of the organisms belonging to the species. I endorse a causal mechanical model of scientific explanation but I do not wish to enter into details of that account in this paper for the sake of brevity.

2) They allow us to make, in Griffiths' terms, better than chance predictions about their future instances.

We can examine a statement that can be considered a law-like generalization about species: "Members of the species *A. mellifera* communicate with their nest members about the location of sources of food and water by means of round dance and waggle dance language, using gravity or celestial cues as a reference."[6] I think that this can be considered as a law-like statement about this species because it is grounded in a regularity found in nature among members of the species A. mellifera; we can predict that the future members of this species will also standardly exhibit the same behavior, and, when we encounter a member of this species, we have an explanation for why it produces particular pattern of flight and how it manages to find food and get back to its housing location.

[6] For additional information see: Fred C. Dyer (2002).

Before continuing to the last part of the paper I would like to address a possible objection to my claim that there are law-like generalizations about species. Waters (1998) argues that there are causal regularities identified by biologists that have the features that are traditionally attributed to scientific law. However, he argues that biologists employ two types of generalizations: “causal regularities exhibited by particular kinds of biological entities” and generalizations that “identify how these entities are distributed in the biological world” (1998, 5). According to Waters, only causal regularities and not generalizations about historical distributions exhibit the features of scientific laws. Someone might argue that generalizations about species belong to the generalizations about historical distributions and, as such, do not exhibit law-like features. In my opinion, we cannot draw a line that will strictly separate generalizations about historical distributions from generalizations about causal regularities. In the example of species, it seems that we have a situation where an historical distribution of traits to the species members directly affects what causal regularities species members’ exhibit. Waters stresses that generalizations about causal regularities are made on the basis of the fact that members of the kind about which generalizations are made share a common internal make-up. Species members, at least to a certain degree, share this common internal make-up, which is a consequence of the historical distribution of traits, so historical distributions are the basis for causal regularities, and therefore the basis for making generalizations about causal regularities.

6. Contingent regularities as a basis for generalizations about species

Even Beatty (1995), who argues against the possibility of laws in biology, emphasizes that evolutionary processes produce contingent generalities. So, it seems that there is a consensus that there are regularities in nature that are the result of evolution, and that on the basis of those regularities generalizations can be made and are in fact made. Lange emphasizes the fact that generalizations of the form “The S is T” are standardly found in modern evolutionary biology textbooks in order to show that these sorts of generalizations are not some old-fashioned way of doing biology characteristic of pre-Darwinian naturalists, but something that is still widely used and accepted.

Lange (1995) and other authors feel the need to show that biologists do talk in terms of traits that are characteristic or typical for species members and that there are generalizations of the form “The S is T”. This is because Ernst Mayr (1959), in his famous distinction between typological and population thinking, claimed that modern, post-Darwinian evolutionary biology “stresses the uniqueness of everything in the organic world” (1959, 2) and that no two individuals are alike, so that all organisms and organic phenomena can collectively be described only statistically. However, I think that Mayr’s account is exaggerated, as has already been shown by authors like Greene (1990). If all particular organisms really were unique in the sense that they are unparalleled or incomparable, this would imply that we could not have a science that deals with such particulars, since it is not clear how a science could deal with a bunch of unique individuals that do not have common characteristics. Secondly, we cannot study evolution just by focusing on particular individuals, since it is not individuals that evolve. In Greene’s (1990, 238) words “it is not particulars (individual organisms) that evolve, it is batches of them.”

The point that I want to make is that there are generalizations about species in biology and these generalizations are grounded in the fact that there are regularities in nature. Species members share common properties, even though not all species members share all common properties. Prima facie, it seems that the existence of law-like generalizations about species suggests that species are kinds (or classes), since generalizations are standardly made about kinds, not individuals. Presumably, there can also be laws about individuals. For instance, we can conceive of the electromagnetic field as a large, wide-spread individual, and still have laws and generalizations about it. However, the property of the electromagnetic field that allows us to make laws and generalizations about it is the fact that the electromagnetic field is homogenous, i.e. it exhibits the same properties everywhere it exists and we define it by these properties. This homogeneity of properties is exactly what the proponents of the view that species are individuals were aiming to avoid, that is why they used the particular organism as a paradigm individual, since different parts of an organism can have completely different properties. So, the property that would justify the claim that there are laws about individuals (homogeneity) is the main property that the proponents of the view that species are individuals deny to species.

Even if someone wishes to argue that scientific laws and law-like generalizations are equally applicable to both individuals and kinds, it still follows that Hull's argument fails, since it offers us no reason to prefer the view that species are individuals.

7. Conclusion

The central point of this paper is Hull's claim that from the fact that there are no laws about species it follows that species are best conceived of as individuals. This argument relies on the strict conception of laws being universal, exceptionless and empirical, but it is neutralized if one accepts a less strict view of laws as being scientifically interesting law-like generalizations. I have examined these two opposed views on biological laws and reached the conclusion that, whether we call them laws or not, law-like generalizations are being made about species in biology. If this conclusion is correct, it follows that it is more plausible to conceive of species as kinds rather than individuals, since generalizations are standardly made about kinds (classes), not individuals.

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WHAT IS MORE PUZZLING, REAL ESSENCES OR THE WORLD OF UNDIFFERENTIATED STUFF?

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Abstract:

Conventionalists about modality deny that the world has a modal structure. Metaphysical necessity is not a real feature of the world, but a linguistic necessity grounded in conventions governing our use of words. In this paper, I focus on Allan Sidelle's conventionalist account and especially on his claim that the idea of real necessity should be abandoned since it is puzzling. My strategy for the defense of the realist notion of modality is twofold. First, the ontology of undifferentiated stuff, which underlies his conventionalist account, is itself very puzzling and in need of further defense. Second, the alleged problems of the realist interpretation are based on an empiricist view of the world.

Key words: metaphysical modality, conventionalism, world as undifferentiated stuff, real necessity, real essence.

Realists and conventionalists both agree that there are true essential attributions and modal statements, but disagree over the ground of their truth. Realists believe that essentialist attributions are grounded in the objects themselves, in their essences, and that modal statements in general are grounded in the modal facts "out there" in the world. The realist picture of the world is that of a world with a modal structure, inhabited by individuated objects with real essences. Conventionalists see the world as entirely devoid of modality, and locate its source "in us," in our ways of speaking and thinking about the world and objects. Thus, the truth of modal statements is dependent on our adopting certain linguistic conventions. And, when we are conducting a modal inquiry, we are not discovering metaphysically deep facts about the objects investigated, but rather clarifying ways in which we speak and think, and trying to better understand our concepts and rules for speech and thought. In other words, the inquiry is not really about the world "out there," but about our language. Metaphysical necessity is ultimately linguistic or conceptual necessity, and metaphysical inquiry is ultimately a conceptual analysis.

In this paper, I will argue that conventionalists are not justified in their mistrust of real necessity and essence. Clearly, the phenomenon needs to be explained, but it does not deserve an outright rejection. In particular, I will consider Sidelle's proposal in *Necessity, Essence, and Individuation* (1989), which is the most elaborated conventionalist account, and argue that the conception of the world that seems to follow from his own account – the world of undifferentiated stuff devoid of modal properties and identity conditions – is itself very puzzling and in need of explanation. Thus, if puzzlement is taken as a criterion, he is hardly in a position to claim that his view trumps the realist one.

First of all, conventionalists must provide a satisfactory explanation of necessity *a posteriori*, which suggests that modality should be interpreted realistically. Namely, the necessary *a posteriori* truths are discovered by empirical investigation, which suggests that they concern mind-independent features of reality. First, I will shortly describe Sidelle's solution and then, discuss the plausibility of the ontology that underlies the conventionalist treatments of modality. That is a material world as an undifferentiated stuff devoid of modal properties and identity conditions. Finally, I will proceed with Sidelle's formulation of the two problems – the metaphysical and the epistemological – that supposedly plague the realist account of modality and essence. How serious are these two problems? Are they really so detrimental, as Sidelle claims, that they merit the rejection of the more natural explanation of modal phenomena and justify the adoption of the conventionalist account? I claim that this is not the case.

1. The conventionalist interpretation of necessity *a posteriori*

The introduction of the notion of metaphysical necessity and the rehabilitation of essentialism took place in the early 1970's. Before that, analytic philosophers as a rule had equated necessity with analyticity and were grounding it in our linguistic conventions. Furthermore, by identifying the necessary with the analytic they had explained how necessary truths can be known *a priori*. An analytic sentence is devoid of any factual content and true in virtue of its meaning alone, that is, in virtue of the way in which we use words. As such, a necessary truth cannot be confuted in experience and cannot be but true since it simply records the rules that govern the use of language.[1]

However, Kripke persuasively argued that in principle, necessity as a metaphysical notion, the *a priori* as an epistemic notion and the analytic as a linguistic notion could not simply be assumed to mean the same. In particular, he showed that the metaphysical boundary between the necessary and the contingent does not coincide with the epistemological boundary between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori*. There are necessary truths that can be known only *a posteriori* (Kripke 1980). But, if the necessary *a posteriori* truths are discovered by empirical investigation, then they are synthetic truths and not analytic, and they are true because they correspond to certain modal facts. Thus, the identification of necessity with analyticity and the conventionalist interpretation of necessity seem to be refuted.

Let me start with the familiar explanation of the necessary *a posteriori* truths. The conclusion that necessarily *p* follows from two premises: one is the conditional that if *p*, then necessarily *p*, and the other is the antecedent of this conditional, namely *p*. This is represented schematically as:

$p \supset \Box p$
p
$\therefore \Box p$

If we take the claim that water is necessarily H_2O, then its analysis will be:

(1) If water is H_2O, then water is necessarily H_2O.

(2) Water is H_2O.

Therefore,

(3) Water is necessarily H_2O.

The conclusion is necessary because of (1), but known *a posteriori*, since it was an empirical discovery that (2) water is H_2O. Clearly, this truth cannot be learned simply by reflection. Moreover, one could hardly claim that being H_2O is part of the meaning of "water," and that (3) expresses a linguistic necessity.

Sidelle finds a conventionalist way out of this predicament in the further analysis of the premise (1), whose truth is usually further supported by adding two supplementary premises:

(1a) Water is a chemical kind (a compositional stuff).

(1b) Chemical microstructure (composition) is necessary to anything that belongs to a chemical kind (is a compositional stuff).

(1b) states what is essential or necessary to something if it is a chemical kind, and Sidelle calls such claims that specify what it is for something to be of a particular kind or a particular individual of a particular sort the "general principles of individuation." For water, the relevant general principle of individuation states that

> (*x*) (If *x* is a chemical compound, then (if *p* is *x*'s chemical structure, then it is necessary that *x* has *p*))

And the general formula for the principles of individuation of kinds is as follows:

> (*x*) (If *x* belongs to kind *K*, then (If *p* is *x*'s *P*-property, then it is necessary that *x* is *p*)) (Sidelle 1989: 34).

It is plausible to assume that the principles of individuation, given their essentialist character, are themselves necessarily true if true at all.

How do we come to know them? Kripke himself says that we come to know the premise (1) by an *a priori* philosophical analysis (Kripke 1971: 153 and 1980: 159). Others often speak of intuitions, or thought experiments. On this explanation, then, the necessary *a posteriori* truths are deducible from non-modal truths and certain *a priori* necessary principles. Now, Kripke does not say anything more about the "*a priori* philosophical analysis," so it is difficult to say what he thought the nature of these *a priori* principles were. Still, almost certainly he thought of them as substantive modal claims that describe features of a mind-independent structure of reality. However, another option is to take them to be grounded in our conventions, i.e., conventions that determine the ways in which we individuate objects and natural kinds, and therefore, as being analytical

[1] See, for example, Ayer 1971. Later I address the issue of truth by convention.

truths. Thus, water is essentially H_2O, because our conventions dictate that sameness of the chemical kind requires sameness of the chemical microstructure.

Sidelle embraces this conventionalist, non-substantive understanding of the general principles of individuation. He sees them as "object-level formulations of conventions we have adopted concerning how we will describe things, particularly when we are speaking of nonfactual, or hypothetical, cases" (Sidelle 1989: 35-6). He then explains the necessary *a posteriori* truths as follows. The general principles of individuation are analytic truths that are grounded in our conventions for judging numerical identity across time and membership conditions for kinds. This guarantees that the necessity of the necessary *a posteriori* truths is grounded in us, in our ways of describing things. However, the conventions of individuation are of a more general sort, that is to say, they specify the parameters for our linguistic behavior; for example, that if something is a chemical kind, then it has its chemical composition necessarily. But they do not specify the specific actual values for these parameters, that is to say, they do not tell us specifically what the essential features or individuative criteria are in any particular case. These have to be acquired through empirical inquiry. For example, in order to specify the individuative criterion for water, we must first empirically discover what the actual chemical microstructure of water is, namely H_2O. This is why the resulting necessary truth is known *a posteriori* (ibid: 37). However, its necessity is grounded in the relevant convention of individuation, which prescribes that whatever actually takes that value is necessary to it.

The immediate objection to such a conventionalist account is that while there is nothing wrong with a claim that we have linguistic conventions that govern the appropriate application of kind terms, it is wrong to assume that these conventions do not mirror "deep" metaphysical facts, namely, the real nature of kinds. Thus, the term "water" is used correctly, if by it we refer to something that is composed of H_2O in every possible situation, not simply because we chose to use the term in this way, but because the nature/essence of the kind water is such that its members are necessarily composed of H_2O. Clearly, conventionalists deny that this is the case, there is no real necessity; but then, in order for their conventionalist explanation to work, they have to show how their analytic general principles of individuation can be applied to anything. Namely, if there are no independent modal features of reality, then there is nothing in the world which is such that it is necessarily composed of H_2O and there is nothing that, according to our convention, counts as the kind water.

Sidelle deals with this objection firstly by abandoning the object-level mode of speaking and proceeds with the discussion on the more appropriate formal, linguistic level. Thus, we shouldn't speak of general principles of individuation, but of linguistic conventions governing the kinds of terms that make these object-level principles analytic. Thus, the general formula for conventions of individuation should be stated as follows:

> If '*x*' denotes something of a kind *K*, then if *p* is the *P*-property of the thing denoted by '*x*', then '*x*' applies to something in any possible situation only if it is (has) *p*.

This is a schema of the rule that governs the use of the kind term. It says that, providing that certain actual conditions hold, we are constrained in our descriptions of possible situations. Namely, we are not to apply the kind term to anything in any possible situation unless it has the *P*-property. *P*-property is the property that is definitive of the K-kind, for example, for chemical kinds the definitive property is their particular microstructure. Now, we need to avoid the direct talk about the referent and the microstructure, otherwise the actual application conditions for kind terms will be modally packed. This is achieved if we talk instead about the structure of instances to which we apply the kind term. Accordingly, the *P*-property is simply the property that is found in most (enough) of things to which we apply (through which we introduced) the term. Thus, for the term to have an application there must be actual P-similarity among the things we call by the term. Beyond this, no other fact is needed, certainly not the existence of a modally extended kind. For example, the term "water" has an application because there is enough actual similarity among the items we call "water," namely, most (enough) of the samples are in fact composed of H_2O. Now, this condition being satisfied, the rule for its use prescribes that we do not count as water anything that does not have that same microstructure. In this way, the modal force of the statement is conventionally explained.

Thus, our modal talk is constrained by our linguistic conventions, whose application is not determined by the real existence of kinds with essences, but only by what the actual property that fills the general parameter for the kind, stated in the convention, is. In fact, because of our linguistic conventions of individuation, the way in which we constrain the application of the terms in the counterfactual situations, there are kinds. In other words, the kinds are constructs of our conventions; they are that which determines how we carve the world into kinds, and the only facts that enter into this story are non-modal facts of actual resemblance between items, which fulfill the conventionally prescribed condition for kind membership, i.e. sameness in microstructure, or atomic number, and so on (Sidelle 1989: 43-9).

Besides the necessary *a posteriori* truths with general or kind terms as subjects, there are also necessary *a posteriori* truths with singular terms as subjects. For example, "Margaret Truman is a biological daughter of Bess Truman" is such a truth. While the necessity of the first group derives from the analytic general principles of individuation that are grounded in our conventions for judging membership conditions for kinds, the second group is grounded in our conventions for judging numerical identity across time. Here, the conventionalist needs to deal with the same problem of how to achieve an actual application without presupposing the modal import and how convention of individuation can have any correct application if there is no real necessity.

Concerning the actual application for singular terms, the problem is that here we have only the referent itself and we cannot avoid talking directly about its origin. In the case of kind terms, as we have seen, Sidelle was able to go one level down and talk about the structure of instances to which the term applies, which finally led him to proclaim kinds to be mind-dependent constructs, arising from our individuative practice. But now we are dealing with individuals and there does not seem to be any lower level than this.

Nevertheless, Sidelle proposes the same strategy again (Sidelle 1989: 50-8). He observes that picking out an individual object itself is not an innocent task. For example, if being a chair requires only satisfaction of certain actual, non-modal conditions, then the collection of wood is as good a candidate as the intended chair is. Therefore, we can pick out objects only according to what they are essentially, as "of type with *these* individuating conditions" (ibid: 55). In this way, to be a chair involves having certain identity conditions, being capable of certain, but not other, sorts of change, and having certain possibilities. Thus, Sidelle concludes that the concept of an object of a certain sort is already a modally-packed notion: the object has already built-in identity conditions and modal features. Given this conclusion, he denies the fully independent existence of objects, as he before denied the fully independent existence of kinds. They both "arise out of our individuative practice, which is our way of articulating the world" (ibid: 57). The world, considered purely mind-independently, is just stuff "devoid of modal properties, identity conditions, and all that imports" (ibid: 55).

Now, the problem of the actual application of singular terms is solved as follows. Sidelle uses the example of a chair he named Ralph, which necessarily originates in a certain hunk of wood. We perform ostension: "I name this Ralph," but what we actually point at is a lump or bunch of stuff. Therefore, we cannot really speak of some *thing* to which we are pointing. *That* is a chair only because we introduce "Ralph" as a chair name and we intend to use it "in such a way that nothing counts as Ralph unless it can be tied to the thing to which we are pointing in accordance with our identity conditions for chairs" (ibid: 53). Thus, we manage to pick out the chair because we are pointing in the relevant direction at some bunch of stuff with "chairish intentions" (ibid: 54).

This also solves the problem of the necessity of origin, namely, how can a conventionalist coherently claim that something has its origin necessarily, if there is no necessity in the world. Again, our conventions of individuation constrain our counterfactual use of "Ralph" in certain ways. As Sidelle says, "we determine analytically, at some level of generality, what the identity conditions are for 'Ralph,' and this includes what sort of beginnings Ralph could have" (ibid: 54). It needs to have a requisite origin, so, when we approach this stuff with a chair term, we can trace back to see when this stuff started to be/look chairish, and that is considered to be the origin of the chair. Again, there is in fact no independent chair origin: "there is only a time when some stuff got organized in a certain way" (ibid: 55).

To sum up, in the case of necessary *a posteriori* truths with kind terms as subjects, Sidelle avoids positing mind-independent, real modal facts by talking about the structure of instances to which the term applies instead of the proper referents of kind terms and their distinctive properties. Their necessity is a consequence of the type of kind terms we use and the conventions governing their use, while their factual content is grounded in the actual, but modally innocuous, structure of the actual instances by which we introduce these kind terms. Relevant conventions of individuation constrain counterfactual use of kind terms. Kinds are our inventions that we impose on the world, so the resulting conception of the material world is that of individual objects, but without kinds. In the case of necessary *a posteriori* truths with singular terms as subjects, Sidelle avoids positing mind-independent, real modal facts by talking about stuff instead of the proper referents of names, and about contingent changes in the stuff instead of actual origins and so on. Their necessity is a consequence of the sorts of names we use, the conventions governing those sorts of names, while their factual content is grounded in actual, but modally innocent features of the stuff through which we introduce these names. Here, conventions of individuation do not constrain only counterfactual but even actual use of names. Individual objects turn out to be our creations as well and we end up with a conception of a material world of undifferentiated stuff.

2. The neo-empiricist metaphysical picture

Sidelle does seem to succeed in showing how the necessity of the necessary *a posteriori* truths could be conventional in character by having its source in our individuative practices. Our conventions specify what is to be necessary only generally, while the particular specification of these conventionally set boundaries is determined by empirical inquiry, thus, being known *a posteriori*. But the metaphysical baggage that comes with this conventionalist approach is quite heavy.

The empiricist position about modality – allowing only linguistic kind of necessity, thus denying that the real world has a modal structure – leads Sidelle to accept an ontology of mere undifferentiated stuff. The reasoning goes as follows. Modal properties are not real features of the world, and essences of kinds and objects arise from our ways of speaking and thinking about the world. However, if essences are creatures of our understanding, then kinds and objects which are what they are in virtue of these essences, are also our creation. Thus, the world in itself is not only devoid of modal properties, but also of kinds (which have modally determined boundaries) and of objects (which have modally determined identity conditions). It is merely a stuff, a material from which we, by adopting certain linguistic conventions, carve out the world of objects and kinds (with chosen essential determinations). The position is clearly not idealist since the stuff is wholly mind-independent, but it is anti-realist about kinds and objects.

The familiar objection to the conception of truth by convention is that while conventions determine what a sentence says, that is, what proposition it expresses, the question of the truth of this proposition is an entirely different matter that has nothing to do with the rules of use. This general principle holds true for synthetic and analytic sentences alike. Indeed, for analytic sentences we can know that they express a true proposition simply from knowing the meanings of the terms used and their connections. For example, we know that "all bachelors are men" is true, because it is part of the meaning of "bachelor" to be a male. However, their truth does not reside in the conventionally determined meanings; they cannot be made true simply by pronouncement. "All bachelors are men" expresses a true proposition because all bachelors are men, i.e., in virtue of what bachelors are like, the same as "All apples in the basket are red" expresses a true proposition because all apples in the basket are indeed red. Thus, analytical truths cannot be said to be devoid of factual content.

Sidelle avoids this objection because he treats the general principles of individuation simply as object-level formulations of the conventions we have adopted for describing things in actual and especially in possible situations. Clearly, statements of conventions can be made true by pronouncement. And because we also create/determine the kinds and objects that are subjects of these principles of individuation, they succeed in getting a grip on reality as well. The only caveat, of course, is that there is actually something in the world that can fill the generally-stated parameter for being a certain object or a member of a kind.

What makes such conventionalism about necessity more amiable than conventionalism about other subject-matters is that conventionalists about modality can claim that the non-modal content of a certain necessary statement is true in virtue of how the world is and propose only the conventionalist interpretation of the modal "force" of the statement. Thus, the necessary statement is necessary by convention, but not true by convention. For example, he can say that the sentence "Socrates is necessarily human" expresses a true proposition, because firstly, it is true that Socrates is human in our world, and secondly, it is true that Socrates is human in every possible situation because our conventions constrain the use of "Socrates" in such a way that it can apply only if what is said to be Socrates is also human. Thus, the only real facts connected with this sentence are provided by the actual, modality-free world, while the necessity is just a matter of how conventions we chose to adopt constrain the use of the terms.

In short, the conventionalist treatment of necessity consists in arbitrarily choosing a certain actual feature in the world, on which we then confer necessity. We choose this property, but we could as well choose some other. There is nothing special, at least not in the ontological sense, that would suggest picking exactly this property. Such a strategy of reducing modality has gained currency lately. For example, Sider proposes that necessity of analytic, mathematical, and logical truths as well as some metaphysical truths is not some special property of these kinds of truth, but is just a consequence of our decision to take them as necessary. In fact, in an ontological sense, they are no different from other truths; what makes them special is only the fact that we consider them important (Sider 2003: 203-5).[2] Concerning objects, Sider says that

> [w]hat necessary properties objects have is just a matter of which features of actuality we hold constant. So long as our theory of actuality is in order – so long as objects are really red, round, juicy; and intrinsically so – modal considerations should not change the accounting (Sider 2006: 391).

Similarly, Cameron claims that reality does not carve a natural joint between essential and accidental properties, but that one of the various distinctions in the reality is chosen by us, and proclaimed to be the relevant distinction. However, this is not a joint in reality, but an unnatural distinction (Cameron 2009: 6).

These proposals differ from Sidelle's in that they take objects as mind-independent. We then have real objects with their properties in place and what is up to us is which of the object's actual properties we will choose as its essential properties. In this way, we determine which modal attributions are going to come out true. Such a position is also defended by van Fraassen:

> At the bottom, everything that can be said about the world can be said in purely general statements, without modalities. There is no *thisness* beyond *suchness*, but every actual individual is individuated already by the properties it has in this world; hence can be denoted in principle by a definite description (in which the quantifier ranges over actual existents alone (Fraassen 1978: 13).

At the next stage, when we try to make sense of our world in a more *convenient* fashion, we only raise certain attributes to the status of natures (ibid: 14).

At a first glance, conventionalism about modality in combination with realism about objects appears better than Sidelle's version, but I agree with him that it is untenable. A distinctive thesis of conventionalism is that we freely choose conventions and that there exist alternative conventions that are just as good as the one we decided on. For example, we have seen that in van Fraassen's picture, at the fundamental level, we simply have objects with all their properties and only afterwards we pick out certain properties by which we classify objects into kinds. We could just as well choose some other properties and then our world would consist of quite other kinds of things with different principles of identity. But then, we seem to be compelled to say that the very same object could have a different essence from the one it has. The question here is whether the idea of one and the same object falling under one kind and then another even makes sense. What could it really mean that Humphrey – that very object – could have been a poached egg? As Forbes suggests, such understanding would require "a model of bare particular and incoherence, according to which a thing is a propertyless substratum and can take any nature you please via the inhering of appropriate properties" (Forbes 1997: 521).

Another problem is how we are to articulate our actual conception of an object without its identity conditions. As we have seen, Sidelle believes that the precondition for the existence of an object is the possession of the relevant identity conditions. In this he follows Wiggins, who argues that there is no object at all without its principle of individuation. An individual cannot be individuated or 'singled out' from the rest of reality simply by enumerating its non-modal qualitative properties as van Fraassen supposes to be the case at the bottom level, but only as an object of a certain sort (Wiggins 2001: Ch 4 and 5). The assumption here is that the object has its actual principle of individuation necessarily. As

[2] In Sider 2011, it is called Humean strategy: to say that a proposition is necessary is to say that the proposition is true and of a certain sort (269).

Penelope Mackie has pointed out, if the principle of individuation is supposed to be a principle of distinction and persistence that governs the object's identity over time, then there is no reason to suppose that the object could not have had a different principle of individuation. In other words, one should not suppose that the condition of the identity over time coincides with the condition of the identity across possible worlds (Mackie 2006: Ch 8).

Of course, this is a valid point, but usually realists do not suppose that both conditions coincide. For example, if the statue is made out of a particular hunk of clay at a certain time, it cannot cease to possess the property of being created at *t* and continue to exist, but it could have been created out of this hunk at a different time and still be this statue. The idea is not that the conditions of identity over time and of trans-world identity are identical, but that there is a core which they have in common and a natural candidate for this role is the object's kind, for example, being a statue. Thus, it would seem difficult to claim that the object could have been of different kinds in different worlds.

Therefore, I think that Sidelle is right in thinking that the concept of an object without essence is incoherent.[3] However, the conception of a world as an array of matter or stuff is also a difficult one to make sense of. This stuff looks just as the world looks, but without modal properties and identity conditions, which are projected onto this stuff through our linguistic conventions. In reality, there are no phenomena of kind-sameness or of numerical sameness across time. The question is how do we get from this amorphous stuff to the world carved into a multiplicity of particulars? Can our conventions really play such an enormous role? Better still, as Lowe asks,

> what place can we ourselves have in such a world, seemingly so much of our own making? For we can hardly be supposed to make ourselves, in the sense in which … it seems we have to make the other objects of which we speak (Lowe 2002: 114).

Similarly, Elder argues that Sidelle can assign no properties to the "stuff" except immediate phenomenal properties, which makes it, in turn, difficult to explain how we come to acquire and internalize our conventions of individuation and how we all come to imply them more or less in the same way (Elder 2007).

There are many difficult questions concerning the workings of conventions, but what is in my opinion the best reason for rejecting the conventionalist account is that it implausibly classifies metaphysical problems as being simply problems concerning our concepts and rules for speech and thought. In fact, when we are having a metaphysical debate, we are not disagreeing about some metaphysical facts, but rather about the meanings of our words, the content of our concepts, and what is the best way to use them. In this way, metaphysics is again, as in the era of positivism, identified with conceptual analysis. The most problematic part of this conventionalist refuge in conceptual analysis is that it uncritically assumes that all we are able to do as philosophers is to get a better understanding of our language, our conceptual scheme, while the investigation of reality should be left for scientists to deal with. If there really is such a division between language and reality, I would expect that the main task of a philosopher would be to determine the relationship between the two realms, and not just happily accept the allocated corner. Conventionalists seem happy to assume that there are two independent realms without any relevant mutual influences.

My remarks are surely too sketchy and there are many avenues for conventionalists to counter my objections,[4] but one thing is clear – the conventionalist picture of the world is radically different from the common-sense picture. Sidelle does admit this, however, claiming that only if we adopt it, we can provide a successful empiricist account of necessity. And we need to have such an account, because, although the realist interpretation of modality is more natural, the idea of real necessity itself is incomprehensible. There are supposedly two problems with the realist approach to necessity – the metaphysical and the epistemological – that make the conventionalist interpretation the more appealing option of the two. In the rest of the article I will shortly present both problems and indicate realist answers to them. Clearly, there is no chance of persuading the empiricist believer, but it should at least show that realists are not entirely helpless when it comes to explaining the real nature of necessity, as Sidelle would like to claim. But then, if real necessity is not so mysterious and beyond any explanation, and we agree that it is a more natural interpretation of metaphysical necessity

[3] For Sidelle's argument against the combination of conventionalist view on modality and realism about objects, see Sidelle 2010.

[4] A good defense of philosophy as conceptual analysis is Thomasson 2007.

than the conventionalist one, and after it was shown that the latter interpretation is not without its own mysteriousness and strange results, maybe we should give it another chance.

3. The metaphysical problem

Conventionalists simply cannot see what the real necessity could be. "Metaphysically, nothing in the actual world," says Sidelle, "seems to be a candidate for determining what is necessarily the case. What is necessary depends on more than what is actual" (Sidelle 1989: 116). He further adds that "[n]ecessity is not an 'ingredient' to be added to a state of affairs. There must be something about the state of affairs itself in virtue of which it is necessary, if there is to be a real necessity" (ibid: 117). But what could this be? Sidelle professes to be puzzled: "What, in what is actual, could make it the case that something could not be differently?" (ibid: 117).

Often this is termed the arbitrariness problem. What is the ground of the essential/accidental property distinction? What is it in virtue of which it is true that an object is necessarily *F* and only contingently *G*? (Della Rocca 2002: 230). Quine famously claimed that nothing in the object itself could sustain the distinction, and hence it can be at best arbitrary (e.g., Quine 1960: 199).

I must admit that I have problems with understanding what is so puzzling about objects themselves grounding the essential/accidental distinction. An object *x* has some properties essentially or necessarily because it could not exist without them, and the others only contingently since it can exist without them. Why couldn't this distinction be grounded in the objects themselves? For example, McGinn quite plausibly explains relevant modality as a matter of the strength of the instantiation relation (McGinn 2000).

Generally, the puzzlement does not make much sense to those who believe that our world has a modal structure; that in the world something is or is not the case as well as that something is necessarily or possibly the case. Given that the concept of metaphysical modality captures exactly the idea that our world has a modal structure, its proponents cannot do much more than reiterate their position and offer some further explanation of its workings. What more could they do? Indeed, conventionalists, who believe that our material world is completely devoid of modality, and deny the possibility of real necessity, are puzzled by the concept. However, if you do not subscribe to their strict empiricist views, you need to be told something more concrete to accept that the concept should be given up. Why is it is so "incomprehensible, or at least extremely troublesome"? (Sidelle 1989: 85)

At the bottom of the conventionalists' rejection of the idea that the actual world grounds modality is their empiricist view of the world. In the world something happens or it does not happen; there is no room for a distinction between what happens necessarily and what happens only contingently. At the end of the day, then, the main issue is what the fundamental building blocks of reality are. Conventionalists believe that necessity and possibility cannot be a fundamental feature of reality and thus must be explained somehow. In general, metaphysicians like to operate with as few categories of being as possible and thus are in favour of reduction, but this in itself is not enough to guarantee that the world can really be explained only in terms of the chosen entities. In our everyday life and in scientific and philosophical theorizing, we regularly employ modal notions. This could be taken as an indication of the important role modality has in our world and used in the argument that modality is ontologically fundamental and irreducible. In any case, the conventionalists' argument that modality cannot be real because it is not amongst the fundamental building blocks of the reality of their choice does not have much force. It does not win converts, only reassures the believers.[5]

According to a more charitable interpretation, the metaphysical objection is not an outright rejection of the realist character of metaphysical modality, but just a complaint that modal realists do not explain how modality features in the world. Clearly, if metaphysical modality is fundamental, then it cannot be explained in fundamentally different terms, but we can improve our understanding of it by clarifying what exactly we mean by it, by showing how it functions and connects with other notions and so forth. But there are many realist attempts to do exactly this, so the conventionalist metaphysical objection does not seem to amount to much. Surely, on its own, it does not persuade that the realist inter-

[5] A sophisticated argument against the tenability of objective necessity is Blackburn's dilemma concerning the ultimate source of any necessity: some necessity is either grounded in something that is itself necessary, which then needs to be grounded itself, or in something that is only contingent, but then it is not necessary at all. See Blackburn 1986.

pretation of metaphysical modality and essence must be abandoned.

A more promising line of argumentation would be to claim that modal notions are not needed for the most fundamental inquires of mathematics and physics, and therefore, modality itself is not fundamental and should be reduced to something else.[6]

4. The epistemological problem

The epistemological problem is composed of two parts, one concerning the possibility of knowledge of metaphysical necessity in principle and the other concerning our actual methods of acquiring modal knowledge.

Concerning modal knowledge in general, the objection is posed as follows. The familiar empirical methods are adequate for determining what *is* the case, but not what *must* be the case, so it is impossible to know what must be the case.

However, why must we take it for granted that "all substantive knowledge comes through the senses"? Another possibility is that we acquire modal knowledge by empirical means in combination with *a priori* analysis that is not limited to analyzing our language and thought, as empiricists would have it, but also provides us with substantive knowledge of reality. Thus, some realists about modality suggest that we come to know modal truths through *a priori* philosophical analysis (e.g. Kripke), others mention rational intuitions (e.g. Bealer), conceivings (e.g. Yablo) and thought experiments (e.g. Williamson).

One can question the claim that modality cannot be known through empirical means as well.[7] If we counted as knowledge only what we can immediately observe to be true, then we would have to discount many beliefs that we consider to qualify as knowledge, for example, beliefs about the future, electrons, or laws of nature. Therefore, we take the claim that knowledge comes through senses loosely and accept truths that can be only indirectly confirmed or justified. But why couldn't modal knowledge be acquired in such a way as well? For example, we have pretty good evidence that glass is fragile, that salt is soluble. Why exclude knowledge of metaphysical modality? Why suppose that from what is the case it cannot be inferred what must be the case?

The epistemological problem is often formulated in connection with the possible worlds interpretation of modal discourse, according to which truth conditions for modal propositions refer to possible worlds. These are usually interpreted as some kind of abstract entities. However, if possible worlds are abstract entities, then they are not causally accessible. In this case, how can we know anything about them? For example, Sidelle asks, "What is our access to other possible worlds in virtue of which we know that in none of them is some actual truth false?" (Sidelle 1989: 87).

Undoubtedly, the proponent of the realist interpretation of modality needs to explain how we as natural beings come to possess modal knowledge. Again, however, it must be pointed out that it is unfair to take for granted that the only way of acquiring knowledge is through direct causal interaction with the entities in question. Most would agree that mathematical knowledge is about some sort of abstract, thus causally inert, entities. Surely, we do not believe that we cannot know mathematical truths? Thus, the causal theory of knowledge does not seem to be an adequate explanation for all knowledge.

The second part of the epistemological problem concerns our actual methods of acquiring modal knowledge. Are the methods by which we actually come to know modal truths in fact capable of "reaching" to the objective modal facts?

Sidelle takes it that we acquire modal knowledge through imagination and claims that this cannot be a reliable method of acquiring knowledge about a completely independent reality. How do we know that our inability to conceive something is not only a sign of our limited ability of conceiving? After all, we wouldn't want to turn our cognitive limitations into real necessities. Moreover, imagining does not seem to be a method for learning about the world. For example, in determining what is physically necessary or possible we do not think that the testimony of our imagination would help. We can easily imagine tables floating in the air and various other violations of physical laws. It makes more sense if imagination is used in determining the "limits of our conceptual scheme" (Sidelle 1989: 87), if it is a method of acquiring knowledge of linguistic necessity.

The proponent of realist interpretation of modality must, for sure, show how the proposed account of the nature of modality (i.e., the proposed truth-conditions for modal statements) meshes with the possibility of our knowledge of these conditions, and this should be done not only on a general level, but

[6] See, for example, Sider 2011.
[7] For example, see Elder 1992.

also by showing it on the example of the actually used procedures.[8] An account of the workings of the cognitive processes by which we acquire modal knowledge should be provided in order to dissipate the mysteriousness surrounding intuiting, conceiving, or imagining. And there are such attempts concerning the question of the reliability of the conceivability-possibility connection.[9] This requirement also applies to the conventionalist accounts of modality. However, this is already a question concerning a satisfactory presentation of specific accounts, and does not pertain to the general question whether a concept of metaphysical modality makes any sense.

To conclude, Sidelle argues that metaphysical modality taken realistically cannot be satisfactorily explained. Therefore, the realistic interpretation of modality, our intuitive choice, should be rejected and replaced with the conventionalist interpretation, according to which metaphysical necessity is just linguistic necessity. My strategy was twofold. First, I argued that the conventionalist account itself is not without problems that cause puzzlement, so Sidelle is not really in a position to object to the realist account on this ground. Secondly, I argued that while the realist account does need to be defended, its problems are not so insurmountable, if we are not adherents of a strict empiricist view of the world. Additionally, I indicated some solutions that realists proposed concerning metaphysical modality.

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[9] See, for example, Yablo 1993.

TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON ON THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS – AN EMPIRICAL WORRY

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Abstract:
The topic of this paper is Timothy Williamson's understanding of the logical form of thought experiments as involving counterfactual conditionals which are true when their antecedent is impossible. At the same time, he sees the ability to handle counterfactuals as grounded in our everyday capacities. The aim of this paper is to drive a wedge, on empirical grounds, between our ordinary capacities and the counterfactuals which require an impossible antecedent.

Key words: thought experiment, logics, Timothy Williamson.

Introduction

The focus of this paper is on chapters V and VI of Timothy Williamson's 2007 book *Philosophy of Philosophy*. In the first part of this paper, we will examine chapter VI, which deals with thought experiments, and specifically with their logical form. This is done by examining the form of a paradigmatic thought experiment – the Gettier problem. As we will see, Williamson's solution requires the framework of counterfactuals and (metaphysical) modality.

Once this result is established, we turn our attention to the epistemology of counterfactuals and metaphysical modality. To this end, we will discuss chapter V of his book, concerning the knowledge of metaphysical modality. Williamson argues that this knowledge essentially relies on our everyday capacity to handle counterfactuals.

The final segment of this paper will aim to criticize this reliance – I will argue, on empirical grounds, that the capacity to handle counterfactuals falls short of the requirements needed for it to do any serious philosophical work. As the fact of our common capacity to handle counterfactuals is an empirical one, empirical evidence can be used to refute it.

I. The Logical Form of Thought Experiments

Thought experiments are a method in which the "contemplation of an imaginary scenario can lead to new knowledge about contingent features of the natural world."[1] More specifically, as it pertains to philosophy, imagining a plausible scenario in which our intuitions tell us that a well-established theory does not hold is considered by many in the philosophical community to constitute a refutation of said theory.[2] Williamson considers the Gettier thought experiments, as they are, as he puts it, "paradigmatic, in the sense that if any thought experiments can succeed in philosophy, his do: thus to determine whether Gettier's thought experiments succeed is in effect to determine whether there can be successful thought experiments in philosophy."[3] Before proceeding, let us recap briefly the famous challenge to justified true belief constituting knowledge posed by Edmund Gettier.

I.1. The Gettier Problem

In his 1963 article "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Gettier poses a challenge to the claim that "*S* knows *P* iff *i)* *P* is true, *ii)* *S* believes that *P* and, *iii)* *S* is justified that believing that *P*."[4] In constructing counterexamples to this theory, Gettier first

[1] T. S. Gendler, "Thought Experiments Rethought—and Reperceived," *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 71, No. 5, 2004, p.1152.
[2] T. Williamson, *The Philosophy of Philosophy*, Blackwell Publishing, 2007, p.179.
[3] Willaimson, 2007, p.180.
[4] E. L. Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?". *Analysis*, Vol. 23, No. 6, 1963, p.121

assumes two points: that one can be justified in believing a false proposition and that one is justified in believing any proposition one validly deduces from a proposition she is justified in believing.[5] He then proceeds to construct the following scenario: Smith and Jones are both applying for a job, and Smith has very good reason to believe that:

i) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket[6]

On the grounds of *(i)* Smith concludes that

ii) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket

However, unbeknownst to Smith, he is the one who will get the job, and he also has ten coins in his pocket. So, in accordance with the first assumption Gettier makes, Smith is justified in believing *(i)* even though it is false. Then, since *(i)* entails *(ii)*, he is justified, by the second assumption, to believe *(ii)* as well. So, *(ii)* is true, Smith believes it, and he is justified in doing so. Therefore, by the claim Gettier is attacking, it is clear Smith should know *(ii)*. However, as Gettier points out, "it is equally clear that Smith does not know that [it] is true."[7]

What Willaimson wants to consider is the logical form of Gettier's (and many similar subsequent) arguments, and in particular how one should understand and come to know the claim about clarity Gettier puts forth at the end of the example.

I.2 The Logical Form of Gettier Examples

As the first premise in his logical reconstruction of the argument, Williamson formalizes the claim that being a justified true belief is a necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge. He states it formally as:

1) $\Box\forall x\forall p(K(x,p)\equiv JTB(x,p))$

This claim serves as an assumption for *reduction* arguments and states that, necessarily, for any subject x and any proposition p, x knows that p if and only iff x has a justified true belief in p.[8]

Next, we establish, via a plausible example, the possibility of a Gettier-type situation, which we label with an open formula $GC(x,p)$ – the subject x is in a Gettier Case situation with respect to a justified true proposition p. Such an example needs to be possible for it to pose a threat to the claim of necessity in (1)[9], and thus the second step in reconstructing the argument reads:

2) $\Diamond\exists x\exists p GC(x,p)$

It is possible for some subject x to stand in a Gettier Case relation to some proposition p. Next, we need to establish that being in a *GC* situation constitutes a case of justified true belief which does not amount to knowledge – the Gettier intuition. As a first approximation, Williamson formalizes that intuition as:

3) $\Box\forall x\forall p(GC(x,p)\rightarrow(JTB(x,p)\wedge\neg K(x,p)))$

or: necessarily, if one is in a *GC* relation to a proposition p, one has justified true belief in p without knowing it.[10] Now, since a necessary consequence of something possible is itself possible, (2) and (3) entail

4) $\Diamond\exists x\exists p(JTB(x,p)\wedge\neg K(x,p))$

It is possible to have justified true belief without knowledge, which is in contradiction with the right-to-left direction of a biconditional in (1). Note that it is crucial, as Williamson points out, that (1) has modal content – the claim that justified true belief actually coincides with knowledge is compatible with a claim that it could be otherwise.

Does (3), as a first approximation, faithfully represent the logical form of our intuitions on cases such as the ones Gettier asks us to make a judgment on? It seems not to do so. To see why, imagine a case of Mary, who has a rather peculiar psychological makeup. Due to a series of extraordinary events in her childhood, Mary has a manic fear of coins. So, placed in the same (i.e. *GC*-type) situation as Smith, she loses, by shear panic, any belief whatsoever,

[5] Ibid, p.121
[6] Ibid, p.122
[7] Gettier, 1963, p.122

[8] Williamson, 2007, p.183.
[9] Ibid, p. 184.
[10] Williamson, 2007, p.184.

rather than forming a justified true one. Far-fetched as that situation may be, since (3) ranges over all possible worlds, it should pertain to the (possible) situation poor Mary is in, and it clearly does not.

What went wrong with (3) in the case of Mary is, quite obviously, the fact that this formalization uses the necessity operator. But in asking to make an intuitive judgment on *GC* scenarios, we are not interested in covering any imaginable option, but rather we are inquiring what common people would decide, *were they* in a situation like that, and all other things being equal. In other words, we are asking what the intuitive judgment would amount to in *close* possible worlds – a *counterfactual* question. Willamson refines the formulation of (3) in view of this observation, taking

$$\forall x \forall p(GC(x,p) \rightarrow (JTB(x,p) \wedge \neg K(x,p)))$$

to mean Gettier cases are cases of justified true belief without knowledge, in the following way:

3)* $\exists x \exists p GC(x,p) \Box\!\!\rightarrow \forall x \forall p(GC(x,p) \rightarrow (JTB(x,p) \wedge \neg K(x,p)))$ [11]

If one were in a *GC* relation to a proposition *p*, than *GC* situations would constitute a case of justified true belief without knowledge.

How does the argument go through under this revision? Given (2), that a *GC* is possible, (3*) must be non-vacuously true[12], so its antecedent and consequent must both hold in a possible world. In (at least) that possible world, there is a case of a justified true belief without knowledge, so (4) is true. Therefore, (1) is false. The same argument can be put forward without reference to the possible worlds, which Williamson does, but the details need not concern us here.

Further discussion on the nuances of this formalization that Willaimson explores in the remainder of the chapter on thought experiments will be omitted for the sake of brevity. In any case, Williamson concludes that "we may continue to view the Gettier argument as something like the argument from (2) and (3*) to (4)."[13] What is important to note here is that this argument relies essentially on the knowledge of metaphysical modality in (2) and our ability to handle counterfactuals like the one in (3*). Our knowledge of the two, and their connection, is the topic of chapter V of *Philosophy of Philosophy*, which we will turn to next.

II. The Knowledge of Metaphysical Modality

In chapter V, Williamson argues "that the ordinary cognitive capacity to handle counterfactual conditionals carries with it the cognitive capacity to handle metaphysical modality."[14] In order to argue for this, he must first demonstrate our ordinary capacity for dealing with counterfactuals.

II.1 Capacity for Counterfactuals

The reason our ability to evaluate counterfactuals should come as no surprise is, Williamson believes, that "we cannot know in advance exactly which possibilities are or will be actual"[15] and therefore "we need to make contingency plans."[16] Of course, not all the possibilities can come to fruition, so at least some of them will turn out to be counterfactual.

So, how does this ability function? For an illustration, consider the sentence:

1) If the bush had not been there, the rock would have ended in the lake.

We make this claim upon witnessing a rock from a landslide stuck in a bush on a slope next to a lake. We would tend to agree that this statement is true, but how do we know this? The crucial part in determining that this is so, claims Williamson, comes from our imagination.[17] In imagining the slope without the bush, we see the rock tumbling all the way to the lake.

However, imagination is a powerful tool – we could just as easily have imagined the rock simply hovering where the bush had been or slowly drifting into the air. The answer is that we do not use our imagination alone – our knowledge of the laws of physics, for example, will play a huge role in determining how the scenario with no bush on the slope

[11] Williamson, 2007, p.186.
[12] A counterfactual $p \Box\!\!\rightarrow q$ is non-vacuously true iff its antecedent is possible. Conversely, it would be vacuously true if *p* were impossible
[13] Williamson, 2007, p.204.
[14] Ibid, p.136.
[15] Williamson, 2007, p.137.
[16] Ibid, p.137.
[17] Ibid, p.143.

would have unfolded. In fact, "our capacity to evaluate counterfactuals recruits all our cognitive capacities to evaluate sentences."[18] A simple argument to this effect Williamson puts forward is the following: a counterfactual with a true antecedent has the same truth value as its consequent. Therefore, for any sentence *A*, what is needed to judge the truth value of the counterfactual $T \Box\!\!\rightarrow A$ (where *T* is a trivial tautology) is whatever is needed to judge *A* (and this may include any cognitive capacity we may possess).[19]

The capacity to possess the knowledge of metaphysical modality can be derived from this ability to evaluate counterfactuals[20] The procedure Williamson offers relies on first noticing two relations that hold between counterfactuals and modalities. First, the strict conditional entails the counterfactual one:

$$\textit{NECESSITY:}\ \Box(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (A \Box\!\!\rightarrow B)$$

If all *A* worlds are *B* worlds, then the closest *A* world is a *B* world.[21] The second relation, which connects the counterfactuals with metaphysical possibility, states that counterfactuals transmit possibility:

$$\textit{POSSIBILITY:}\ (A \Box\!\!\rightarrow B) \rightarrow (\Diamond A \rightarrow \Diamond B)$$ [22]

If $A \Box\!\!\rightarrow B$ is vacuously true, then $\Diamond A \rightarrow \Diamond B$ is true in virtue of $\Diamond A$ being false. However, if the counterfactual is non-vacuously true, then there is a possible world where *A* and *B* both hold.

These two claims enable us to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for necessity and possibility in terms of counterfactuals. Let (1) be a special case of *NECESSITY*:

1) $\Box(\neg A \rightarrow \bot) \rightarrow (\neg A \Box\!\!\rightarrow \bot)$

where $\bot$ is a contradiction. By elementary modal logic it holds that

2) $\Box A \rightarrow \Box(\neg A \rightarrow \bot)$

Now, by transitivity we obtain

3) $\Box A \rightarrow (\neg A \Box\!\!\rightarrow \bot)$

Let (4) likewise be a special case of *POSSIBILITY*:

4) $(\neg A \Box\!\!\rightarrow \bot) \rightarrow (\Diamond \neg A \rightarrow \Diamond \bot)$

But since the possibility of a contradiction is itself impossible, $\Diamond \neg A \rightarrow \Diamond \bot$ entails $\neg \Diamond \neg A$, which is equivalent to $\Box A$. Thus from (4) we obtain

5) $(\neg A \Box\!\!\rightarrow \bot) \rightarrow \Box A$

Putting (3) and (5) together, we get

6) $\Box A \equiv (\neg A \Box\!\!\rightarrow \bot)$

Necessary is that from which, if it were not the case, a contradiction would follow. From here we can go on and formulate possibility as well. Since $\Box A$ is equivalent to $\neg \Diamond \neg A$, (6) entails

7) $\neg \Diamond \neg A \equiv (\neg A \Box\!\!\rightarrow \bot)$

Substituting $\neg A$ for *A* in (7), and eliminating the double negation, we obtain

8) $\neg \Diamond A \equiv (A \Box\!\!\rightarrow \bot)$

Finally, the contraposition of (8) yields

9) $\Diamond A \equiv \neg(A \Box\!\!\rightarrow \bot)$

Possible is that from which, if it were the case, no contradiction would follow. This construction demonstrates Williamson's claim that the ordinary ability to evaluate counterfactuals will carry with it the ability to handle metaphysical modality.

III. An Empirical Objection to Williamson

This account faces some difficulties. The first one to be discussed casts some doubts on the idea that the counterfactuals which people have an ordinary ability to handle are those needed for this analysis to work. Notice that the counterfactuals under examination here quite often have impossible antecedents. However, empirical evidence seems to suggest ordinary people have problems handling

[18] Ibid, p.152.
[19] Ibid, p.152.
[20] The remainder of this section is a summary of Williamson, 2007, p.156-157
[21] Williamson, 2007, p.156.
[22] ibid, p.156.

even the material conditional, which is true if its antecedent is false. To illustrate this point, consider the famous 1966 Wason selection task: the subjects are faced with four cards, with their faces showing 3, 8, red and brown. The task is to determine which cards must be flipped over to determine whether or not if one face of the card shows an even number then its opposite face is red. Obviously, the cards that need to be turned are the ones showing 8 and brown, as only in those cases the conditional could have been false. However, less than 10% of subjects got the answer right. The problem this experiment poses to the analysis at hand is the following: if we do not have an ordinary capacity to handle even the material conditional, with its false antecedent, how can we be expected to be able to handle counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents, which are more complex or at the very least equally complex. After all, evaluating the philosophical counterfactuals involves determining the truth value of several material conditionals (or one material conditional in several possible worlds). This can by no means be easier than handling material conditionals which we do not seem to be able to do reliably.

One could reply that we do in fact sometimes deal with counterfactuals with impossible antecedents – when those are false mathematical statements.[23] Consider a situation where Smith and Jones go for lunch (perhaps after a job interview), and realize that, while they each have 10$, the bill comes out to $22. They could easily claim that,

1) If 10+10 were 22, we would be able to settle the bill.

This presents a normal, ordinarily understandable and true statement. However, notice that on the philosophical conception of counterfactuals, a statement along the lines of

2) If 10+10 were 22, we would be $17 short'

comes out true as well.

It is obvious from this example that the counterfactuals they are using here are not those that come out true when the antecedent is impossible. A much simpler explanation of this situation is available – when using '10+10', Smith and Jones are not, in fact, talking about a number, but are rather, with a touch of irony or exasperation, using the phrase to refer to the amount of money they have. So the sentence can be understood as saying

1') If (only) the amount of money we have were $22, we'd be able to settle the bill.

This not only provides a plausible explanation of the situation, but also explains why we intuitively find (2) to be false. Therefore, this interpretation conforms to our grasp of such a situation better than the one which suggests we are using an impossible antecedent. Consequently, a situation of this sort will not do as a reply to the objection this paper raises.

Conclusion

Williamson's account of thought experiments relies on counterfactuals in two ways – by providing the logical form of a paradigmatic thought experiment as counterfactual, and indirectly, as that logical form that essentially contains metaphysical modality. However, this modality relies, according to Williamson, on our ordinary capacity to handle counterfactuals.

Of course, a logical consequence of something ordinary need not itself be ordinary (just think of repeated applications of disjunction introduction, for example), so this grounding still leaves open the question of how available the knowledge of metaphysical modality really is. But this worry aside, while we arguably do have an ordinary capacity to handle counterfactuals, it is not indubitable whether those are the kind of counterfactuals needed for Williamson's account to work. In fact, empirical evidence suggest otherwise – a well-known experiment shows ordinary people do not handle material conditionals very well, and counterfactual conditionals are at least as complex, and probably more so, than the former type. Therefore, the use of metaphysical modality, in thought experiments or otherwise, might not be so ordinary after all.

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Gendler, T. S. (2004). "Thought Experiments Rethought—and Reperceived," *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 71, No. 5, pp.1152–1163.

[23] Thanks to Nenad Miščević for pointing this objection out

Gettier, E. L. (1963). “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” *Analysis*, Vol. 23, No. 6, pp. 121–123.

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NORMAL AND ABNORMAL AND THE BODY-SOUL RELATIONSHIP IN SOME ANCIENT MEDICAL TEXTS*

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Abstract:
This essay intends to reveal the contribution of some Aristotelian concepts – such as "just measure" (metron, meson) and "lack of measure" (alloiosis) as well as some other connected pathological affections (pathe) of the human volitive part of the soul (thymos), caused by certain changes of the humoral mixtures, especially the ones of the black bile, a humoral substance that was considered largely responsible for the severe alterations of the normal rational activity of the human soul (logismos). – to the definition of melancholy as a natural/pathological condition. This type of analysis could be useful for wider cultural studies in which certain medical traditions would have a significant contribution and would help us understand better the holistic thought of the ancient and medieval European culture.

Key words: ancient medical thought, body and soul relationship, humoral theory, somatic and psychological aspects, health, medical disorders, cultural implication of the medical thinking.

One way to find out the "perspectives" of the connection of health – culture – society would be to trace the contributions of ancient medical knowledge to cultural thought. In our opinion, ancient Greek medical knowledge could still be of assistance even if our contemporary medical science has made impressive steps forward. If we think of and look deeper in history, we can discover that many of the fundamental medical principles on which our contemporary medical knowledge is based come from ancient works belonging to Hippocrates and his school and from Galen and his followers. We also have to remember that for more than 1500 years these works were the most representative for all of medical thinking in Europe. Their impact on European culture and society during the Medieval Ages and Renaissance was fundamental. Let's consider just one aspect: Plato's texts are full of examples of medical thinking. Why? The answer is simple: Hippocrates and his school were almost Plato's contemporaries, even if a little older. And not only was philosophy interested in the savvy of the medical sciences, bt some of its aspects were also obvious in theater plays written by famous tragedians, especially Sophocles and Euripides.

One can thus say that having a better understanding of Greek medical thought brings us to a better understanding of ancient culture and the social behavior of those times. A relevant theme could be the ***relationship between normal and abnormal*** or the understanding of pathological behavior and its social consequences. What does 'normal behavior' mean from a medical point of view? What are the elements and the conditions necessary for normal medical behavior? Is there any connection between body and soul? How should this connection function and on what principles is it based? Do malfunctions or medical disorders of the body have consequences at the psychological level? Do body and soul belong to the same condition from an ontological perspective or do they differ? What are those conditions and the reasons for their being? These are only a few questions to which ancient thought tried to get an answer and they could enhance our understanding of the holistic thought of ancient and medieval Europe.

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In order to answer some of these questions we have chosen to focus on one aspect: the pathology of *thymos* (the volitive function of the human soul) in its connection to the loss of the bodily humoral balance as it was analyzed in some texts belonging to the Hippocratic Corpus (5th century BC), especially *On the Human Nature* and *The Sacred Disease*[1]*;* *Problem XXX*, a peripatetic text written during the 4th - 3rd centuries B.C.[2]; and Galen's *On the Black Bile* (2nd century AD)[3].

*

In the first part of our essay, we will try to point out some fundamental aspects of Hippocratic thought such as the distinction between philosophy and medicine, the consideration of medical science as *techne* and its basic meanings, the theory of humors and the meaning of normality or healthy condition. We shall see what was meant by the loss of a balanced condition (or of the status of healthy order), what were the causes of this imbalance, and its consequences using as an example: the so-called "sacred disease" or epileptic mental disorders.

In the second part we shall note some aspects of Aristotelian philosophical influence on medical thought, especially on the study of black bile, its abnormalities and their psychological consequences. Finally, we shall add some of Galen's contributions and adjustments to the same subject.

Some fundamental ideas and concepts of the Hippocratic thought

It is well known that the Hippocratic Corpus includes 60 works (in Littré's French translation), written during the second half of the 5th century B.C. Two medical schools were trying, during those times, to become famous, one on the island of Cos and the other on Cnidos. Their attitudes concerning medical knowledge and practice were quite different. The Cnidos School used a small number of remedies (purgatives, milk, and sour milk) and a rigid but very descriptive classification of diseases. Led by Hippocrates, the Cos School was more rational. Firstly, it made a clear distinction between medical science and magical-religious medical practices. The Hippocratic direction proposed a natural explanation for body functioning and for the evolution of medical disorders. This school used the empiric medicine of Cnidos, as Jacques Jouanna points out in his work[4], a medicine based on the analysis of individual cases and on the doctor's initiative. Jouanna remarks that doctors were paid by the citizens of the city. As Herodotus mentions in his *Histories* III (131), a certain Demokedes of Crotona received a salary and his duty was to treat the citizens of that city. Plato in his *Gorgias* (454d) mentions that the doctor of the city was appointed by the Athenian People Assembly. He was supposed not only to treat the citizens of Athens but also to be able to deliver lectures concerning the social health of the city. Thus, one can speak about a practical medical science but also about a medical thought capable to express and persuade people by means of rational judgments on the necessity of a certain healthy and hygienic behavior within the collectivity as a whole. The doctor also had a pedagogical role in educating people on health aspects of common interest. As Plato mentions in his *Protagoras* (311b), Hippocrates was teaching medicine and was paid for his classes. Thus we can think about a medical school based on a contractual association which is also evident from the Hippocratic Oath as D. Gourevitch has already pointed out in his study[5].

The first contribution of this school was to clearly separate a scientific medical thought from a magical-religious one. Doctors should have a rational discourse and a practical behavior based on scientific knowledge. Then, Hippocrates also tried to separate medical thought from philosophical thought. Philosophy tried to offer a rational explanation of the universe and to rationalize the behaviors of individuals within society. Medical science

[1] Hippocrate de Cos, *De l'art médical,* trad. Emile Littré, textes présentés, commentés et annotés par Danielle Gourevitch, Introduction par Danielle Gourévitch, Mirko Grmek et Pierre Pellegrin, Paris, Librairie Générale Française, 1994. The Hippocratic *corpus* currently contains 11 works. It seems that initially the Hippocratic *corpus* consisted of up to 60 works.

[2] Aristotle, *De la mélancholie, Problème XXX*, traduction, présentation et notes par Jackie Pigeaud, Paris, Ed. Rivages, 1988

[3] Galien, *De la bile noire*, Introduction, traduction et notes par Vincent Barras, Terpsichore Birchler et Anne-France Morand, Paris, Gallimard, 1998. The Galenic *corpus* currently contains 16 works but it was more extended during Middle Ages.

[4] Jacques Jouanna, *Hippocrates. Pour une archéologie de l'école de Cnide*, Paris, 1974, see also Roger French, *Medicine before science*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 26 and Kate Kelly, *The History of Medicine. The Middle Ages. 500-1450*, Facts on Files, New York, 2009, p. 25

[5] D. Gourevitch, *L'auteur et les textes,* in *De l'art médical. Hippocrate de Cos,* Paris, Librairie générale française, 1994, pp. 5–10.

should be capable of having a rational discourse on human life and to cure the human body. There were a lot of debates on the relationship between body and soul. If philosophy, especially through its ethical studies, tried to treat bad behaviors and to encourage the development of virtuous attitudes, medical practice and knowledge were called to treat somatic diseases which could affect mental order.

In fact, it was already common knowledge that the dispositions of the soul, with their virtuous or bad consequences, depended on somatic causes. This idea was also based on another general understanding: the soul was inside the body and therefore under the strict influence of the good working of the body. Socrates established a strong connection between ethics and medical science when he said that people having bad moral behaviors should be treated as sick persons. Thus, the role played by a doctor was given significant importance for the well-functioning of the entire collectivity. In some of his texts, Hippocrates remarks that the human body should be studied in its connection with nature and the universe.

Hippocrates also mentions that certain philosophers were considered as good as doctors and that it was possible to find a certain medical thought in philosophy itself. Thales, for instance, pointed out the role played by vital phenomena in the study of nature. Anaximandrus also claimed that the study of normal and abnormal (pathological) conditions was a logical consequence of the knowledge of vital processes. Anaximandrus also developed a theory about how life appeared and evolved from the humid medium that evaporated under solar heating.

In his *Ancient Medicine* and *On the Human Nature*, Hippocrates seems to plead for a practical medical thought and partially against a philosophical one. The doctor should smell, taste, and touch; he should not be satisfied only with abstract rational judgments. At the same time, some philosophical concepts were successfully used by medical thought. The theory of combination and separation which was present in Anaxagoras' ideas as well as the theory about health as just measure or equilibrium of various potentialities of the body were applied by the Hippocratic School.

Hippocrates tries to point out the practical dimension of medical thought and the fact that this knowledge supposed three components: the patient, the sickness and the doctor. It was not an abstract knowledge. It was similar to philosophical rational thought, but it also supposed a practical dimension. A doctor should analyze the individual behavior of his patient and should also have accumulated a wide knowledge on diets, plants, animals, on airs and places. Then he should be capable of synthesizing these by means of logic and dialectic reasoning, applying them to the individual case of his patient. Thus medical knowledge became a real *techne,* being able to replace what was under the sign of *tyche* (the hazard).

Medical practice should be based on precise thinking, including the role of number, measure, weight, etc. And it needed a specialized vocabulary and a systematic thinking based on rules and definitions. Thus, Hippocratic doctors understood that the human body did not contain abstract entities as humidity or warmth; but blood, flesh, and the like. And their analysis should not be only a descriptive one, it should include interpretation, *id est* a rational analysis of what is visible and also of what is invisible. The analogical way of thinking was a basic one in the process of revealing the invisible. The doctor should listen to the voice of his patient, and he should scrutinize the way the patient breaths, for example. This way he could evaluate the consistency, color and smell of some substances produced by the body and thus could decide which disease had left its signs there. It is now evident that the Hippocratic School was in favor of a global understanding of medical phenomena based on the analogy between the human being and the universe, doubled by clinical practice.

The poor knowledge of the inside structure of the body was an inherent fault of Hippocratic thought. During that time, Greek doctors refused the practice of surgical operations, as little was known of internal body structure. The body was theoretically divided into two cavities: the upper and the lower, separated by the diaphragm. Even if they knew the dispositions of bones, the movement of limbs, for instance, was not understood in connection with the contraction of muscles. As M. Grmek points out[6], neither the abstract concept of organ nor that of organism as a unity was available. Nor could they see that the brain was primordial to the heart. At this level of debate, medical thinking was strongly influenced by the philosophy of the soul and its metaphysical condition. We shall see how the philosophical theory of the soul influenced medical theory especially in *Problem XXX*, which is a text written under Aristotelian influence. As M. Grmek

[6] M. Grmek, *op. cit.* pp.14-24.

mentions, no anatomic center was supposed to coordinate the movements of liquids inside the body. The deep or large parts were always filled with liquids (the head, the uterus or the bladders), the open parts received liquids. More important were the special powers or potentialities (*dynameis*) of humors, for they could dramatically affect the healthy order of the body. A doctor was also required to take into consideration that the body is a living entity that needs refreshments continuously (food, drinking, air).

The theory of the four humors

On the Human Nature is a Hippocratic text, written at the end of the 5th century B.C. (410-400 B.C.), that contains a theory of physical human nature. Its author seems to be Polybius, Hippocrates' famous disciple and his son-in-law. A short presentation of the main ideas of this text is necessary in order to get a clear image of one of the most important Hippocratic theories, one that was considered fundamental for almost 2000 years(since the 5th century BC). *On the Human Nature* attacks those who proclaim monism in medical thought via a philosophical monistic theory. Similarly *On the Ancient Medicine* says that those who support the monistic attitude dangerously oversimplify medical thought. It is unacceptable to think that all diseases are caused by a single aspect. This way of thinking could be acceptable in cosmology or ontology. To apply a monistic theory to medical thought is extremely wrong and dangerous. If a human were a simple substance, than he could not evolve, change, and adapt. And even if he changed, there would be only one remedy for this unique change. In reality, there are numerous remedies based on some fundamental processes: cooling, heating, moistening or drying. If these processes do not function properly, disorder will conquer the entire body. In conclusion: there is a diversity of diseases and medical treatments while human nature is not a simple one. Thus we can remark that if we take into consideration the philosophical relationship *one – multiple*, a theme developed especially by Plato in his *Parmenides*, medical thought chose to plead in favor of the Multiple. This is a fundamental option which made possible further medical researches and discoveries. As we have already mentioned there was no centre inside the body presumed to be capable and responsible for the control of the movement of fluids. At the same time, this option for the Multiple did not help the author achieve a unitary vision of the entire body structure with precise, well established functions. As a consequence, human nature, as well as that of any other living creature, was based on combinations and relations among basic components. These combinations guaranteed the specificity of the entire human being. The nature of the human body was characterized by an appropriate combination of four humors. This just, correct or proper combination was the condition *sine qua non* of health.

The four humors are fluids: blood, phlegm, and yellow and black bile. They should be present in the body in just and correct combinations of force and quantity. The concept of a just combination is a philosophical one (*meson, metron*) and was analyzed by Plato and Aristotle in their works.[7] Any unbalanced combination, any excess or lack of the necessary quantity and quality of a humor could generate a sickness, or a pathological situation, an abnormality. If a humor fluid leaks inside or from the body more or less than it should the dangers are extremely high. The four humors differ from each other as a result of two pairs of characteristics: wet (humid) – dry and warm (hot) – cold.

The blood is wet and warm. The yellow bile is dry and warm.
The phlegm is wet and cold. The black bile is dry and cold.

Each humor becomes dominant within the correct combination during a certain season: the phlegm increases in quantity and force during winter as it is the coldest of the humors and thus it is favored by the cold season. In spring, the blood, which is humid and warm, increases in quantity and is more active. In summer, the yellow bile is stimulated by the heating of the air and the body, and in autumn the phlegm diminishes due to the heating of summer and the blood lessens as the body starts cooling itself. The black bile now becomes dominant. As time passes towards winter, the air cools and becomes more humid. Thus, the quantity of phlegm increases again. Even if all humors are present inside the body, their combination depends on external factors, such as seasons, because they are dependent on the combination of those two pairs of opposites: warm/cool, humid/dry. As a consequence, diseases starting in winter should stop during summer and those beginning in spring end in autumn. Any dis-

[7] Aristotle, *Nicomachaean Ethics*, is one of the most relevant works.

ease that exceeds these temporal limits is more difficult to treat. The principle of opposites is present also in the general rules of medical treatment. Diseases caused by filling up are cured by an intensive process of evacuation and those caused by an excessive evacuation should be cured by a filling up. Those due to excessive effort will disappear by relaxation and those attributable to a lack of action will be cured by increasing effort.

Treatment is oriented towards the cause but it should take into consideration the individual nature of the sickness, i.e. the person's age and body structure, as well as the season of the year, etc. The treatment depends as well on how serious the sickness is and the site in the body where it occurs. Those diseases which attack vital parts of the body are the most serious as the entire body could suffer from them. If the pathological condition is transferred from a less important part to a vital one, the latter will need higher quantities of humoral fluids to re-establish the correct combination, and the effort to recover is going to be more significant. These are some fundamental principles mentioned in the first chapters of *On Human Nature* (1-10).[8] These short details help us understand that the Hippocratic School had quite a flair in delineating the concept of disease.

In another text, *On Medical Art* VI,[9] one can find the following explanation of medical practice: any action in medicine is based on the answer to a "why" question. The haphazard, the irrational is not accepted. Medical *techne* belongs to rational thinking on causes and effects and is able to provide rational predictions. Furthermore, there is another idea: any disease complies with certain commands; and is not the effect of gods' will. Thus we find once more the idea of a rational and systematic medical thought which is not based on magic. The author accepts the fact that the same treatment for the same pathology could generate various degrees of recovery, depending on individual characteristics. Thus, he admits that the haphazard, the accidental, could play a certain role in the process of recovery, but then immediately he points out that an untreated illness would bring a disaster while a well-treated one will be followed by the desired recovery. Those who are cured should consider their recovery a result of the medical treatment which proves medical scientific awareness.

A fundamental concept of this medical practice is *dynameis*, considered as possibility, or capacity. As the human body needs continuous refreshments (food, drinking, and air), a fierce fighting will take place between the *dynameis* of the body and those of the refreshments, a fightingthat could generate the loss of balance among the four humors.

Kinesis is another fundamental concept in medical thought that designates the body's continuous process of changing or becoming. This concept was analyzed by Aristotle especially in his *De generatione et corruptione*. The body itself is in a continuous process of changing and can be considered as an order in movement, an order which is not static; while pathological disorder can be seen as a deviation, an alteration in a normal process of changing. This deviation can be generated by sediments and transfers of certain residues that can in turn generate a loss of humoral balance. Thus Hippocratic thought points to the fact that abstract philosophical knowledge alone won't do in the process of curing diseases. The doctor should have both a scientific and a practical knowledge on each single disease caused by *dynameis* as potentialities.

We find an example of this knowledge and the role played by humors in another Hippocratic text: *On the Sacred Disease*[10], which was written around 450-400 B.C. It is a monograph of a famous disease – epilepsy – which was generally considered as having a sacred, divine source. The first part of the text is polemic, as the author says that epilepsy is not at all "divine", it's not at all special but, like all diseases, it has rational causes.[11] It is generated by a failure in the evolution of fetuses while still inside the motherly womb. The phlegmatic fluid is insufficiently purged from the brain. As a consequence, sediments of humoral fluids fill up the brain which causes an unsteadiness of the humoral combination with dangerous consequences for the entire body. The phlegmatic fluids should be evacuated from the brain. If this does not happen after birth, the child might be prone to various weak points, for instance he might hear noises in his head, might not bear the solar heat or cold weather. This mental disorder is stimulated by *external causes*, such as a sudden change of winds (South winds – dryer and warmer, could be suddenly replaced by the North winds – more humid and wet). The phlegmatic fluids de-

[8] Hippocrates, *De l'art médical*, trad. E. Littré, texte annoté par Danielle Gourevitch, Mrko Grmek, Pierre Pellegrin, Livre de Poche, Librairie générale française, Paris, 1994.
[9] Ibid. *De la nature de l'homme,* VI, in *op.cit.,* pp.142–156.

[10] *Ibid.*p.143
[11] *Ibid.*p.150.

scend from the brain to the heart and lungs and towards the abdomen. If the residues of this fluid stay behind in the heart, the patient will suffer from shallow breath and suffocations; if these residues mix with blood, the patient will finally lose consciousness. The phlegmatic fluid is cold and it goes down towards lungs and heart and cools them. These cold fluids can dissipate within the warm blood. As a result, the contrast is too vicious, and the blood cools down so rapidly that it can no longer flow normally through the body. If the phlegmatic intrusion is abundant, death strikes rapidly, because the blood coagulates.

On the Sacred Disease gives us a lot of details for various particular situations (depending on age, season, degree of the force of the attack, degree of damages on parts of the body, and degree of recovery). At the end of the text, we find out that mental disorders could be caused not only by an excess of phlegmatic fluid but also by similar excesses of bile fluids. The author makes a distinction between a patient whose mental disorder was caused by phlegmatic excess and another one whose illness was caused by an increase in the quantity of bile. The former is not agitated, does not cry, and is quite calm, while the latter is very disturbed, all over the place and very noisy. We can also find out about a dissimilarity among various excessive passions typical of these mental disorders; terror or fear are both attributable to an initial heating of the brain caused by hot bile, followed by a sudden cooling process; sadness or anxiety occurs when the brain cools down and contracts itself due to an overload of phlegmatic fluid.

These details end in a debate over what should be the governing part of the body. The answer to this debate is not unquestionable, but only explanatory: the brain is the part which has the most important role and force in the body; and is responsible for the processes of thinking and inspiration. On the other hand, the heart does not help us get knowledge, only the brain does, and is exposed to the most serious pathological disorders. Taking into consideration these theories and ideas of Hippocratic reflection, we can surely state that the medical science of the 5th century BC tried to establish a systematic and rational way of thinking in the domain of medicine. An important role was attributed to medical practice and to the individual use of medical knowledge adapted to each single case. The texts we have mentioned are not interested in analyzing the relation between body and soul in particular in the case of epilepsy. *On the Sacred Disease* approaches that mental disorder simply from a somatic point of view.

Problem XXX - On Melancholy

A step forward was achieved during the 4th century B.C. when medical thought was deeply influenced by Aristotelian theories. A significant text which continues the Hippocratic analysis is *Problem XXX*, *On Melancholy* or *About the Good Functioning of the Black Bile*. This text tries to explain the close relationship between body and soul. The author wants to prove that disorders of the soul are caused by body pathological anomalies, by humors lacking the right proportional combination. As Jackie Pigeaud has already argued in her studies the text is an image of the ancient psychology.[12]

The text belongs to an Aristotelian way of thinking. As Jackie Pigeaud mentions when trying to identify its author, Diogenes Laertius was the one who considered Aristotle as the author of *Problemata,* a text having a pedagogical way of expression in a question-answer style. Cicero and Seneca used this text and they also considered it an Aristotelian contribution. There is however another point of view: the author must have been Theophrastus, Aristotle's famous disciple. Diogenes Laertius also mentions that Theophrastus would have written a text called *Problemata* dealing with politics, ethics, physics and love and, in addition, *On Melancholy* dealing with epilepsy, enthusiasm, paralysis, ecstasy, dreaming, and sleep. Even if there are still debates on the authorship, the text contains many Aristotelian theories and reveals the connections between body and soul in Greek medical thought and how those connections were altered by pathological conditions.

Excess and the exceptional

The text of *Problem XXX* begins[13] with a motivation: the study of melancholy remains important as many famous heroes (*perittoi*) and also many philosophers, poets and politicians had melancholic behavior which turned eventually into mental disorder and ended up in tragic consequences. The author mentions that epileptic behavior used to be named "the sacred disease". This was the reason for a thor-

[12] Jackie Pigeaud, *La maladie de l'âme,* Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1981 and *De la mélancholie*, French transl. of *Problem XXX*, Paris, Ed. Rivages, 1998.
[13] *Problem XXX*., in *op.cit,* (1998) pp. 82–127.

ough analysis of the melancholic behavior.

First, melancholy should not be considered only a pathological mental disorder. The text develops a deeper explanation for the theory of combination or just measure of the humoral fluids and analyzes what happens when this combination is modified due to the excess of black bile. In another text, *Problem I* (861 b)[14], one can find a debate about the sediments or residues. There is a special connection which is mentioned in this text between what is in excess (*perissos, perittos*) and what is exceptional, of exceptional character (*perittoi*). The residue is what remains unchanged, which cannot be modified, metabolized and thus it is in excess. *Perittoi* also named many mythological Greek heroes as they were exceptional characters, exceeding what was normal and common. For example:

– Heracles killed his children in an outburst of anger and died in horrible pains caused by a tunic impregnated with the poisonous blood of the mythological monster Nessus. The explanation of this pain is a magic-mythological one. In a medical perspective we find here two characteristic aspects of madness: the status of violent actions caused by violent feelings and very painful ulcerations of the skin. These two aspects are experienced by Heracles as a result of the domination of excessive black bile. It is a clear case of black bile affecting the head and its intellectual activity.

– Ajax, Telamon's son[15], was the most courageous hero, comparable only to Achilles[16], and had an extraordinary force. He was Odysseus' competitor for Achilles' fighting arms.[17] Ajax gets violently angry and has a strange behavior killing many cows instead of fighting on the battle field. Aeschiles and Sophocles wrote tragedies treating Ajax' madness.

– Plato, in his *Phaidros* 265ab, describes four types of madness (*maniai)*, all having a divine source: Apollo, Dionysius, the Muses, Aphrodite, and Eros.

This connection between the exceptional and the pathologic became for many centuries a significant theme of debate especially in the domain of arts and among artists. In addition, the connection between melancholy and creativity, especially artistic creativity, was a very fruitful theme, not only during the Middle Ages but also in such streams as Romantic literature.[18]

Wine and black bile

The text of *Problem XXX* discusses the role of wine in revealing the temperament of a person. An interesting connection between wine (a stimulating drug) and the nature of melancholy is brought to attention. Here the author analyzes the role of black bile which, like wine, is a *euplastos*, meaning it can shape the temperament of a person. The words *euplastos* and *euplastia* are connected to the process of creative activity in art, especially in sculpture. Black bile can "shape" the mental behavior of a person the same way a sculpture gives shape to a block of marble. On the other hand, there is a fundamental distinction between wine and black bile: while the latter shapes the temperament for a whole life, the effect of wine does not last long. There are however many similarities between wine and black bile: the former contains air which can influence the behavior of the drunken person. The latter is unstable, it should be cold but can become warm or even hot and it implies the presence of restless air (the winds). It is a residue, sediment (*perissos*) which is not metabolized, changed, transformed. As a residue it may become excessive.

Aristotelian influence

If *crasis* is the word for combination, *eucrasis* supposes a healthy state when all the humoral fluids are present in a relatively balanced combination. Melancholy is a temperamental attitude (generated at the psychological volitive level) by black bile input. What is significant in the text of *Problem XXX* is the fact that melancholy (*melaina chole – black bile*) should be considered from two perspectives: 1) as a normal temperament caused by black bile and 2) as an abnormal and pathological condition when black bile exceeds a certain degree in quantity and quality. In the first case, we have to remember that the theory of humors established the four basic temperaments caused by the fact that each humor can be dominant in the humoral combination causing a specific general behavior:

[14] Cf. to J. Pigeaud, *op.cit* (1981).p. 7–139, especially 122–139.
[15] Homer, *Iliad*, II, 557–558.
[16] *Ibid,* 760.
[17] Homer, *Odyssey*, XI, 543–564.

[18] See, for instance Goethe's *Werther* but also *Faust*. This theme was also developed in another cultural context by Thomas Mann in his *Doctor Faustus.* A fundamental work for such cultural implications is undoubtedly the one written by P. Klibansky, E. Panofsky and F. Saxl, *Saturn and Melancholy,* Cambridge, 1964 and also J. Pigeaud's already mentioned books.

blood – a sanguine temperament;
phlegm – a phlegmatic temperament;
yellow bile – a choleric temperament;
black bile – a melancholic temperament.

Thus, melancholy should not be considered only a pathological situation. In fact, we have here a medical version of the Aristotelian ***theory of the just measure*** as it is developed in the *Nicomachean Ethics* V. In the medical version of this theory, the just combination should contain a certain dominant amount of black bile, and any excess of it could destabilize the proportion and generate pathological disorders. In his *Physics* 246b, Aristotle mentions that the health of the body and soul should be considered the just or appropriate measure (*metron*). In *De anima* 403a 15-30 we read that all that affects the soul depends on the body. And Aristotle mentions the case of anger, defined firstly as a certain movement of a part of the body, or a capacity (*dynamis*) towards a certain purpose. Then, the definition of anger gets more details: it is a desire of reaction to a certain pain and an upheaval caused by the blood heating around the heart.

Aristotelian psychology and its authority in *Problem XXX*

In order to get a clear image of the ***connection between body and soul*** in ancient reflection we will try to summarize some basic Aristotelian concepts present in *De anima* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In *De anima* 403ab, Aristotle uses his basic theory: anything in the universe is the result of a combination between matter (*hyle*) and form (*eidos*) where matter is in a potential (*dynamis*) condition and form is the active principle (*energeia, entelecheia*) determining the other component. Living bodies contain the soul as their active principle. The Aristotelian theory of the soul mentions two distinct psychological functions: the irrational (or the vegetative function – *psyche threptike*) and the rational function (*psyche noetike*). In between these two functions there is the sensitive and volitive function (*psyche aisthetike, thymike)*, which is at the same time somewhat irrational, somewhat rational. At its level, the sensations are considered as potentialities (*dynameis*) which, when stimulated by an external or corporal stimulus, become acts (*energeiai*). The results would be the affections named *pathe* at the psychological level and *pathemata* at the somatic level. The word "affection" has here a special meaning: a passive consequence of affecting something, the affected thing remains passive, does not react. When reactions appear they are named *ergai.* They can be both at the somatic and psychological level. At the somatic level, the somatic potentiality (*dynamis*) is stimulated by the humoral fluids which generate certain somatic affections as *pathemata*. They, in turn, generate reactions (*ergai*). If the humoral fluids do not form a proper, proportional combination, any humoral excess will destabilize the affections, and the reactions (*ergai*) will be altered.

Taking into account this fundamental scheme, the big problem Aristotle wanted to solve was how this volitive-desiderative and sensitive side of the soul could be oriented in order that the individual behave correctly, i.e. in a proper human way which is a rational and decent way, being controlled by the rational function (*psyche noetike*).

The *ethos*, as a way of just behavior supposes an educated coherent behavior based on regularity, constancy and rationality. The ethic virtues result from habitudes (*hexis*). By our nature, we are potentially capable to form them and by practice we transform these potentialities (*dynameis*) in correct, just and rational acts (*energeiai* as *entelecheiai*). Getting used to acting in a suitable manner, we become suitable ourselves; getting used to acting courageously, we become courageous ourselves.

In his *Poetics* 1453 ab, Aristotle tells us of the necessity to purge (*katharsis*) any excessive affect of the volitive side of the soul (*thymikos)* as an anomaly or abnormal behavior. Tragedy is, in his opinion, *the* work of art capable of purging our excessive feelings of fear and compassion. Thus, the volitive function (*thymos* means desire) should be controlled by practical reason (*phronesis*) in order to maintain a balanced condition of the affects and desires. Only in this way can the correct, just psychological measure be achieved. *Thymos* as a volitive function includes will, desires, and emotions such as being happy or satisfied, feeling love, compassion, fear, or hatred, etc. When *thymos* is controlled by the rational side, these feelings become generosity, courage, eagerness to do suitable things. These feelings can also become excessive when they are not controlled by the rational side: fierceness, aggression, impatience, fury, irritation. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* V, VIII, IX, we find the entire demonstration of this fight for maintaining the just measure between excess and lack of desires.[19] When *thymos* is controlled by *logos* it can generate the specific human virtue – *andreia*. If this control does not function properly, the result will be the excessive affections (*pathe*) and excessive reactions. There could be an excessive irascibility – *oxythymia* which is a very intensive passion and desire for fight and competition generating aggressiveness and violence, haughtiness, vanity and self-sufficiency. *Thymos* then becomes hatred (*orge*) and fury (*phtonos*). There are also other affections as *phobos, aidos* (intensive fear caused by shame or disgrace), *lype* (affliction, sadness).

The somatic level

At the somatic level, changes which are not in proportion suppose an excess of black bile and a lack of the necessary amount of phlegmatic fluid. This situation causes a loss of the proportionate combination which in turn stirs up the already disordered affections. Being a dynamic factor, *thymos* acts as a stimulus and has the capacity to move the residues when it behaves normally. It heats them up, makes them more fluid and mixes them with air (*pneuma*) similar to the heating of the sun or a reinvigorating shower. That is the benefic situation. The opposite one is *athymia* or *disthymia*, when this refreshing heating does not take place. On the contrary, the cooling process intensifies. These conditions lead to the transformation of the normal grade of melancholy into an abnormal and pathological mental disorder. *Disthymia* and *athymia* are forms of pathologic anxiety and lack of willpower to survive. They can cause the desire of suicide. Their source is the excess of black bile. This humor in excess can also cause types of madness (*ek-stasis*) and *mania* but also of *morosis* (stupor, prostration), apoplexy and epilepsy. All these serious mental disorders can be caused externally by sudden changes in the direction of winds and internally by hypochondriac diseases which stimulate the excess of black bile. This one heats up and tends to manifest itself at the surface of the skin where much black ulceration could appear, which are visible symptoms of the disease.

Black bile is cool by its nature and it does not usually manifest itself on the surface of the skin. When it appears in excess, it heats up, becoming too hot and causes fits of *mania* and ulcerations. This sort of behavior is specific to the group of *oxythymia* disorders. The others (*athymia* and *disthymia*) are generated by a cooling down of black bile. The way (*dynamis*) of bile is to be very unstable: now cold, now hot; consequently, its changes are quick and powerful. The fluid of black bile is generated by the spleen and liver. When being in excess, it can migrate upwards to parts situated in the upper half of the body (heart, lungs, brain). It affects dramatically their correct, proportional functioning. The behavior generated by the excess of black bile can be similar to that of the consumption of too much wine. The distinction however consists in the fact that black bile can cause extremely serious pathological disorders which are very difficult to treat. The consumption of wine is a way of purging certain excessive distresses and passions but its effects do not last long. Another method of purging excessive emotions is achieved by arts, especially by tragedies, as explained by Aristotle in his *Poetics*. As one can see, *Problem XXX* analyzes mental disorders not only at the somatic level, but also at the psychological one. The author of this text mentions that epilepsy can be caused not only by phlegmatic fluids but also by the excess of black bile.

A very interesting connection, used later on, as we have already mentioned, is that between mental disorders and strange behaviors of exceptional literary characters, artists and philosophers. This connection points out that medical thought made distinctions between healthy and pathological conditions considering them as *processes* triggered when one leaves a certain condition (stable and positive) to aggravate more serious disorders. It is not a distinction between black and white or bad and good; it is a distinction among various degrees of a process. And this is a perfect application of the Aristotelian concept of *kinesis* (movement) understood here as *genesis* (becoming, process). In his *Metaphysics* E I, 1025a and in *Physics* E, Z, H, Aristotle explains that reality is based on movement and this should be understood under "various meanings". What is universally characteristic is the fact that *kinesis* supposes a process of passage from potentiality (*dynamis*) to act (*energeia*) having a certain purpose (*telos*). *Entelecheia* is the act in the development and fulfillment of its proper *telos*. Thus, *kinesis* has various meanings depending on the category in which it is analyzed. In the category of substance, *kinesis* is

[19] In an article written by Paola Mamuli, *La pssione nel De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* in *Le opera psicologiche di Galeno*, Pavia, Bibliopolis, 1986, pp.185-214, one can find an extensive analysis of the concept of *thymos* in an historical and also etymological interpretation.

an entire process of generation and destruction (*genesis kai phthora*); in the category of quality it supposes the alteration (*alloiosis*) of that quality, in the category of quantity, it supposes the increase or the reduction of a certain quantity considered as a proportional or just measure, and in the category of space it implies a transfer from one place to another. Reflecting on *Problem XXX*, one can clearly see that each of these categories and their meanings were used in proving the pathological consequences of a "movement" as a change of the basic features of black bile.

Galen's contribution

Galen lived during the second century AD. He thought melancholy was a pathological passion but also a source of creativity as it had been already acknowledged in *Problem XXX*. His fundamental text on this topic is *On the Black Bile*. It is in fact a synthesis of an already long tradition of discussing black bile. Galen's contribution is centered on the somatic aspects. Thus, in his opinion, melancholy is caused by the excess of black bile. The author admits that melancholy is psychologically a state of mind, but he wants to treat no more than its somatic aspects.

When the body is healthy, black bile can be seen as sediment, similar to that of beer yeast or olive oil. In normal, correct limits, black bile is one of the humoral fluids. When it exceeds those limits, it acts against the proper nature of the healthy body. The text gives us many details based on the opposition between normal/abnormal conditions and consequences. Usually black bile is cold, dense and as corrosive as vinegar, it does not coagulate but has a consistent composition. It causes the fermentation of the soil on which it drops or ulcerations at the surface of the skin and "hidden" cancers inside the body. It also causes dark excretions and makes ulcerations darker and darker. Black bile is present in some kinds of varicose. Its source is in the spleen and liver. Galen also mentions some external conditions that could favor the increase of this humoral fluid:

– specific food: salted beef meat, salted oxen meat, or meat of a he-goat; crawfish; red and black wine;

– geographic regions characterized by certain relief forms, certain regional minerals and brackish waters;

– hot and dry seasons;

– certain plants – the hellebore ("grass of madmen").

Galen also mentions the characteristics of all four humoral fluids. We shall mention only those specific to yellow and black bile. The first is bitter and thick, has a subtle humidity and is not very consistent, being similar to perspiration and urine. In comparison to yellow bile, black bile has some distinctive features: it has a specific taste and smell, and has consistent components in its structure. No bee or other creature dares touch it. The heated up black bile is disastrous. The ulcerations caused by it are incurable; the only cure is to get them excised. The intestines affected by this humoral excess cannot be cured. It moves upside towards the upper half of the body. Sometimes it changes its consistency, being more fluid and subtle or, on the contrary, more consistent in structure. The body tries to evacuate the excess of black bile. It separates from blood the dangerous substances which are transported to the stomach and intestines or at the surface of the skin. An example of this situation is the varicose. Galen considers that in this case phlebotomy is absolutely necessary. There is an explanation for these sediments and residues: those liquids which are more fluid can pass through the skin by perspiration, those which are more consistent remain captive inside the body. They can cause cancer or anthrax. If the black bile fluid is not in excess and flows down with blood, it can cause elephantiasis (a kind of leprosy) which can get darker and darker. The author also points out that the black bile fluid should not be completely eliminated from the body. This complete separation could generate a pathological disorder of the parts which produce this humor. The evacuation of a higher quantity than necessary could cause significant pains, too. When the spleen produces a higher quantity it means there is an inflamed condition and cancerous pathologies can appear. The spleen can look darker than the liver, especially when the patient has a humoral combination dominated by hot and dry humors. As one can see, Galen's analysis restricts itself to the somatic level. He regards speculations about the nature of the soul as futile. He evaluates pathological aspects simply as alterations of a somatically healthy situation. The disease is seen as a status of the body opposite to its specific nature, as

L. G. Ballester pointed out in his study.[20]

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As one can see, ancient medical thought was interested in establishing the correct or right combination necessary to maintain a healthy corporal condition. This principle is functional even nowadays as it was also in other cultural areas, such as traditional Chinese medical analysis. What seems very interesting in our opinion is the fact that this proportional combination was perceived as a *dynamic* one. This theory helped medical thought to carefully evaluate all aspects, even those that could seem auxiliary like geographical specificity, regional winds, waters, etc.

The connection between philosophy and medicine was also a very fruitful one for both disciplines. It helped them clarify their appropriate domains and purposes. Hippocrates was the first who understood that medical science should be based on practice and experiment. This helped the development of rational thinking based on experience and observation. There's an obvious interest in developing a psychological knowledge and in finding out the connections between somatic and psychological levels. The analysis of passions and mental disorders proves the intention to find rational explanations for various psychological behaviors.

Galen admits that he does not have enough knowledge concerning the condition of the soul; he prefers to use Aristotelian texts which support the fundamental idea that the soul is part of the body and thus it is in a strong relationship with the somatic level. He also admits that the debate on the condition of the soul is a problem whose answer should be given by philosophy and religion. He thinks that the aim of medical science is to treat this relationship from the somatic perspective using a rational methodology. This proves that ancient medical thought already separated itself from any magical-religious beliefs. Unfortunately the Medieval Ages were not a favorable period for medical scientific developments. Only during the 17th century when the entire system of blood circulation was finally discovered, did medical thought began to again develop and make progress in this direction. The essential Hippocratic and Galenic knowledge survived throughout the Medieval Ages even if lately theories such as that of the four humors were replaced by modern and far more precise data.

If we consider ancient medical thinking from a cultural point of view, we can open and study an entire universe of mentalities generated by it. Such studies, strictly speaking, are not extremely rigorous as they include contributions from many cultural fields: cultural anthropology, sociology, history of mentalities, mythology, arts and philosophy. They try to reconstruct the image of a collectivity for large periods of cultural history. There are already a large number of studies on how the human body was perceived during the Middle Ages and how this perception changed during the Renaissance and later on; this was the relationship between body and the Universe during ancient times, Middle Ages and Renaissance. This relationship appears in texts written by the Fathers of the Church as well as in Jewish texts written during Middle Ages, in the image of the human body in Dante's *Divine Comedy*; in Rabelais' characters seen as giants whose dominant daily preoccupation is to eat and drink ravenously and to satisfy all the natural needs of their huge bodies. What could the relationship between the normal and the abnormal have meant for them? Would the abnormal be always a pathological condition? Or, how could we interpret the *Encomion Stultitiae* of Erasmus of Rotterdam? Did being foolish or stupid have different meanings for the 16th century as compared to the 2nd, when Galenus wrote about melancholy and the passions of the soul? And what were the changes in European society of the 16th century that made possible such a philosophical pamphlet? These outlooks could open a wide space for exploring some aspects of the ancient medical thought.

[20] Luis Garcia Ballester, *Soul and Body. Desease of the soul and disese of the body in Galen's medical though*t, in *Le opera psicologiche di Galeno,* Pavia, Bibliopolis, 1986, pp.117–152.

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REVIEWING THE *RAWLSIAN* CONCEPT OF PUBLIC REASON

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Abstract:
This essay tries to review the main elements of the concept of public reason as presented by John Rawls with reference to his latest book (The Law of Peoples with The Idea of Public Reason Revisited) and simultaneously brings up the arguments for and against this concept that have been put forward by the literature. Many of the arguments presented here are not new, but what this essay aims at is a reassessment of the debate by confronting many of the interpretations and points of view raised around the concept of public reason. Based on the argumentation that if 'right' precedes this leaves room for the (different existences of) 'good' I propose that public reason ought to be conceived more as a political concept and less of a comprehensive account of morality.

Key words: John Rawls, public reason.

Introduction

The idea of *public reason* is not a new concept having a long history of use[1], but its contemporary formulation is introduced by John Rawls in several of his works. Rawls' idea of public reason has received considerable attention from many scholars of different fields, furthermore it has generated a wide set of arguments in favor as well as against it, many concerning the adequacy of the proposed concept. This has made Rawls himself reflect upon his conception of public reason and *revisit* the concept in his latest work *The Law of Peoples with The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.* In his own words this work "represent[s] the culmination of reflections on how reasonable citizens and people might live together peacefully in a just world" (Rawls 1999, vi). He has developed his arguments further, moving from his (only) prior concern with fundamental political questions of "constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice," to what he calls "the wide view of public political culture" (see Rawls 1999, 152–156). Considering such an evolution of his idea of public reason it can be said - as some of his critics have argued – that "Rawls's argument … is not merely a refinement or detailed elaboration … but, in some respects, confirmed a significant rethinking of his ideas" (Horton 2003, 7). Rawls himself draws attention to how to read his work by admitting that even though many of his works have an idea of public reason, these uses are asymmetrical. "In the first book (*Theory of Justice*), public reason is given by a comprehensive liberal doctrine, while in the second (*Political Liberalism*), public reason is a way of reasoning about political values shared by free and equal citizens that does not trespass on citizens' comprehensive doctrines so long as those doctrines are consistent with a democratic polity" (Rawls 1999, 179). However, considering the latest work of *The Law of Peoples*, where the idea of public reason is revisited, it needs to be stressed that while public reason has been 'widened' and the supporting arguments have been signifi-

[1] For a comparison of Rawls' formulation of *public reason* to other historical formulations advanced by Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, and Jefferson see: Solum 1993, 759–62.

cantly revised, the principle of justice is still there and "its substance has not undergone fundamental change" (Horton 2003, 8).

This evolution of Rawls' idea of *public reason* shows not only the importance of the concept of public reason but also the need to reflect upon its formulation. That is why in this essay I will aim not only at a simple restatement of the concept of public reason but I will also try to address the various questions and doubts raised about Rawls' idea of public reason. For a better analysis and to fully understand what public reason is, I think three main issues have to be taken into consideration; first, the content (idea) that public reason represents, second, how public reason applies (ideal), and third, the limits it may encompass. The paragraphs below will present all three issues in detail.

Rawlsian *Idea* and *Ideal* of Public Reason: A Restatement

The idea of public reason 'is part of the idea of democracy itself' (Rawls 1999, 131) and as such it originates from the need to answer the question of how democratic societies with a plurality of conflicting reasonable and comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral doctrines can coexist so to form what Rawls calls a 'well-ordered constitutional democratic society'. When speaking of a 'well-ordered constitutional democracy' Rawls has in mind a "deliberative democracy, where citizens exchange views and debate their supporting reasons concerning public political questions" (Rawls 1999, 138). So how can this deliberation be achieved given that modern societies are characterized by what Rawls calls "the fact of pluralism"? In order to achieve such an aim, Rawls proposes the idea of public reason, a definite structure composed of (five) different aspects where public reason is applied and (three) ways in which reason can be seen as public (see: Rawls 1999, 133). These aspects will be elaborated below aiming at responding to the two major questions of *what* the content (idea) of public reason is and *how* (ideal) public reason can be applied.

The idea: Rawls suggests that we understand the idea of public reason as "the basic moral and political values that determine the (constitutional) relationship between a government and its citizens as well as among citizens themselves" (Rawls 1999, 132). It is not unintentionally that Rawls distinguishes moral from political values (see Rawls 1999, 143). Even though both moral and political values come in to play, the second precedes the first. Rawls prior concerns are the liberal political values equality and freedom[2] since they will provide public reason for all citizens. In such a context, reason for Rawls is public if and only if it is the reason *of free and equal citizens* which concerns *fundamental* (constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice) *political justice* and satisfies the *criteria of reciprocity* (Rawls 1999, 133). Such a polity, based on the criterion of reciprocity, will offer to its citizens fair terms of cooperation where "those proposing them must also think it at least reasonable for others to accept them, as free and equal citizens, and not as dominated or manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior political or social position" (Rawls 1999, 136). Based on *a fair system of cooperation,* the idea of public reason does not depend on comprehensive doctrines and as such it is not seeking for the one and only truth. This simply because public reason, "if it is to be acceptable to people holding widely differing comprehensive doctrines, cannot depend upon the truth of any one of these doctrines" (Horton 2003, 9). So what public reason is aiming for is not truth, rather it is public justification. Here, public justification should not be considered simply as valid reasoning but has to be thought of as arguments that proceed from premises that we accept and think others could reasonably accept to conclusions we think they could also reasonably accept (Rawls 1999, 155). Thus, "the conception of public reason is to specify the idea of justification in a way appropriate to a political conception of justice" (Horton 2003, 9). Such a justification should not derive and be based on the 'good' argument; it primarily should be based on the 'right' argument. In considering our arguments to justify legislation – take here as an example homosexuality or abortion – we should reason neither from a philosophical or nonreligious view (good) nor from a religious one (bad), but rather

[2] Rawls argues that such political values are given an order within a particular political conception to which they are attached. Rawls 1999, 163.

question whether the civil rights of free and equal democratic citizens are violated (Rawls 1999, 148).

Grounding the idea of public reason on such characteristics restricts the applicability of the concept to political discussions. That is why it is imperative to realize that the idea of public reason applies only to what Rawls calls 'the public political forum', that is judges (of a supreme court), legislators (and chief executives), bureaucrats (candidates for public office) (Rawls 1999, 134). Distinct from public political culture is what Rawls calls background culture (the culture of civil society) including the culture of churches and associations of all kinds, institutions of learning at all levels (especially universities and professional schools), and scientific and other societies; in addition, media of all kinds make what Rawls calls the nonpublic political culture, a mediation between the public political culture and the background culture; The idea of public reason does not apply to any of them. (Rawls 1999, 134)

The Ideal: Having laid down the content of public reason, the next logical question is how the concept of public reason can be applied to official governments and furthermore to citizens. First of all it is important, – as Rawls warn us –, to distinguish the ideal of public reason from the idea of public reason (Rawls 1999, 135). The ideal of public reason, distinct from the idea, obligates public officials or citizens to reason from public reasons when publicly discussing or voting on fundamental political issues. So "an ideal of public reason is a normative standard for the use of public reason" (Solum 1993, 730). As Rawls argues the ideal of public reason is realized whenever judges, legislators, or bureaucrats act from and follow the idea of public reason and explain to others why it is just (most reasonable) (Rawls 1999, 135). This, Rawls argues, is our moral *duty of civility* and, as with all other political rights and duties, it is an intrinsically moral duty (Rawls 1999, 136). Thus the duty of civility of the ideal of public reason imposes a moral rather than a legal duty.

But if the ideal of public reason is realized by all coercive users of state power (judges, legislators, and bureaucrats) how then is the ideal of public reason realized by citizens who are not government officials? Here, Rawls reminds us that public reason sees the office of citizen with its duty of civility as analogous to that of judge with its duty of deciding cases (Rawls 1999, 168) so "ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think it most reasonable to enact" (Rawls 1999, 135). In this case, the duty of civility asks "citizens to be able to explain to others why the principles and policies they favor support the political values of public reason" (Farrelly 1999, 15). Such an "ideal of public reason must govern the conduct of citizens and officials in the voting booth; such an ideal of public reason governs not just how citizens and officials address one another, but also how they exercise political power over one another as free and equal members of a single body politic" (Reidy 2000, 57).

Rawls' ideal of public reason is limited and "does not apply to the background culture… moreover, the ideal does not apply to personal reflection and deliberation about political questions and… finally, it does not apply to reflection or deliberation about questions that are not political in nature" (Solum 1996, 1465). All these arguments about the 'confines' of the concept of public reason will be the point of analysis for the next section.

The Debate on the Limits of Public Reason

A vast literature exists on the concept of public reasoning. Besides the numerous interpretations and disagreements that public reason has generated it needs to be said that the arguments pretty much go around the same issues. A very broad way of looking at these interpretations and disagreements is to distinguish them into two major trends or manners. The first trend is the Liberalists vs. Communitarian dispute, where the disagreement and differences are of more fundamental significance (on the conceptual approach and on matters of fundamental concern). While the second trend of disagreement rests on the limits of public reason, arguing for a broadening of the concept and the need of a more wide view. Both these concerns will be confronted here with the intention to give a fuller picture of the state of debate. The following paragraphs are organized in such a way as to include most arguments presented by the literature on the discussion about the limits of public reason. To do so, five major points will be highlighted concerning the narrowness of public reason, its neutrality principle, its incompatibility with the whole-truthness, the hesitation for the need of a public reason, and the open questions that the concept itself leaves.

The Narrow Argument: Most of the critiques addressed to Rawls' ideal of public reason, are raised around the limits that his concept embraces. The major concern in question for the supporters of public reason is if the concept, as presented by Rawls, is wide enough. From one part there is the Rawlsian "narrow view asserting that the ideal of public reason must regulate questions of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, but should not apply beyond this limited domain; on the other part there is the broad view claiming that the ideal of public reason ought to be applied, whenever possible, to all political decisions where citizens exercise coercive power over one another" (Quong 2004, 233). The arguments that are brought on the defense of each of these views are numerous but what need to be pointed out is that "while the basic intuition underlying the idea of public reason is widely shared among them, they agree rather less about its interpretation" (Horton 2003, 6). Greenawalt has argued that the distinction between constitutional essentials and other subjects for public political debate may be difficult to draw in practice; such an argument can therefore be read as making a case for the extension of the Rawlsian ideal to all coercive use of state power (Solum 1996, 1465 footnote 16). In response to these critics Rawls will argue that "to speak of all persons in society is still too broad, unless we suppose that they are in their nature basically the same; so one role of ideas about our nature has been to think of people in a standard, or canonical, fashion so that they might all accept the same kind of reasons; instead political liberalism tries to avoid natural or psychological views of this kind, as well as theological or secular doctrines and so accounts of human nature are put aside so to rely on a political conception of persons as citizens instead" (Rawls 199, 172).

So the whole argument here is on the fairness of the Rawlsian ideal of public reason which as interpreted by its critics does limit public political discourse. To bring this argument further Sandel questions whether it is reasonable to bracket moral and religious controversies out from political discourses. What he is arguing is that the concept of public reason, as presented by Rawls, is too restricted and too narrow since it excludes from political discourse discussions about fundamental moral or religious questions. Sandel 2005, 247) argues that "deliberation and engagement afford a more spacious public reason than liberalism allows". The concern here is that public reason aims only at securing social cooperation on the bases of mutual respect. To achieve that it is necessary to set aside controversial moral and religious conceptions for purposes of justice. Some of these issues have been around the cases of abortion, euthanasia and homosexual rights, illustrating the severe restriction that liberal public reason would impose on political debate (Sandel 2005, 243). Two major questions are posed here; the first relates to the possibility of excluding moral or religious claims from public debate, and, second, as a derivative of this, if such exclusion of moral or religious claims is possible there is the risk of creating a moral void which may open the way for the intolerant (far from the desirable social cooperation). Sandel argues that "a politics that brackets morality and religion too completely soon generates its own disenchantment" (2005, 246). Supporting the inclusive, as opposed to an exclusive, interpretation of the ideal of public reason Solum points out that "Rawls has been read as advocating a view of public reason that would exclude religious reasons from public debate, that is not the best reading of his work as a whole"; continuing his argument he clarifies that for Rawls "citizens and public officials do not breach the duty of civility when they offer nonpublic reasons as the foundations for, or supplements to, public ones" (Solum 1996, 1465).

The "Whole-Truth" Argument: A second argument sees that since public reason does not rest on truthfulness it is not be comprehensive. So "being thus reasonable, in Rawls's sense of the term, citizens don't appeal to the whole truth as they see it, but seek to show how their positions can be supported by political values" (Fernandes de Oliveira, 2000). So the claim here is that certain important political values which are adhered to public reason do not demand the whole truth criteria. The whole debate rests on the issue of the incompatibility of the "whole truth" with political values. That is why the entire debate is about deciding on which values we need to appeal to when dealing with political questions of fundamental importance. Rawls resolves this dilemma in favor of political values, and his explanation depends on the argument that the political values involved in public reason are the most important values, more important than even appealing to the whole truth. So the criticism off public reason is exactly that it relies on political values, such as civility and mutual respect, and not the truth. "Public reason requires that citizens decide fundamental political questions without reference to the whole truth as they see it, this restriction is justified by the political values - such as civility and mutual respect - that it makes possible (Sandel 2005, 243). For some of these critics "it seems doubtful if the basic principle of equal respect can itself be grounded without reference to some comprehensive view" (Greenawalt 1995, 82). Supporters of the Rawlsian idea (e.g. Solum) read these criticisms as misinterpretations of Rawls' idea of public reason, arguing that the limits derived by public reason are not external to but are internal to reason. "One interpretation of Rawls (the wrong one) is that Rawls' idea of public reason has limits that are external to reason - that public reason cannot reach for the deepest truths because of political concerns that are not grounded by reason itself. (Solum 1993, 760)

<u>*The-Non-necessity Argument*</u>*:* Other interpretations of Rawlsian public reason are much more difficult to consider since they put into question the need of public reason at all. Reidy (2000, 71) argues that "many citizens and officials, including judges and perhaps Supreme Court Justices, will find it impossible to reach a determinate and reasoned resolution of many fundamental political issues within liberal public reason alone; and he tries to point out issues that are likely to prove indeterminate within liberal public reason alone". To reinforce such observations Horton, building on Rawls's contention, argues that public reason cannot be sufficiently determinate to lead to substantive agreement on most matters (Horton 2003, 13).

Furthermore, Rawls' public reason, if seen as too restricted and not wide enough, may fail to bring about decisions on disputed issues. It is contended that public reason is not the guarantee for achieving a general agreement. This gives rise to Rawls' discussions about questions of deep moral concern (abortion) arguing that "political liberalism does not hold that the ideal of public reason should always lead to a general agreement of views, nor is it at fault that it does not" (Rawls 1999, 170). So drawing on this statement Horton asks "whether the idea of public reason has anything significant to contribute to the process of reaching such agreement" (2003, 15). As a response to this very nihilistic approach it can be argued that even in a situation where a general agreement cannot be reached "citizens still can learn and profit from debate and argument, and when their arguments follow public reason they instruct society's political culture and deepen their understanding of one another" (Rawls 1999 170-1).

<u>*The Neutrality Argument*</u>*:* Another objection refers to the principle of neutrality which implies that laws should be neutral among competing visions of the good life and should not seek to promote any of the reasonable comprehensive views. The argument behind the principle of neutrality is that the state (with its coercive power) should not impose its judgment on the entire citizenry. This raises discussion since Rawls' ideal of public reason is interpreted to rest on the fact that public reason must always proceed or be derived from some consensus. The arguments here have been based, first, on the 'impossibility' of consensus and second, on the argument that if consensus is achieved it is only a result of 'balance of power' and nothing more.

Given that the reason for neutrality is stability (of the society), one might interpret public reason only as an aspect of *modus vivendi* (see for example Greenawalt 1995, 80-1), where toleration is nothing but a basis for political agreement and does not expect shared conceptions of good. But what is important here is to consider Rawls' distinction between two kinds of stability; the first is stability as a balance of forces (the one that applies to *modus vivendi*); and the second is stability for the right reason (Rawls 1999, 44). Rawls' argument builds on the second so that a *reasonable overlapping consensus* is operative, which is superior to *modus vivendi* because it does not depend on a balance of power but on common shared principles (Rawls 1999, 172-4). An example of achieving a reasonable overlapping consensus, taking religions as a point of reference, may be that Catholics, Orthodox and Muslims all share the principle of freedom and respect for other religions. This shared concept can be used as a basic principle to achieve religious stability for the right reason.

The Open Questions: A couple of points are worth making here related to some of the arguments presented above (restrictedness and neutrality) when dealing with morally deep aspects such as abortion, homosexuality or euthanasia. Given the non-inclusion of such issues and the impossibility of applying an overlapping consensus since they often develop categorically opposed positions, it is nearly impossible to settle such concerns. This type of moral agreement is not agreement about whether abortion, homosexual conduct or euthanasia, for example, are right or wrong; instead, it is agreement about basic principles of justice for a society composed of people who disagree about such issues (George 1997). The trouble here is that such absolute disagreement about good offers no ground for choosing one over the other. First, because they are categorically contradictory to each other and second, and more importantly, we take the risk to deny the minimum justice if one of the doctrines is true. Take the case of abortion. Let us suppose that Christian doctrine, recognizing the fetus as a human life, is true. Then staying neutral is a relevant moral difference, which public reason cannot solve, between aborting (killing) a fetus and killing a small child. In such cases "citizens and officials should undertake to resolve abortion issues within public reason without fully determining the moral status of the fetus; but such a dilemma cannot be avoided" (Reidy 2000, 70) since there is the risk that the principle of justice itself may be violated. Open questions on deep moral issues echo this dilemma in the context of justice where even public reason is too weak to resolve the issue.

(In)Conclusive Thoughts

As the discourse on public reason has been presented in this essay it is unsurprising that a definite conclusion cannot be drawn. Following the logic of the arguments put forward (especially the arguments about open questions), it can be easily seen that public reason is weak to respond to specific issues related to deep moral concerns where differences are not simple but of a more fundamental significance. Such a dilemma in the broader context of scholarly discussion has risen and

> concerns whether public reason should be understood as primarily a theoretical construct, an outcome of a philosophical argument that may have only a remote connection with what people actually believe; or whether a workable conception of public reason needs to be rooted in the values and beliefs to which people in fact broadly adhere; and this distinction is sometimes obscured by formulations of public reason in terms of reasons that are 'acceptable or can be made so' to all reasonable people (Horton, 2003, 6–7).

On the other hand, what makes this conclusion more difficult is that many of the critics do not suggest any alternative to the concept of public reason (see for example Sandel, Greenawalt, Horton or Reidy). Horton will admit that "he neither endorses any other version of this project, nor does he have any conception of public reason of his own to proffer as an alternative" (2003, 7).

Perhaps a way to deal with public reason is to consider the context (political) in which it is brought up and is being used. "It is the source of their force and authority that distinguishes public from non-public reason" (Reidy 2000, 50). So, what public reason is dealing with is power and coercion. Public reason is called here to better manage the use (to what extend) of coercion by politics. The question asked is if politics should stay within the bounds of what Rawls calls 'public reason', or to put it other way the discourse – as set by some critics of Rawls (Sandel for example) – is which should precede: right or good?

Rawls suggests that

> the way to understand any political body is that of an association where as citizens we have reasons to impose the constraints specified by the political principles of justice on associations; while as members of associations we have reasons for limiting those constraints so that they leave room for a free and flourishing internal life appropriate to the association in question (Rawls 1999, 159).

What Rawls advnaces here is that democratic societies are directed to political equality rather than majority rule or any other comprehensive doctrine. Following this Rawlsian claim, with which I agree, public reason gives 'power' to 'right', and if 'right' precedes it leaves room for the (different existences of) 'good'. 'Public reason' based on 'right' is in turn based on the fundamental idea of citizens as moral persons with necessary capabilities/capacities for distinguishing/deciding their concept of good. While following a communitarian reasoning by giving the power to 'good' (an abstract concept where different – many times contradicting – views exist) we risk ruling out the 'right', meaning an exclusion of individuals, at least those that share a different concept of good. Calling back to historical events we see that the preceding of 'good' has brought, at its worst, many disasters to humanity (Nazi-Fascism for example); and, at its best, adherence to one comprehensive view, so that the use of state power to impose certain comprehensive views on people that do not share them has involved 'privileged places' of some over the others (for example Communism).

<u>*Public Reason: More Political Less Ethical*</u>*:* This is how I see and think that 'public reason' has to be conceived: normative claims are merely political and are less of a comprehensive account of morality. The substantive normative claims of public reason are confined to the domain of politics where questions of culture, morality and tradition are therefore bracketed in a reasoned account of justice (O'Neill 1997, 411–3). It still might be said in Rawls' favor that, although the problem of how to turn the theoretical account of public reason into a workable criterion of legitimacy is unresolved, the idea of public reason nonetheless constitutes a real advance in articulating a structure that distinguishes reasonable from unreasonable disagreement within a constitutional democracy (Horton 2003, 14–15) and further more is the best model we can consider to deal with coercion and its consequences. The idea of public reason (revisited) is nothing but a viable (political) model sustaining that holders of many comprehensive views - be they either religious or secular – need to see and recognize the limits (constrains) of public reasons.

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THE CONCEPT OF HUMANISM FROM *EXISTENCE* TO *BEING*: SARTRE vs. HEIDEGGER

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Abstract:
Humanism as an ideological term in the modern sense finds its roots in the 18th century Enlightenment. However, it has been exposed to some important changes. For example, Sartre and Heidegger interpreted the concept of humanism by abstracting it from its ideological content and differentiated the term according to their own essential understanding. At the end they both identified their original grasp of humanism with their own philosophies, which at first glance resemble each other as Sartre thought, but in detail are very different. The difference between the concepts of humanism that Sartre and Heidegger understand occurs in their starting point of philosophizing. Sartre, according to Heidegger, starts from existence and could not be able to understand Being. For this reason, Sartre reaches a different kind of understanding on humanism. On the opposite side, Heidegger insists on moving from Being itself, hence attains another concept of humanism which has a different content from Sartre. In this paper my aim is to discuss the concept of humanism on the basis of these two philosophers' views and draw a frame for understanding how the term gains different implications. In this context, the issue is argued on the basis of the works of Sartre *Existentialism Is a Humanism* and Heidegger *The Age of World Pictures* and *Letter on Humanism.*

Key words: Humanism, Sartre, Heidegger, *Existentia-Essentia*, Being.

Introduction

Humanism in the present era signifies an ideological doctrine that places human beings, as opposed to God, at the center of the universe. Although a focus on human nature and human life can be traced back ultimately to ancient Greek thought, humanism in the modern sense, with its anthropocentric belief in the boundless potentiality of unfettered human reason and its secular conviction that human destiny is entirely in human hands, has its roots in the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. This philosophical orientation should not be confused with the intellectual movement known as Renaissance humanism. Unlike its contemporary namesake, Renaissance humanism was not specifically concerned with promoting and exalting human values. It was, instead, a hugely influential cultural and educational program dedicated to the revival of the classical ideal of cultivated and civilized learning, referred to in Latin as *humanitas* and in Greek as *paideia*. For humanists of the Renaissance and their successors, the only way to achieve this ideal was through the *studia humanitatis*, the study of Graeco-Roman civilization through its literature, history, philosophy, and surviving artifacts (Kraye 2005).

Humanism, although not systematized as an ideology at the beginning of the history of philosophy, always hints at its presence in different contexts. For instance; it is possible to think the ancient Greek Protagoras' description of human as a measure of everything as prefiguring humanism in the sense of aggrandizing human nature, faculties, limits and interests. Nonetheless, it is clear that for the ancient Greeks, the assumption that the human is at the center of the world was not especially foreground. In a similar way, for medieval philosophy, in which the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle were reconciled with God, there was no humanism in the modern sense of believing that God is at the center of the universe.

> In the same way, Descartes's theory can also be read from epistemological or humanistic angles of vision. In the Anglo-Saxon discussion, Descartes is mainly studied as the prototype of the modern epistemologist, as the founder of foundationalism, as the discoverer of a method to secure knowledge against scepticism. In France, emphasis is often placed on the link in the Cartesian theory between science and human being, between knowledge and the human mastery over the world, on the thinker who substitutes reason for prejudice. In French circles, Descartes is understood less as an epistemologist than as a humanist whose idea of reason dominates the later Enlightenment debate culminating in Kant's critical philosophy and continuing to our own time (Rockmore 2003).

> Philosophy, which is only one of the many strands in the growth of culture during the Enlightenment period, tends to stress an anthropological approach. This tendency is particularly evident in Hume's writings. In *A Treatise of Human Nature,* David Hume writes: 'Human Nature is the only science of man; and has been hitherto the most neglected'(Hume 1968). Clearly anticipating Marx's famous claim that all the sciences are sciences of man, Hume asserts: 'Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature' (Hume 1968). He further writes: 'He straightforwardly holds that all scientific questions are finally questions about man: There is no question of importance, whose decision is not compriz'd in the science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending therefore to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a complete system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they stand with any certainty' (Rockmore 2003).

> Here the Enlightenment stress on reason is accompanied by an increasingly secular view of human being as central to the world and as the master of human fate. Thinkers like the Danish writer Kierkegaard, who understand human being as authentic only through a particular relation to God, are an exception to this tendency. Although Kant famously seeks to limit knowledge to make room for faith (Kant 1961) his position throughout is rigorously secular. Even his discussion of reason is conducted within the bounds set by reason that, from his very rationalist viewpoint, cannot be rationally transgressed. The anthropological element in Kant's critical philosophy is partly traceable to Hume's well known influence in awakening him from his self-described dogmatic slumber (Kant 1950). In his theory of ethics, Kant insists on freedom as the necessary but indemonstrable presupposition for ethics through a conception of human being as wholly free from external influences, hence able to determine the principles of action in an entirely rational fashion. He stresses a similar concept in his famous definition of the Enlightenment as 'man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity' (Kant 1985). A closely Kantian insistence on human being as rational and free is a main theme in later German idealism (Rockmore 2003).

After the World War II, the problem of humanism increasingly began to come into question. Certainly, humanity's encroachment to the center of the world brought about various consequences which are inhuman. In the 20th century, Sartre and Heidegger interpret humanism differently than these pioneers, giving new meaning to the concept. Neither think humanism in its classical meaning which places human being at the center of the world and puts it as a final goal.

Sartre, as a result of misunderstanding Heidegger, bases his existentialism upon his conception of humanism. However, Heidegger does not move from the existing individual in his concept of humanism, rather placing Being at the center of it. Both thinkers criticize previous humanisms by claiming that they were metaphysical and they separate their own conceptions of humanism from them. Nonetheless, for Heidegger, Sartre's humanism remains metaphysical as well.

If Heidegger is a humanist at all, he is not a humanist in any ordinary sense of the term as he rejects many usual humanist ideas, such as the ideas of progress and human perfectibility as well as the so-called metaphysical conception of humanism. Yet Heidegger does not break, but rather re-forges, the philosophical link to humanism from the perspective of his concern with being (Rockmore 2003).

Sartre's reading of Heidegger is always overly generous. He consistently attributes to Heidegger's theory doctrines that were his own, on occasion doctrines even incompatible with Heidegger's. An example among many is his classification of Heidegger's position as existentialist, a description which Heidegger later pointedly rejects in his "Letter on Humanism" in a determined effort to distance himself from Sartre's thought (Rockmore 2003).

Humanism for Sartre and Heidegger

> Like French philosophy since Descartes, Sartre's thought is dominated by the problem of humanism. His main concern from beginning to end, including both his earlier existentialism and his later Marxist period, is the concept of the human subject, including human freedom. Sartre's continuing interest is human being as his central philosophical theme (Rockmore 2003).
>
> Although Sartre follows the early Heidegger in his focus on human being, they comprehend it in basically different ways. Heidegger focuses on human being in terms of the problem of being that was never a Sartrian concern. Heidegger is an anti-Cartesian whose rejection of Cartesianism deepens in his later thought, above all in his effort to decenter the subject. Sartre begins as and finally remains a Cartesian whose effort to understand human being in situation, even in his Marxist phase, never abandons its Cartesian roots. There is, then, a deep and finally unbridgeable chasm between Heidegger's and Sartre's conceptions of human being. Unquestionably Sartre's thought was influenced by Heidegger's, and for a time Sartre seems genuinely to have thought that Heidegger had anticipated some aspects of his own humanism. Yet if Heidegger is a humanist, his humanism is very different from Sartre's. And although Sartre discerned a close relation between his conception of the human individual and Heidegger's, he in fact offers a different, or at least basically revised notion of subjectivity (Rockmore 2003).
>
> Heidegger's thought is not humanism in any obvious, ordinary sense, although he suggests—and his suggestion is widely followed—that his theory is a new form of humanism. The term 'humanism' *(Humanismus)* does not occur in *Being and Time*. From Heidegger's angle of vision, the French humanist reading of his thought relies on an uncritical assumption of the traditional understanding of humanism. This assumption, suggested by Kojève, reaches a peak in Sartre's enthusiastic, erroneous, but highly influential conflation between his own existentialism and Heidegger's thought. Kojève was never popular with more than a small intellectual circle, but Sartre was popular with the general public. His enthusiastic embrace of Heidegger's thought on the basis of his own humanism helped to popularize Heidegger's theory through a false interpretation that quickly spread throughout the French discussion. Yet around the same time that Sartre's humanist misreading of Heidegger emerged into public view in Sartre's public lecture, a reaction against any anthropological reading of Heidegger's theory was also beginning to emerge. In general terms, the first reading ignores the transcendental side of Heideggerian phenomenology in favor of philosophical anthropology in the interpretations of Kojève, Wahl, Sartre, and others (Rockmore 2003).

Does Existence or Essence Stand at the Center of Humanism?

Sartre based his humanism upon the claim that existence precedes essence which means in general that an individual's existence is not predetermined by his essence. Hence his concept of humanism is the most important feature of his existentialist thought.

> What exactly do we mean by that? If we consider a manufactured object, such as a book or a paper knife, we note that this object was produced by a craftsman who drew his inspiration from a concept: he referred both to the concept of what a paper knife is, and to a known production technique that is a part of that concept and is, by and large, a formula. The paper knife is thus both an object produced in a certain way and one that, on the other hand, serves a definite purpose. We cannot suppose that a man would produce a paper knife without knowing what purpose it would serve. Let us say, therefore, that the essence of the paper knife-that is, the sum of formulae and properties that enable it to be produced and defined-precedes its existence. Thus the presence before my eyes of that paper knife or book is determined. Here, then, we are viewing the world from a technical standpoint, whereby we can say 'production precedes essence' (Sartre 2007).

What Sartre emphasizes here is that it is impossible to produce a paper knife if its function is not known previously. Hence it is a necessary fact that the essence of the paper knife precedes its existence. But the same conclusion is not valid when human being is in question because human is not a being who is determined in God's mind before coming into existence.

Although Sartre criticizes traditional humanisms because they place human being as a final purpose, he is accused by Heidegger for presenting a traditional humanist conception as well. According to Heidegger, despite his own claims that existence precedes essence, Sartre still uses these terms metaphysically in a traditional sense. In order to transcend this traditional meaning, one has to begin with Being, from which the terms *existentia* and *essentia* are derived. That's why all humanisms which place human being at the center remain traditional or metaphysical. Because of this Heidegger thinks that his theory must be different than all other theories, beginning from Being itself and then moving to the distinction between existence and essence. According to him, human being cannot be understood by itself, but only in light of Being. So while Sartre identifies his existentialism with humanism, Heidegger identifies it with his fundamental ontology.

In his letter to Jean Beaufret, Heidegger illuminates his new humanism. He complains about how Being is forgotten which causes Dasein to be homeless (Heidegger 1998). He writes: "To think the truth of Being at the same time means to think the humanity of *homo humanus*. What counts is *humanitas* in the service of the truth of Being, but without humanism in the metaphysical sense" (Heidegger 1998). So his humanism is a turning back to Being.

Humanism in its metaphysical sense not only explains everything with regard to man but also evaluates everything from man's perspective. It is obvious that this kind of humanism is not found in Heidegger. But it is not found in a strict sense in Sartre either, since he does not put human being as a final end.

Humanism Consists of Existence or Being

In his speech *Existentialism Is A Humanism* (2007), while responding to the critics against existentialism, Sartre presents his humanism. Hence his conception of humanism includes his explanations of existentialism. His existentialism is the target of criticism by those who defend Christianity, as well as by communists and Marxists. Christians accuse Sartre of being a materialist because of his atheism. On the other hand, communists accuse him of not being a materialist, because of his subjectivism. Communists blame him for presenting the human as an isolated being like the Cartesian *I* think. According to them existentialism drags people into pessimism, calmness, laziness and hence makes them inactive, which also mean that existentialism is an observative philosophy that provides bourgeois philosophy a basis. Similarly, critics from the Marxist side claim that existentialism places too much emphasis on the negative aspects of human. For this reason, both critics agree that existentialism is not a humanism.

Sartre explains (2007) that the word 'subjectivism' has two possible interpretations, and his opponents play with both of them, at his expense. Subjectivism means, on the one hand, the freedom of the individual subject to choose what he or she will be, and on the other, the subject's inability to transcend human subjectivity. The fundamental meaning of existentialism resides in the latter. When we say that a human chooses itself, not only do we mean that each of human must choose itself, but also that in choosing itself, the human is choosing for all humans. So Sartre saves himself from subjectivism. He leaps onto a sense of universal responsibility. In fact, in creating the human each of us wills ourselves to be, there is not a single one of our actions that does not at the same time create an image of humanity as we think it ought to be. Choosing to be this or that is to affirm at the same time the value of what we choose, because we can never choose evil. For Sartre, people are afraid of existentialism because it is a challenge to the order which people get used to obeying and it gives humanity free choice which means responsibility.

Man is to be aware of his actions' validity for whole humanity. An individual who chooses himself in fact chooses 'man' by which he experiences the feeling of 'nausea'. Everybody feels nausea but most of them mask it and choose to deceive themselves. But essentially this experience of nausea is the first requirement of acting. Sartre argues that (2007), nausea is not a wall which divides people from the act; rather it motivates people to act, so it is an inseparable part of the act.

For Sartre, existentialism does not push man to inactivity; rather it compels him to act and to take on the responsibility for his acts. But it is always easier to act according to present norms and values than to act by creating one's own choices. Believing that God plans what man will do is an easy way of living. But it is merely a technical interpretation of the world like the technical explanation of a paper knife. For Sartre, since there is no God, human's actions cannot be planned in God's mind. This means that if there is no God, existence precedes essence. At first, man exists and then makes his essence by his decisions. Hence, man is nothing more than his own project. Man is composed of his own acts.

> If, God does not exist, we will encounter no values or orders that can legitimize our conduct. Thus, we have neither behind us, nor before us, in the luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone and without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free: condemned, because he did not create himself, yet nonetheless free, because once cast into the world, he is responsible for everything he does (Sartre 2007).

Since people have a tendency to throw their responsibilities on other's shoulders or external conditions, they cannot face existentialism. As Sartre argues (2007), these people blame their behavior on their heredity, or on environmental influences, or their society, or factors of an organic or psychological nature. With this people would be reassured and would say, 'That is the way we are. No one can do anything about it'. But when an existentialist describes a coward, he says that the coward is responsible for his own cowardice. He is not the way he is because he has a cowardly heart, lung, or brain. He is not like that as the result of his physiological makeup; he is like that because he has made himself a coward through his actions. There is no such thing as a cowardly temperament. A temperament is not an action; a coward is defined by the action he has taken. What people are obscurely feeling, and what horrifies them, is that the coward, as Sartre presents him, is guilty of his cowardice. People would prefer to be born a coward or be born a hero. But this is impossible from an existentialist view.

It is incoherent for existentialism to think of people as live identities which are predetermined. That's why Sartre denies that essence precedes existence. To believe that essence precedes existence is nothing more than to think of man as a paper knife. Man neither exists by a divine project, nor technical means. Therefore, it is a mistake to claim that existentialism emphasizes man's negative aspects. Existentialism is also not a materialist interpretation of man. According to Sartre (2007), since materialism takes man as an object, it characterizes him as if he is merely composed of reactions. Existentialism emphasizes the subjectivity of man, but in an extreme way: in thinking in terms of the *cogito*, Sartre is not limited to a single individual, but is able to transcend to a universal humanity. Man who comprehends himself by *cogito* at the same time comprehends others. There is no nature of the human such as a universal essence, but there is a humanist universal situation of man such as choosing for everybody. The other is necessary for one's existence and knowing oneself. There is a universality for man, but not in the sense of a predetermination. It is constituted day by day. Man constitutes this universality by choosing characters which are preferable for humanity since they are worthy. With this it is seen that the claim that existentialism allows people to do what they want without taking responsibility or seeking universal valuation fails. Making no choice is still making a choice for Sartre. In this context, our choices are not able to be unmotivated, unjustifiable or causeless.

In his speech Sartre (2007) concludes that existentialism is a humanism. According to him the term humanism has two different senses. First, it takes man as an end and ascendant value. Sartre thinks that it is not appropriate for man to be evaluated according to some people's eminent acts. Existentialism does not mean such a judgment. He does not present man as a final end, since existentialism itself implies that man is always in a process of being. This kind of humanism is a fascism. But there is another meaning of humanism in which existentialism stands. Here man is not an end but rather a progress, surpassing itself as an occurrence. Man proceeds beyond himself every time he establishes himself by his acts. In this sense, existentialism is a humanism.

Thence, Sartre responds to his critiques that the philosophy of existentialism defines people by their acts and decisions and for this reason it is not pessimistic or an inactive philosophy. Rather it is humanism since it gives people their destiny in their own hands.

Against Sartre's humanism which emphasizes existentialism, Heidegger presents a humanism that is based on Being. It is not possible to find Heidegger's views on humanism in his *Being and Time*. But in this work, we can find his critiques on anthropology. And in his speech *The Age of World Pictures,* he identifies anthropology with humanism. In this speech Heidegger challenges humanism in its traditional sense while criticizing anthropology. We can follow his thoughts on humanism in his letter to Jean Beaufret in which he argues how it is possible to give a new sense to the term humanism based on the critiques of Sartre's humanism. Although Heidegger's view of humanism is not placed in *Being and Time,* it is obvious that he identifies his humanism with the fundamental ontology that occurs in this work.

Heidegger, in *The Age of World Pictures* (2001), presents his critiques of the traditional sense of humanism by analyzing the modern age. For him the modern age has some basic facts. The first fact of the modern age is its science. This science and its mechanical technic are identified with the metaphysics of the modern age. Heidegger plans to clarify the essence of modern science in order to clarify the essence of modern metaphysics. Another fact of this age is from the way art is constituted in relation to aesthetics. In this way artwork is transformed to an object of life. Another fact is culture which is composed by acts. But this culture is transformed to cultural politics at the end. Finally there is the fact of God's disappearance which doesn't pretend atheism, but rather means that no judgment is made about God. So Christianity becomes a world view and finally historical and psychological discourses replace God. According to Heidegger, these facts show what kind of understanding about Being and beings is dominant in modern era.

For Heidegger modern science has a different kind of essence than the medieval age's *doctrina* or *scientia* and the ancient *episteme.* This is because a different kind of understanding of Being and beings was dominant in those periods. In the modern age, an inquiry is formed by assuming natural processes as an essence. The inquiry reaches a certain knowledge and mathematics is a safe way for it to proceed. But this certainty does not come from mathematics itself; rather it comes from its way of linking itself to the objects' area. This is the difference between Greek and modern science. They are connected with two different kinds of human conceptualization. In the modern age *sophos* does not exist, rather the researcher replaces him. For researchers it is important to prove their research's' certainty, and not to get knowledge. Heidegger seeks out the conception of truth and Being that caused science to become research. Knowing as research consists of making something in front of the eyes which reduces an object to a being. This means that a subject who is placed in front of an object is distant from it. Thus, *Dasein* becomes a subject while Being becomes an object. By this separation man loses his essence. The concept of subject in this metaphysical sense is *hypokeimenon* and has nothing to do with *Dasein* or 'self'. In this way beings are presented as Being. This is why Heidegger calls the modern age the age of the world picture (Heidegger 2001).

As Heidegger argues (2001), the term 'picture' does not mean here a copy of something. What he emphasizes is the way in which beings stand in front of us as a picture. A world picture is not a picture of the world; rather it is an understanding of the world as a picture. In Greek thought there was not such an understanding. Parmenides maintains that the grasping of beings is to belong to Being since it is determined and wanted by Being. Beings do not become beings because how man perceives and portrays them. Rather man is looked at and called by beings. But in the modern age man thinks himself as preceding beings. The process of the world becoming a picture is the same process as man becoming a subject.

Heidegger claims that anthropology occurs by this process in which man aggrandizes himself. In ancient Greek thought it was impossible for there to be a world picture, just as it was impossible for there to be humanism. Humanism is an interpretation of beings moving from man, an explanation of beings moving from where man stands according to man's values. This transforms the world into a picture. Giving priority to man as a subject, means that beings are only beings to the degree they enter into man's world. In the age of the world picture man gives standards, rules and, value to beings (Heidegger 2001).

In his *Letter on Humanism* (1998) Heidegger supports his critiques of humanism by attacking Sartre's, arguing that Sartre moved from the existing individual instead of Being. In this letter he illuminates the structure of thinking and criticizes its technical explanations.

> According to Heidegger, thinking accomplishes the relation of being to the essence of human being. It does not make or cause the relation. In thinking being comes to language. Language is the house of being and in its home human beings dwell. Those who think and those who create with words are the guardians of this home. As in the *Age of World Picture,* Heidegger here criticizes technical thinking. This kind of thinking is a product of a delusion that philosophy is deficient without being scientific. With this delusion thinking abandons Being. Heidegger's attempt is to turn thinking back to Being. According to him the rigor of thinking, in contrast to that of sciences, does not consist merely in an artificial, that is, technical-theoretical exactness of concepts. It lies in the fact that saying remains purely in the element of the truth of being and lets the simplicity of its manifold dimensions rule (Heidegger 1998).

For Heidegger, if we want to give humanism a new content, we have to abstract it from being an "-ism" because "-isms" are not trustworthy since they demand explanation. But Greek thought did not think through such "-isms", because "thinking was the thinking of Being" in ancient Greek. This means that thinking was not far from itself in that period as it belonged to Being (Heidegger 1998). Philosophy, while becoming a technic of explanation, becomes a slave of such "-isms" and gets away from its essence, the essence of its language. The language of such a technical philosophy is no more the home of Being.

Heidegger claims that (1998) the transformation that happens in language creates a danger for human being. Language, in as much as it becomes distant from Being, prevents humans from hearing the demand of Being. But if the human being is to find his way once again into the nearness of Being, he must first learn to exist in the nameless. He has to leave all abstractions, explanations or –isms. Only by this abandonment, can the human dwell in the truth of Being. If man can leave himself in his "care", he can hear the demand of Being. Care has a power of turning a human's face to Being. The humanity (*humanus*) of man (*homo*) lies in responding to the demand of Being, and humanism (*humanitas*) is the aim of this. Humanism is the attempt to think and work to not lose humanity's essence, which is the relation of human with Being. The *humanitas* of *homo* lies in his essence.

All kinds of humanisms accept that a human essence consists in his being an *animal rationale.* Heidegger claims that this determination is metaphysical.

> Metaphysics does not ask any question about the truth of Being itself. Nor does it therefore ask in what way the essence of the human being belongs to the truth of being. Metaphysics thinks of the human being on the basis of *animalitas* and does not think in the direction of his *humanitas*. Metaphysics closes itself to the simple essential fact that the human being essentially occurs in his essence only where he is claimed by Being. Only from that claim "has" he found that wherein his essence dwells. Only from this dwelling does he have language as the home that preserves the ecstatic for his essence. Such standing in the clearing of Being Heidegger calls ek-sistence of human beings. This way of beings is proper only to the human

> being. Ek-sistence so understood is not only the ground of the possibility of reason, *ratio,* but is also that in which the essence of the human being preserves the source that determines him (Heidegger 1998).

What the human being is, that is the essence of human being, lies in his ek-sistence. But Heidegger claims that ek-sistence is not identical with the traditional concept of *existentia*, which means actuality in contrast to *essentia* as possiblity. The essence of Dasein, lies in its existence. However, here the opposition between *existentia* and *essentia* is not what is at issue, because neither of these metaphysical determinations of being, let alone their relationship, is in question. The ecstatic essence of human being consists in ek-sistence, which is different from the metaphysically conceived *existentia.* Medieval philosophy conceives the latter as *actualitas*. Kant represents *existentia* as actuality in the sense of the objectivity of experience. Hegel defines *existentia* as the self-knowing Idea of absolute subjectivity. Nietzsche grasps *existentia* as the eternal recurrence of the same. In any case living creatures are as they are without standing outside their being as such and within the truth of being, preserving in such standing the essential nature of their being (Heidegger 1998).

Heidegger understands actuality from the term *existentia* while Sartre understands it from existence. For this reason, Heidegger thinks that human's essence is not in his existence in the Sartrian sense, but in hearing the claim of Being, that is his ek-sistence. The essence of human being is not in establishing himself as a subject before Being, but existing through and in Being. In other words, the essence of human is his being an ek-sistence. On this point language is very important for Heidegger. Language is not the utterance of an organism, nor is it the expression of a living thing. Nor can it ever be thought in an essentially correct way in terms of its symbolic character, perhaps not even in terms of the character of signification. Language is the clearing-concealing advent of being itself. Ek-sistence thought in terms of ecstasis, does not coincide with *existentia*, in either form or content. In terms of content ek-sistence means standing out into the truth of Being. *Existentia* (existence) means, in contrast *actualitas,* actuality as opposed to mere possibility as Idea. Ek-sistence identifies the determination of what the human being is in the destiny of truth. *Existentia* is the name for the realization of something that is as it appears in its Idea. The sentence 'human being ek-sists' is not an answer to the question of whether the human being actually is or not; rather, it responds to the question concerning the 'essence' of the human being. This indicates that 'essence' is now being defined neither from *esse essentiae*, nor *esse existentiae* but rather from the ek-static character of Dasein (Heidegger 1998).

As ek-sisting, the human being sustains Da-sein, in that he takes the *Da*, the clearing of Being, into 'care'. But Da-sein itself occurs essentially as 'thrown'. Being throws and demands Da-sein. In this context, ek-sistence does not mean the realization of a certain essence. Here Heidegger criticizes Sartre's claim that existence precedes essence. Because, Sartre in this statement is taking *existentia* and *essentia* according to their metaphysical meaning, which from Plato's time on has said that *essentia* precedes *existentia*. Sartre reverses this claim; however, Heidegger thinks that a reversal of the metaphysical statement is again another metaphysical statement. For Heidegger this is the result of the oblivion of the truth of Being. We have to ask first of all, from what destiny of Being does this differentiation in being as *esse essentiae* and *esse existentiae* come to appear to thinking? There has to be a consideration as to why the question about the destiny has never been asked and why it could never be thought. Heidegger says that this is a sign of the forgetfulness of Being itself. For this reason Sartre's existentialism has, according to Heidegger, nothing to do with ek-sistence which appears in *Being and Time.* According to Heidegger, Sartre does not start from the point which he has to, that is Being itself (Heidegger 1998).

The essence of human is his existence for Heidegger too, but here existence means ek-sistence which Sartre does not emphasize. To say that the essence of human being is his ek-sistence, means that man is thrown by Being itself into the truth of Being. In this way human is the shepherd of Being. For this reason it is only the human being who as ek-sisting individual has to guard the truth of Being. Human beings experience this ecstatic existence as care, which Heidegger focuses on in *Being and Time.*

According to Heidegger the traditional humanisms did not find this relation between human and Being and could not see the ecstatic existence of an ek-sisting individual who is not a subject before Being, but a shepherd of Being. The truth of human being is to realize that beings appear in the light of Being as the beings that they are, and a man is an individual in as much as he responds to the demand of Being.

Heidegger is an anti-humanist in a traditional sense since he claims that such humanisms do not present man's value which can only be understood in the light of Being. But this does not mean that Heidegger himself defends that which is inhuman nor does he devalue the human. He claims that man's worth lies in his relation to Being.

> Being- that is not God and a cosmic ground, Being is essentially farther than all beings and is yet nearer to the human being than every being, be it a rock, a beast, a work of art, a machine, be it an angel or God. Being is the nearest. Yet the near remains farthest from the human being (Heidegger 1998).

Heidegger claims (Heidegger 1998) that the question of Being always remains a question about beings. It is still not at all what its elusive name indicates: the question in the direction of being. Philosophy, even when it becomes critical through Descartes and Kant, always follows the course of metaphysical representation. It thinks from beings back to beings with only a glance in passing toward being. For every departure from beings and every return to them stands already in the light of Being. For this reason the truth of Being remains covered. Heidegger's answer to the question of how Being relates to ek-sistence is that Being itself is this relation since as the locality of truth of Being amidst beings, it gathers to itself and embraces ek-sistence in its existential, that is, ecstatic essence.

Sartre maintains that existentialism is a humanism, since we are precisely in a situation where there are only human beings (Sartre 2001). But Heidegger reverses this sentence by virtue of claiming that it is metaphysical: we are precisely in a situation where principally there is Being (Heidegger 1998). Here Being itself is not a being. But when we say "being is", we can easily confuse Being with beings because "is" is commonly said of something that exists. We say that such a thing is a being. For this reason Parmenides said "there is being" instead of "being is". Heidegger understands Being as beyond all beings.

Heidegger's answer to the question of how some sense can be restored to the word humanism as such is that the question contains an admission that this word has lost its meaning. It has lost its meaning because the essence of humanism is metaphysical, which now means that metaphysics not only does not pose the question concerning the truth of Being, but also obstructs it, because it persists in the oblivion of Being. For this reason, examining the essence of humanism is to also examine the essence of human. Of course, the word humanism has some meaning for Heidegger; humanism tells us that the essence of human lies in his ek-sistence. In this way Heidegger changes the content of the term.

After restoring the term humanism, Heidegger identifies his new conception with his philosophy which he presents in *Being and Time.* If humanism is to think the essence of human and the essence of human is to think the truth of Being, then this thinking must be the fundamental ontology. Fundamental ontology is different from the ontology of metaphysics.

> The fundamental ontology strives to reach back into the essential ground from which thought concerning the truth of Being emerges. But "ontology" itself however, whether transcendental or precritical, is subject to critique, not because it thinks the being of beings, and in so doing reduces Being to a concept, but because it does not think the truth of Being and so fails to recognize that there is thinking more rigorous than conceptual thinking. In the poverty of its first breakthrough, the thinking that tries to advance thought into the truth of Being brings only a small part of that wholly other dimension to language. This language even falsifies itself, for it does not yet succeed in retaining the essential help of phenomenological seeing while dispensing with the inappropriate concern with 'science' and 'research'. But in order to make the attempt at thinking recognizable and at the same time understandable for existing philosophy, it could at first be expressed only within the horizon of that existing philosophy and the use of its current terms (Heidegger 1998).

Conclusion

As we have argued the concept of humanism for both Sartre and Heidegger is not a humanism in its metaphysical or classical sense. Both philosophers criticize these kinds of humanisms and emphasize the difference of their own theories. And finally both of them identify their philosophical views with their humanisms. Yet there are several points which are basically different for each of their humanisms. First of all for Heidegger, Sartre's humanism remains as metaphysical as all the others that he himself criticizes. Instead of going beyond them he uses the terms existence and essence without changing their content. Sartre merely changes the priority of the terms, but not their meaning. Without presenting the relation of human to Being, his humanism is deficient even though it tries to give a new meaning to the concept humanism.

It is reasonable to accept that Sartre's humanism differs from a modern sense since he does not present human being as a final end and he ascends to a universal sense of responsibility from an individual one. With the term nausea, which pushes the human to act, Sartre claims that everybody has to realize his own existence as no one can escape from choosing and deciding. In this context, Sartre maintains that since human is not predetermined in a divine mind, such as an object which is determined in our mind, the existence of human precedes its essence. Thus, Sartre identifies existentialism with humanism. For this reason his humanism is in a sense a new approach in the history of philosophy, but it is not new enough for Heidegger as it is not focused on Being itself.

Heidegger, before the concepts of existence and essence, emphasizes the necessity of examining Being from the point within which these distinctions emerge. So he establishes the relation between human and Being in his humanism which at the end is equalized to his fundamental ontology. For him, human becomes a subject towards the world as a result of confusing Being with beings and reduces Being to an object. So man forgets the meaning of Being itself and his being as well. Human beings become distant from their essence which consists of ek-sistence, that is, the power of hearing the voice of Being. Human beings losing the truth of Being, are alienated from Being. But by restoring the word humanism through fundamental ontology, Heidegger reminds people of their ek-sistence. Like Sartre, Heidegger identifies his philosophy with humanism and qualifies the other humanisms preceding his as metaphysical, including Sartre's.

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ONE CIVILISATION OR MANY? THE CONCEPT OF CIVILISATION IN DISCOURSE FOR AND AGAINST TURKISH EU ACCESSION

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Abstract:

The paper argues that the concept of civilisation has been frequently used as a metaphorin arguments both in favour of and against Turkey's eventual EU membership. However, an examination of the discourse suggests that civilisation, which is a polyvalent concept, has been understood and used differently by each side. While the concept of civilisation used by supporters of Turkish accession is an inclusive one, according to which civilisation is one and (potentially) available to all, it is used in a very different way by opponents of Turkey's full membership. In this case, the conception of civilisation is similar to that of Huntington, as multiple, culturally based and relatively inflexible. Hence, on this basis, it is argued that Turkey is not a suitable candidate for full EU membership as it does not share the civilisational background of European countries, and thus cannot easily adapt to 'European' values such as democracy or human rights. Finally, a minority of arguments imply a culturally based, yet more flexible view of European civilisation as being historically influenced by Islam, and by Turkey in particular. Such a view, similar to Delanty's 'civilisational constellations' implies support of Turkish accession on a cultural basis.

Key words: civilisation, European Union, Turkey, enlightenment, Huntington.

Introduction

Each round of European Union (EU) enlargement provokes considerable soul-searching as to the nature of European identity and the EU's eventual borders. This has especially been true in the case of Turkey's accession bid. However, according to social constructivism, identity is not something inherent and fixed; thus an identity cannot simply be 'found'; instead it must be constructed and reconstructed. It is argued here that the division of EU opinion regarding the issue of Turkish accession represents two alternative attempts at constructing an identity for the EU.

It has frequently been noted that there is a deep division among EU political elites about whether Turkey should eventually become part of the EU or not. Many, most notably in the Commission and in a group of Member States including Spain, the UK and most of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), argue that Turkey should be allowed the same chances as any other candidate country to accede to the EU. Others, however, led by the Franco-German right, argue that by virtue of its cultural and religious heritage Turkey is simply not a European country at all and, thus, should not be considered for full membership in the EU; instead it should be offered a more limited 'privileged partnership'.

This paper argues that these competing arguments are based on fundamentally differing concepts of civilisation. Civilisation is a polyvalent term; it thus has several possible meanings. It is put forward here that, while those who support Turkey's eventual accession to the EU see civilisation as fundamentally 'universal' in character, opponents of Turkey's full membership argue that, rather than 'one' civilisation, there are several distinct civilisations which are culturally based and relatively fixed in nature. In this view, Turkey, which belongs by history to 'Islamic civilisation' cannot easily adopt the EU's values, which are founded on 'European civilisation'.

A Social Constructivist Approach to Identity Construction

According to the social constructivist approach, identity is continuously constructed, negotiated and contested between political actors (Rumelili, 2008:

99). It is, then, not rooted in objective characteristics. However, in the constructivist view identity cannot be created overnight and cannot be completely divorced from objective traits such as ethnicity, religion history or culture (Rumelili 2008: 99). Although constructivism allows for a relation between cultural variables and collective identity this connection is much less fixed than in the primordialist or essentialist version[1] and is subject to construction and reconstruction (Risse 2004: 167).

In the social constructivist view *discourse,* particularly that of elites and epistemic communities, is an important factor in social learning and, ultimately, identity construction. As Fearon and Laitin argue, for instance, "discourses define identities and shape or determine actions"(2000: 853). While epistemic communities tend to have an impact on policy learning, the discourse of political elites tends to have more of an impact in framing particular issues (Milliken 1999: 233). Active efforts to construct a territorial identity, then, tend to be an elite driven, top-down process.

In addition, according to constructivists, elite attempts to construct identity are more likely to result in social learning on the part of the general population during a time of perceived crisis or at critical junctures. As Checkel argues, when "the target of the socialization attempt is in a novel and uncertain environment … [it is] cognitively motivated to analyze new information" (2005: 3). Secondly, the public is more open to elite attempts at identity construction when the elite in question is viewed as legitimate and credible; in other words it must be part of the audience's 'in-group' (Checkel 2001: 59). Moreover, from a constructivist view, this tends to be more successful when the ideas promoted by the elites in question do not significantly clash with those held by the public; the audience should have "few prior, ingrained beliefs inconsistent with the socializing agency's message" (Checkel 2001: 59).

However, identities also imply limits; if some people are included in a particular identity group there must be others who are not. Social identity theory argues that identities necessitate 'Others'; in other words, in order to define who we are we must also define who we are not. The 'imagined community', then, is further defined by a sense of difference in relation to other communities: thus an imagined community needs an 'Other'. Moreover, individuals tend to perceive their group identity as more positive than that of their 'Others', therefore increasing their self-esteem. Thus, an examination of Othering can help to shed light on the various ways in which identities are constructed;

> Unstated in these narratives representing the Other are counternarratives of the self. Thus, if the Other is an 'infidel', then 'we' are 'the faithful'. If the Other is a 'barbarian' then we must be 'civilized'. If the Other is a 'sick man', then we have 'healthy' and 'robust' regimes and societies. If the Other is 'backward', 'despotic', or a 'laggard', then we are 'modern', 'liberal' and 'progressive'. If the Other is 'Asiatic' and 'Eastern' then we are 'European' and 'Western' (Hall 2001: 104).

Social identity theory also puts forward that an individual has several social identities which correspond to widening circles of group membership, and the identity that is most salient at any given moment depends on the social context. Thus, just as identities appear to be multiple in nature, it follows that the 'Others' which define those identities can also differ (Risse and Engelmann-Martin 2007: 292-293). In Kaelble's words, these Others may be "close or alien, amicable or inimical, helpful or menacing, linked to or separate from Europe" (2009: 207). Indeed, a wide variety of candidates for Europe's 'Others' have been put forward, including (but probably not limited to) the East in general, the Islamic East in particular, the USA, and Europe's own past (Neumann 1999).

EU Identity Construction and Discourse on Turkish Accession: One Civilisation or Many?

Civilisation is a polyvalent concept in that it has many possible meanings. This multiplicity is well illustrated by a quip made by Indian leader Mohandas Gandhi on a trip to England in the 1930s. When asked by a reporter what he thought of Western civilisation, his reply was "I think it would be a very good thing" (Aydon 2009: 45). As Kuzmanovic argues, it is its very polyvalence that has led civilisation to be a metaphorical pivot in framing EU-Turkey relations (2008: 42).

[1] Essentialist concepts of collective identities argue that cultural variables are givens which then develop into national identities during the process of nation building. Thus, in this view, identities are fixed and the creation of supranational or postnational identities is impossible.

One issue of debate is whether civilisation is one or many, whether it is culturally bound or transcends cultures. Thus, there has been much discussion over whether the values which constitute civilisation are universal in nature and potentially available to all, or if they vary according to cultural and religious background. Notably, Huntington's 'Clash of Civilisations' thesis which, according to Adib-Moghaddam is a 'contagious' idea in the sense that, whether in agreement with it or mockingly, many tend to contemplate it and engage with its premises (2011: 1), puts forward the latter point of view. According to Huntington, then, there is no single civilisation; instead, the world is divided into different civilisations[2], each of which has a fundamentally different outlook and different values resulting from the specificities of its religious foundation and historical development. In this way, then, a civilisation is "a culture writ large" (Huntington 1997: 41). Thus, in his view, the belief in the universality of the West's values and political systems is naive. Instead, each civilisation has its own, unique values which may not be compatible with those of the West;

> The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. These differences are the products of centuries. They will not soon disappear (Huntington 1993: 3).

Therefore, so-called 'universal values' such as representative democracy, the rule of law or secularism are seen as specifically resulting from the European experience, notably the influence of classical culture (particularly Roman law) and 'Christian values', as well as the Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment and, importantly, cannot easily be transferred to other 'civilisations' which have their own systems of values (Huntington 1997: 69).

A more flexible view is the concept of civilisational constellations. In this view, while civilisations are considered formations of the *longue duree,* they are open to significant internal change and are more adaptable to new circumstances than Huntington's civilisations. Each civilisation is a *constellation* of societies, in that it is a juxtaposed rather than fixed cluster of changing elements; a civilisation in this view thus constitutes a unity in difference. Similarly, civilisations may also cluster together; a *civilisational constellation* is a configuration of civilisations (Delanty and Rumford 2005: 37).

On this basis, Delanty and Rumford argue that Europe is, in fact, constituted by a tripartite set of civilisational constellations; the Occidental Christian constellation, the Byzantine/Slavic/Eurasian constellation and the Ottoman Islamic constellation (2005: 38-40):

> The historical roots of this Western civilisation – Athens, Rome and Jerusalem – were not European in the Western sense of the term European. Classical antiquity and origins of Christianity were Mediterranean … Western civilisation is based on a history that was never entirely European, but became Europe in a process of borrowing, translation and diffusion. The major examples of this are Hellenization, Romanization and the subsequent adoption of the Roman heritage by Christianity, the Renaissance and scientific revolution and age of discovery, and exploration and imperialism which led to the diffusion in Europe of non-Western inventions and marked 'the rise of the West' (Delanty and Rumford 2005: 38).

An alternative view, however, is that civilisation is one and transcends culture; in other words that there is a 'world civilisation'. In this case, the concept of 'civilisation', linked with the idea of a settled, urban and literate society, is defined in contrast to the 'barbarous', or, in psychological terms, as a taming of 'the beast within' (Osborne 2007: 4). While this idea of civilisation as the 'in-group' and barbarians as the 'out-group' can be traced as far back as ancient Greece, the term 'civilisation' itself came into use in the French Enlightenment. According to a view of civilisation inherited from the French Enlightenment, then, while Western Europe is seen as the source of civilisation, the resulting

[2] According to Huntington, the major civilisations are Western, Latin American, Othodox, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Japanese, and possibly African (Huntington 1997: 26–27). Israel is considered a unique state with its own civilisation, although this is extremely similar to the West (1997: 48). Ethiopia and Haiti are 'lone' countries in Huntington's view (1997: 136–137).

values, such as democracy, human rights or the rule of law, are potentially universal in nature. Here, civilisation is not a given; instead it can only be achieved as the result of progress and development (Kuzmanovic 2008: 57). A different view goes a further step by arguing that these 'universal values' did not originate exclusively in Western culture but can be found independently in cultures around the world. As Amatrya Sen, for instance, argues,

> The championing of political liberty and of religious tolerance in their full contemporary forms is not an old historical feature of any country or civilisation in the world. Plato and Aquinas were no less authoritarian in their thinking than was Confucius. This is not to deny that there were champions of tolerance in classical European thought, but even if this is taken to give credit to the whole Western world (from the ancient Greeks to the Vikings and the Ostrogoths), there are similar examples in other cultures as well (Sen 2007: 50).

In the context of the EU, then, civilisation has been an important metaphor in the attempt to define a European identity. The question of a European identity to underscore EU integration has become particularly important since the widened impact of the EU following the Maastricht Treaty, as both the salience and the divisiveness of public opinion on European integration have increased (Hooghe and Marks 2005: 251). Other events, including enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as well as the attempt to develop a 'Constitution' for the EU have also prompted considerable soul-searching about the nature and identity of the EU. As Kuzmanovic argues, while the concept of civilisation has played an important part in conceptualising EU integration from the outset, the significance of civilisation has become particularly notable as a trope for imagining what the EU is and should be since the 1990s (Kuzmanovic 2008: 58).

The prospect of Turkey's accession has intensified this debate. In particular, the idea that the EU should be based on a 'universal' civilisation has been challenged, most notably on the Franco-German right, by an alternative view that the EU should be grounded on a more cultural, Huntington-type 'European' identity. As Jose Casanova argues,

> The public debates in Europe over Turkey's admission have shown that Europe is actually the torn country, deeply divided over its cultural identity, unable to answer the question whether European identity, and therefore its external and internal boundaries, should be defined by the common heritage of Christianity and Western civilization, or by its modern secular values of liberalism, universal human rights, political democracy and tolerant and inclusive multiculturalism (Casanova 2006: 241).

Thus, the increasing politicization of EU identity issues has revealed two contrasting EU identity projects based on differing conceptions of civilisation. The first of these is the 'official' version of EU identity, as expressed in the Treaties; an outward-looking, cosmopolitan civic identity project generally promoted by EU elites and based on 'universal norms'. The formation of a cosmopolitan European identity has also been supported by philosophers such as Habermas, among others. It is this cosmopolitan, civic identity which is embodied, for instance, in the Lisbon Treaty and other EU legislation. Such an identity rests on shared political and social values rather than on a 'thicker' ethnic, linguistic or cultural identity. Therefore, in this view civilisation is one, and the borders of the EU are potentially open to any country considered geographically European regardless of culture or religion as long as they are seen as respecting the 'universal' norms cited above.

The second attempt to construct a European identity is more inward-looking, populist and cultural in nature (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009: 9-10). As is discussed below, such populist movements, most notably those of the French and German right, have argued that a strong Europe requires a strong cultural identity. Increasingly, this has taken on a 'civilisational' nature; thus, the borders of Europe are considered to be the borders of 'European civilisation'.

In this view, then, the 'universal norms' on which the EU is based are the product of European civilisation (itself, in Huntington's terms, a 'sub-branch' of Western civilisation). They are specifically the result of the European experience, notably the influence of classical culture (particularly Roman law) and 'Christian values', as well as the Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment. On this basis, it is argued that a country such as Turkey, perceived as coming from a different civilisation, in this case 'Islamic civilisation', is inherently incapable of properly comprehending and adopting such values.

An EU based on 'One Civilisation': Implications for Turkey's Accession

So far, due to the cultural diversity of Europe, the EU's drive to construct an EU identity has focused mostly on the creation of a civic rather than a cultural identity. Cerruti, for instance, defines civic identity as "the set of social and political values and principles that we recognise as ours, or in the sharing of which we feel like 'us', like a political group or entity" (Cerruti 2003: 27). According to this view, then, the EU is conceived as a "rights-based, post-national Union founded on universal principles such as democracy and governed by the rule of law, rather than on traditional 'national' values such as language, ethnic group, religion and culture" (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca 2007: 5).

Despite some attempts to create European cultural symbols, the concept of a European cultural identity beyond universal norms such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law has not been emphasized in the Treaties, so that any country which is considered both geographically European and able to fulfill these universal values qualifies potentially for EU membership. More than cultural 'Europeanness', then, EU accession implies the voluntary acceptance of a certain set of rules as binding and legitimate. As can be seen in the Preamble to the 2004 Treaty on European Union (TEU)[3], this is based on a concept of civilisation that is close to the 'French Enlightenment' view;

> Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law. […] Believing that Europe, reunited after bitter experiences, intends to continue along the path of civilisation, progress and prosperity for the good of all its inhabitants […] and that it wishes to deepen the democratic and transparent nature of its public life, and to strive for peace, justice and solidarity throughout the world …

Similarly, further analysis of the TEU[4] indicates that the identity referents are generally of a universalist nature rather than based on a common past, and are limited to universal principles. Article 2(1a) of the TEU affirms that "the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities". In addition, article 3(2) of the TEU stresses 'unity in diversity', as it emphasizes the EU's commitment to respect the "rich cultural and linguistic diversity" of the Member States, and its desire to "ensure that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.

Moreover, the focus on the preservation of national identities, cultures and traditions means that there is room for a certain degree of divergence of interpretation and implementation of these values between the Member States. This implies appreciation and tolerance of differences between countries, regions, political orientations and individuals; in other words respect for and interest in the internal Other, at least in so far as the 'universal values' underpinning the EU are respected. Thus, the appreciation of difference is seen as one of Europe's greatest achievements, and a stimulant for democratic institutions as well as for cultural and economic innovation (Kaelble 2009: 201).

Importantly, the Preamble to the TEU does not mention 'a community of Christian values' although, as discussed below, during the European Convention, some Member States, as well as the Catholic Church and some intellectuals, such as Weiler, wanted Judeo-Christian values to be more openly mentioned in the Constitutional Treaty. Instead, the Preamble makes a more general allusion to European religious values as the foundation of universal values on which the EU is based: "Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law.

Thus, while the Treaty mentions 'Europeanness' and 'European values', these values are actually universal and somewhat neutral in nature. More specific references to 'Europeanness' and 'European values' were avoided in order to prevent dissent and to bolster the EU's legitimacy among European citizens. Moreover, the emphasis is again more on the

[3] The numbering of the TEU is that used following its amendment to the Lisbon treaty.

[4] The numbering of the TEU is that used following its amendment to the Lisbon treaty (Open Europe, 2008)

creation of a future common identity through universal values and integration than on a shared past. In addition, the Charter of Fundamental Rights also emphasizes universal values coupled with respect for diversity in areas such as religion, language and custom (Zürcher and Van der Linden 2007: 449).

Similarly, the Copenhagen criteria for accession, set out by the European Council in 1993, demand that the candidate countries meet four conditions as follows:

> The stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union … [and] the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (European Council, 1993).

As Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca point out, then, "whether the candidate country is Turkey, Norway or Switzerland it should not make much difference" (2007: 6). Thus, from this point of view, there is no cultural criteria for EU accession; instead any country that is accepted as geographically European and which fulfills these criteria should be allowed to join regardless of broader identity questions such as religion or history. Supporters of this vision of EU identity, then, tend to favour Turkish accession in principle on the grounds that it would help to prevent a 'clash of civilisations' by proving that values such as democracy are not limited to 'Western civilisation' and that the EU is not a 'Christian club'. Thus, it would show that civilisation in the broader sense is open to all. This kind of discourse has been used by supporters of Turkish accession in the European Commission and Parliament as well as those who support it among national political elites.

As, for instance, former Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn argued in 2004: "A Turkey where the rule of law is firmly rooted in its society and state will prove that, contrary to prejudices, European values can successfully coexist with a predominantly Muslim population. Such a Turkey will be a most valuable crossroads between civilisations" (Rehn 2004). Similarly, former German chancellor Gerhard Schröeder argued that, "A democratic Turkey committed to European values would serve as proof that there is no contradiction between commitment to Islam and enlightened modern society" (2004). In this view, then, although a barbarous 'Other' clearly exists, it is potentially capable of change; thus, the EU is seen as a global force for 'good'. As Rehn argues;

> In my view, we are not doomed to an eternal conflict between the West and the Muslim world. As we used both containment and co-operation to win the Cold War, we should today show resolve against Islamic fundamentalism and firmly contain all kinds of terrorism, while continuing to build bridges with Islam and repeat universal democratic values. Turkey plays a key role in this (2008).

Similar arguments can also be seen in the political discourse of those Member States whose political elites broadly support Turkish accession, such as Spain or Britain, as well as in the discourse of those politicians who support Turkish accession in countries such as Germany. As Aksoy argues regarding the British Labour government's attitude to Turkey's bid for full membership;

> The argument that was consistently pointed out by the government was that EU membership would help to consolidate democracy and secularism in Turkey, which was overwhelmingly a Muslim nation, and this would, apart from sending all the right messages to other Muslim nations which were similarly trying to democratize, help repair the relations between the West and the Muslim world that were significantly damaged by the September 11 attacks and the subsequent War on Terror (Aksoy 2009: 476) .

Similar arguments have been used by other countries which are in favour of Turkish accession. According to Soler i Lecha and Garcia, for example, pragmatic arguments, including that of Turkey's geostrategic value, are also frequently used in support of Turkish accession in Spanish political discourse, particularly on the left (2009: 74).

Moreover, in this discourse it is argued that not only would Turkish accession bolster European security by contributing to the prevention of a clash of civilisations, the failure of Turkey to join the EU would put both Turkey itself and its EU neighbors at the mercy of Islamic fundamentalism. As British Conservative MP Liam Fox, for instance, argued in 2006, EU membership will protect Turkey from those in the "fundamentalist shadows" (Fox 2006).

In addition, bearing in mind that every identity is constructed *vis a vis* an Other, this construction of EU identity includes an internal 'out group': xenophobia and racism (Risse 2010: 53). From this point of view, then, Turkey's accession would help to combat anti-Islamic and xenophobic tendencies within Europe. As Denis MacShane, British Labour Minister for Europe argued in 2002, EU support for Turkish membership "allows Europe to deal with the Islamophobia that drives the new right-wing politics of rejectionism of all things foreign. It should also encourage the major nations of the EU to bring European Muslims into mainstream politics" (MacShane 2002).

Thus from this point of view Turkey may be considered less civilised if it is not seen as sufficiently internalizing the 'internal values' on which the EU is founded. It is not, though, seen as being inherently unable to adopt these values as a result of belonging to 'Islamic' rather than 'Western' civilisation. As is explored below, however, the latter view has been increasingly openly expressed in recent years as an argument for not offering Turkey full membership of the EU.

A European Cultural (or Civilisational) Identity

A contrasting argument is that an entity such as the EU needs to be constructed on the basis of a solid cultural identity, such as a common religious or historical experience. A shared history in this context has often been understood as Europe's classical Greek and Roman past, the Renaissance and/or the Enlightenment. As has been pointed out, in Huntington's view, for instance, 'European civilisation' is informed by 'classical civilisation', which, for him, includes Greek philosophy and rationalism, Roman law, Latin and Christianity . However, he also adds several features which are expressly linked to democracy and the rule of law (Huntington 1997: 69).

Importantly, in Huntington's view, Turkey is a 'torn country' whose leaders have tried to 'shift' its civilisation from Muslim to Western civilisation[5]; given his essentialist concept of civilisational identity, as discussed above, this is a difficult, if not impossible task. Huntington argues that this could only be achieved if the national elite, national public opinion and dominant elements in the host society are staunchly supportive of the change in civilisational identity. However, in his view these conditions are not sufficiently fulfilled in the case of Turkey (Huntington 1997: 144–149).

As has been argued, since the opening of Turkey's accession process at the Helsinki summit in 1999, and especially since discussions began over the opening of accession negotiations in 2004–2005, opponents to Turkey's EU membership have often tended to phrase their arguments against Turkey's accession in terms of cultural identity. This has been the case both in moderate right-wing parties, most notably in France and Germany, and on the far-right. Christianity in particular, for many, appears to still be an important component of 'European identity'. Thus it follows that Islam, and an 'Islamic' country such as Turkey, continue to be seen as an important 'Other' at the popular as well as right-wing elite level. In this view, whatever the pragmatic benefits of Turkish accession, these are overshadowed by Turkey's perceived 'non-Europeanness' and non-democratic nature.

Despite the fact that Turkey is actually a secular state, then, the fact that the vast majority of its population are, at least nominally, followers of Islam is often cited as a reason for excluding it from the EU, which is considered by many to be founded on 'Judeo-Christian values'.

There was much discussion during the European Convention of 2003–2005 over whether the EU constitution should include references to Christianity. The idea that Christianity should explicitly underlie EU values has also, unsurprisingly, been supported by the Catholic Church. Pope Benedict, for instance, argued that "Christians and Muslims could be privileged partners", indicating that the Catholic Church would find it difficult to accept that Turkey could be a full member of the EU (Rehn 2007: 146). Centre-right political elites, particularly but not exclusively in France and Germany, have also tended to emphasize such cultural elements in addition to geography and universal values when defining European identity (Yılmaz, 2007) (Syzmanski, 2007: 34).

Yılmaz describes the role of Christianity in right wing discourse on European identity as an 'extinguished volcano'; thus, as has been argued above, Christianity is viewed not as a belief system but as a

[5] According to Huntington, Mexico and Australia are also examples of 'torn countries'.

cultural marker. Thus, in this view Christian heritage is viewed as the basis of some secular European values, including the separation of religion and the state, the idea of the natural rights of man and even the culture of capitalism. Therefore, conversion to Christianity is viewed as insufficient to acquire 'Judeo-Christian values', as the convert "does not carry the Christian heritage in his or her 'cultural genes'" (Yılmaz 2007: 298). Shakman Hurd supports this analysis, particularly regarding secularism;

> Secularisation, in this view, is the realisation of a Western religious tradition. Religion is part of the moral basis of Western civilisation. A significant implication of this authoritative discourse is that the secularist separation of religion from politics, and the democratic settlement of which it is a part, is perceived as an unique Western achievement that is superior to its non-Western rivals … The potential for secularisation is tied to a particular cultural identity, civilisational history and geographic location … (2006: 409–410)

As Yılmaz argues, "it is generally believed that Turkish secularism is fake, it is artificial, it has been assimilated by a small Westernised elite, it has not submerged into the 'cultural genes' of the larger Turkish society, and it has been protected only by the force of arms" (Yılmaz 2007: 300).

This construction of EU identity, then, also contains an 'out group from within'; in this case Muslim immigrants from North Africa and Turkey (Risse, 2010: 54). From this point of view, then, the accession to the EU of a country like Turkey with a majority Muslim population is seen as highly problematic. As former Belgian prime minister and current permanent President of the European Council Herman van Rompuy argues, "The universal values which are in force in Europe, and which are also fundamental values of Christianity, will lose vigour with the entry of a large Islamic country such as Turkey" (Cited in Cronin 2010).

Thus, in this view, these norms are specifically the result of Western, or European, civilisation, and cannot easily be adopted by other civilisations, especially 'Islamic' civilisation. The concept of the democratic West is thus constructed against that of the 'barbarous' East. This is by no means a new idea. The 'Orient', particularly the Islamic East, has been a traditional and constitutive 'Other' for European or Christian identity. Although the concept of the Orient as an undemocratic and authoritarian 'Other' can be traced as far back as ancient Greece, it was the rise of Christianity in Europe and the subsequent threat posed by Islam to 'Christendom' due to the expansionist nature of neighbouring Islamic regimes at the time that developed and consolidated the image of the Near and Middle East as Europe's principal 'Other'.

Notably, such views also seem to be prevalent among large parts of the European public. Surveys among the European public tend to support a negative view of Islam, and indicate that many Europeans view Islam as being incompatible with 'universal' values. According to a German survey carried out in 2006, for instance, 83% of respondents agreed with the view that 'Islam is driven by fanaticism', 71% believed Islam to be intolerant, and, significantly, 61% considered Islam to be 'undemocratic' (Cited in Bardakoğlu 2008: 113). Europe-wide surveys support this negative view of Islam. In the 2006 Transatlantic Trends survey, for instance, 88% of respondents from the 9 EU countries included believed that the values of Islam are not compatible with democracy, rising to 95% and 98% in France and Germany respectively (Transatlantic Trends 2006)[6]. Therefore, as Kaya points out, "Islam is, by and large, considered and represented as a threat to the European way of life" (Kaya 2005).

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[6] In contrast to these arguments, research suggests that Turkish people do not significantly differ from those in the EU in their evaluation of democracy. As Dixon points out, "Contrary to Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis, there are no civilizational divides in analyses of democratic values". While Turkey does differ from the majority of EU states in its support for more religious and authoritarian values, there are no important differences in this regard with the Orthodox Member States (Greece, Romania and Bulgaria), perhaps as a consequence of Ottoman (or even Byzantine) rule. The only value on which there was a significant difference was in tolerance for minority rights, on which Turkish respondents scored considerably lower than their EU counterparts, perhaps because of the Kurdish issue (Dixon 2008: 694).

In addition, in a 'cross-civilisational' study, Norris and Inglehart found that both Western and Islamic countries were similar in their support for democratic ideals, and indeed, were more similar to each other in this respect than to most of the other 'civilisations' examined. Where there did appear to be a clear divide between 'Islam' and 'the West' was on issues relating to gender equality and sexual liberalisation, with Western countries generally more accepting of both (Norris and Inglehart 2002: 14–15).

In this framework Turkey is seen as inherently alien to European civilisation. This is succinctly put forward by former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who argues that the EU is a 'civilisational project' in which 'Turkey has no place'. Turkish accession, then, is seen as a problem, or even a threat from this point of view. Former French President and President of the European Constitutional Convention Valery Giscard d'Estaing expanded on this idea of how Turkey did not fit into 'European civilisation' as the European convention attempted to define it;

> The European Convention sought a clearer definition of the foundations of this entity, which include the cultural contributions of ancient Greece and Rome, the religious heritage pervading European life, the creative enthusiasms of the Renaissance, the philosophy of the Age of the Enlightenment and the contributions of rational and scientific thought. Turkey shares none of these (2004; cited in Risse 2010: 218-219).

Such views have been echoed perhaps most notably by French President Nicolas Sarkozy:

> I am in favour of signing a contract with Turkey. I am in favour of a joint market with Turkey. But I am against Turkey's integration into Europe. Turkey is a small Asia. And there is no reason for it to be a part of Europe. In 25 years, Turkey's population will be 100 million. Turkey is a great cvilisation; but not a European one (Sarkozy 2007a).

Thus, Turkey's accession is seen as a threat to the entire European integration project as it would endanger the very identity on which the EU is based. Giscard d'Estaing famously argued in 2002 that Turkish accession would mean "the end of the European Union" (cited in Leparmentier and Zecchini 2002). Such views have also been put forward by Sarkozy, who points out that, although he does not consider the EU to be a future superstate, Europeans should close the doors to Turkey's full membership as they were "a Europe of nations exercising their sovereignty and decided to stay themselves (Sarkozy, 2007a). His reasons for viewing Turkey as a potential threat to European identity (or identities) were put forward in more detail during his 2007 election campaign. Here he emphasizes what he views as the fundamental 'non-Europeanness' of Turkey:

> Turkey is not a European country, and as such she does not have a place inside the European Union. A Europe without borders would be the death of the great idea of political Europe. A Europe without borders is to condemn her to become a sub-region of the United Nations. I simply do not accept it (Sarkozy 2007b).

Thus, supporters of this view have generally been in favour of offering Turkey a 'privileged partnership' rather than full EU membership. The Negotiation Framework adopted by the European Council in October 2005 reflects these concerns, emphasizing the 'open-ended' nature of the negotiations. The Negotiation Framework states that "while having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond" (European Council 2005). Thus, the possibility of alternative outcomes, such as a 'privileged partnership', is suggested in the document, and the EU's absorption capacity is emphasized (Duyulmuş 2008: 28). This differs not only from the Negotiation Frameworks of the countries which acceded to the EU in 2004 and 2007, but also from that of Croatia, which was issued on the same date as Turkey's (Aydın 2006: 7-8).

Conclusions

The concept of civilisation has played an important role in EU elite discourse concerning Turkey's EU accession, and can be helpful in understanding the split in opinion between proponents and opponents of Turkish full membership of the EU. While both groups argue that the EU represents civilisation, the view of civilisation differs in each case. In the first view, civilisation is one and is potentially available to all. Thus, there is no obstacle to Turkish accession providing that it proves its 'civilised' nature by fulfilling the accession criteria. Indeed, Turkey would then be able to play a role in preventing a 'clash of civilisations' by proving that 'civilised' values can be adopted by a Muslim majority country.

In the second view, in contrast, civilisations are conceived of as plural, based on a historical and religious background and are mutually exclusive; thus it is difficult if not impossible for a country to switch civilisations. In this view, the EU and its values are perceived as based on 'European civilisation' with its foundations in Christianity, the classical world and later events such as the Renaissance and Enlightenment. In this discourse, then, Turkey is not seen as a suitable EU member as it belongs to a different civilisation – Islamic civilisation – which is based on values which are fundamentally different and incompatible with 'European' civilisation.

Given this opposition, and given that Turkey's accession must be accepted unanimously, it thus seems logical to be pessimistic about Turkey's prospects for full membership in the EU. However, a change of discursive strategy on the part of Turkey and its supporters may be helpful here. Instead of focusing on Turkey as a 'bridge between civilisations', which essentially emphasizes that it does not belong wholeheartedly to 'European civilisation', it may be more useful to argue for Turkey's Europeanness. A focus on arguments of the civilisational constellations type may be useful in this regard. While this type of argument has been relatively unusual in support of Turkey's accession, it can be seen in the discourse of some of its supporters. The Independent Commission on Turkey, for instance, has stressed *cultural* arguments for including Turkey in the EU. Instead of exploring the historical links between Islam and European civilisation, these arguments focus more specifically on Turkey as heir to Byzantium, Christianity and classical civilisation via the Ottoman Empire. According to this argument, then, Turkey is intimately intertwined with European cultural heritage (Independent Commission on Turkey, 2004: 15), in a way that other Muslim countries in North Africa and the Middle East, are not. In this view the Ottoman Turks

> became heirs not only to Byzantine and the Eastern Roman Empire, but also to a rich Greco-Latin and Judeo-Christian culture in Anatolia. Names such as the 'father of history', Heodotus of Halicarnassus; Aesop, who inspired La Fontaine's fables; Lucullus, the patron of gourmets; Saint Nicholas, bishop of Myra and ancestor of our Father Christmas; and Croesus, who became the richest man of his time, are connected with this region, as are places like Troy, Pergamon, Ephesus, and Mount Ararat where Noah's Ark came to rest. Saint Peter preached to the first Christian community in Antioch. Tarsus was the birthplace of Saint Paul, who made his first missionary journey to Anatolia, extending Christianity beyond the limits of Judaism and thereby laying the foundations of a worldwide religion. All this reminds us that the region which today is the heart of Turkey was one of the cradles of European civilisation (Independent Commission on Turkey 2004: 15).

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THE "BULGARIAN MOHAMMEDANS" (POMAKS) IN THE EAST AND CENTRAL RHODOPES: THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY

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Abstract:

Speculations about Islam, Islamization and Fundamentalism proceed from the deficit of a serious historic study on the origin and activity of the Bulgarian Muslims (the Pomaks), which is due to both the politicization and ideologization of this theme through many centuries, and various national and chauvinistic interests. From the beginning of the 1890's and especially in the 1920's and 1930's, the continuous campaign in the press encourages public opinion to differentiate religious affiliation from ethnic affiliation and to accept the Pomaks as the part of the Bulgarian nation. In the 1960's, there is a growing pressure to integrate the "Bulgarian Muslims" (the Pomaks) into the community of the ethnic Turks at the same time that the ethnic Turks use the privileges of communism, of which they were gradually deprived later. Twenty years after the change, the state continues to abdicate its responsibilities for this clearly Bulgarian compact mass of the population, whose mother tongue is Bulgarian. The state does not pay attention to the poor, to education, to the large unemployment rate, the lack of investments in these regions, the lack of infrastructure, the discovery of the adequate and transparent way of financing the religious education of these people, or to their need to participate actively in the processes of building civil society.

Key words: pomaks, identity, country in transition.

Introduction

The global, postmodern, neoliberal European discoursivity proposes a legally-formal, rationally substantiated approach for a tolerant acceptance and cohabitation with diversity and Otherness as well as a formalistically rationalized way for solving the existential crises of Man. We can set the emotionally-axiologically substantiated (attractive to human personalities and communities) Bulgarian model of existence to this. The proposed social relations that come from the centuries of co-experienced being by the regions with a mixed population are much more attractive than the European ratio regarding Otherness and Selfness. The social dominance of the essence of the individual is very important and it is one of the most essential features of the Eastern attitude. In Islam, the social Ego is closely related to ethical character. It is not important how Selfness functions under a definite social position but the social ideal, to which the Selfness is aimed, is important. The Koran is a specific moral code, but individuality in its European understanding is practically lacking in it. If we compare Western and Eastern types of individuality (in the spirit of Steiner), we see that Western personality forms rising from contact with the personified God while interpersonal contacts are secondary in relation to this contact[1].

Therefore, the problem of identification and identity is related to the problem of the existence of Selfness, combining in itself different images of Self. What can destroy it or represent a real threat to it is the so-called crisis of identity[2].

The present paper aims to underline the connection between the individual crisis of personality and the accompanying historical and social crises of the society.

Historical background

The speculations on the questions for Islam, Islamization and fundamentalism proceed from the deficit of serious historic study on the origin and activity of the Bulgarian Mohamedans (the Pomaks),

[1] Steiner, E,S. 1990: Man in history. Moscow. 38–47.
[2] For the first time this concept is used during World War I.

which is due both to the centuries long politicization and ideologization of these questions and various national and chauvinistic interests. The social context of the historical memory in Bulgaria is related to the process of the construction of the nation and especially the efforts to integrate and homogenize the population. First, this directly affects the Bulgarian-speaking Muslim population (the Bulgarian Mohammedans) and its place in the new independent state, which is itself not interested in integration, leaving that to the larger Muslim group. In all population accountings from the end of the 19th century (1880, 1885, 1888) Bulgarian speaking Muslims are recorded as 'Turks'. Yet in the accounting from 1905 the separate group of the Pomaks appears. The term Pomaks itself is used as the name of the Muslim communities that speak Serbian, Greek or Walachian, with the corresponding specifications: the Serbian Pomaks (Bošnijaci), Greek Pomaks (Walachidi), Vlaški Pomaci. Pomaks is not a traditional name and it was not the name of all the Bulgarian Mohammedans. It was established through journalism and literature by taking the place of the pre-existing regional names. One can read in the Turkish encyclopaedia for 'Pomak' that these were Bulgarians who shifted to Islam preserving their language and national spirit. The term "Bulgarian Mohammedans" was established in Bulgarian historical literature after their Liberation from Turkish slavery in 1878. At an everyday level, the local terms Ahrijani and Kauri appear in the spoken language.

The question this raises is about that part of the Bulgarian population (about 250,000 people) that determines itself as ethnical Bulgarians and who have accepted Islam as their religion. Within this group there is a part who lately either returned to the religion of their ancestors – Eastern Orthodoxy – , joined the Evangelical Church, accepted some other confession, or, more recently, adopted an atheistic philosophical conception of the world. The Bulgarian Mohammedans are linguistically the purest Bulgarians as they managed to keep the Slavic features and language untill now better than the Christians. A large part of the modern scientific research of the Bulgarian Mohammedans is aimed at the study of their ancient Bulgarian language, folklore customs and original traditional culture[3].

The geographical limit of the Bulgarian Mohammedans coincides with the ethnic territory of the Bulgarians from the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. To the North of the Balkan mountain the Loveč, Pleven, Teteven, Bijala Slatina, Vratza, Tărnovo and Russe districts. At the territory of the east Rhodopes, the Bulgarian Mohammedans are present in the regions of Smolyan and Kirdzhali. The immigrants from the villages of Banite, Madan, Zlatograd and Rudozem form the appearance of the villages of Skakak and Višna (the Ruen municipality) as well as the villages of Bosilkovo and Manolič (Sungurlare). The Bulgarian Mohammedans in the territory of Greece (Belomorska Trakija) – Ksanti, Rodopi and Evros, are bilingual due the assimilatory policy of the Greek government, which allows education only in Turkish or Greek. However, in our other southern neighbour Turkey (Lijule Burgas and Odrin districts) they preserved an excellent Bulgarian language. There is also a community of Bulgarian Muslims in the territory of the West Rhodopes in the regions of Dospat, Devin, Čepina, Smolena, Peštera, Zlatograd, Asenovgrad, Plovodv, Gijumijurdžina, in Macedonia – the regions of Nevrokop, Drama, Solun, Măglen, Veleš, Resen, Bitolija, Prilep, Kostur, Tikveš, tetovo, Strumica, Voden, Skopije), and in Albania – in the regions of Golo Bărdo and Reka.

The Bulgarian Ethnic origin of the Rhodopean population is confirmed by the 3-year study of the French scholar Ami Boue, who finds that not all the Mohammedans in the Ottoman Empire are Turkish.

The question of whether the shift to Islam is a result of a centrally planned and systematically applied policy of assimilation or is the product of an individually performed social, political and religious adaptation is the subject of internal discussions and differences in Bulgarian historiography[4]. Nonviolent or voluntary conversion to Islam can be considered a result of an indirect pressure or coercion (economic and social – tax privileges and alleviations, but not administrative alleviations) with the aim to achieve a social reclassification. From an authentic Defter for the expenses of newly-Islamized Bulgarians during the period June 1679 till May 1680, which is present in the Oriental Department of

[3] See The old features in the life and culture of the Rhodopean Bulgarians 1965: IEIM, Vol. 7, 95–106.

[4] The research of Prof. Strašimir Dimitrov and the collections of documents published by Prof. Petăr Petrov have an especially high significance.

the national Library, there are a total of 339 persons (193 of which males and 146 females), 22 males and 2 females which accepted Islam during the hunting of the Sultan. (Petrov 1987: 150, 151)

There are exceptions in cases where the shift to Islam is en mass for larger or smaller groups of the population, irrespective of whether it is voluntary or compulsory: Bosna, Albania, the Rhodopes (the Pomaks), Macedonia (the Torbeši), Serbia (the Gorijani).

It is fully natural and justified that after the democratic changes in 1989 a process of reconsideration started that implied an extremely controversial and politicized question about the Ottoman past. In 1998, an article entitled "An Effort to re-think the Stable Historical Models" was published by one of the best Bulgarian Ottomanists, Evgeni Radušev, that examines the demographic and ethno-religious processes in the West Rhodopes between the 10th and 15th centuries . E. Radušev claims that the documentation from the Ottoman archives that has recently become accessible to Bulgarian researchers allows us to speak to the process of Islamization that have led to the mass introduction of a new religion (Radušev 1998: 48), (Radušev, Kovačev 1996). Thirty years ago, Prof. Strašimir Dimitrov showed that given the Džizie registrations of the West Rhodopes, Islamization was not a result of one mass and forced campaign, which is ordered by the government, but rather by a continuous process.

All the respondents (ethnical Turks, Pomaks and Christians) of my fieldwork (2006–2010)[5] on the territory of the East Rhodopes defined Bulgarian Mohammedans as more strongly believing if defining their religious identity.

Humanistic psychology sets belief as the internal power of the subject that gives it the possibility to be itself above all. To live, the subject must believe in the significance of her own behaviours. Belief is the unproved concept of truth but not the truth itself. It is not identical with religious belief, which, as the pool of religious concepts, experiences and expectations, joins to religious culture and religious-psychological processes, in which catharsis takes place. Belief is not sufficient as the gnoseological and psychological feature of religiosity.

The axiological analysis of belief allows one to show the different degrees of believing and belief as a value for the person. It can be also a hyper-value that defines the main live meaning. As this hyper-value, it has a global essence for the structure of subjective reality. It comprises all internal relations and is the most important feature of the ideal. Especially important for the axiological-meaningful understanding of belief is its imperativity. In this case, modality (the moments of doubt, unbelief or indefinite conditions) is reduced regarding the state and significance of belief. The presence of an internal authority satisfies the human need for an Absolute as the instance that possesses the Absolute truth.

The absolute helps humanity to overcome a feeling of guilt, to remove from itself imperfections which are set in human nature, and finally to turn its existence to eternal existence. Religious belief is an approach for a cultural solution of fundamental, eternal and existential problems. It is an approach to justify human existence. It is also the hope of salvation. It gives solace and removes the fear of death, the transience of the terrestrial, the almightiness of time. It joins the human to the eternal. The idea for God and the immortality of the soul are already preset, so religious belief removes from the human the burden of the choice of a creative search and the true sense of life.

Life, existence and crisis are a whole. The crisis is a stimulus for a change of experience, and the solution arises when an individual is obliged to choose between different possibilities. Through critical

[5] In November 2010, the three-year study (2006–2010) "Does the Bulgarian ethnic model exist – myth or reality within the common European problem of the tolerance between Christians and Muslims" was launched by a research team from the Anthropology and Religious Studies section at the Institute for Philosophical Research at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, with the financial support of the Fund for Scientific Research of the Bulgarian Ministry of Education and Science. The project aimed to re-examine the 'Bulgarian ethnic model', a popular construct during the transitional period in Bulgaria (since 1989), in light of real empirical data gathered during an extensive in-depth study in some of the areas with mixed religious and ethnic groups. The study employed the method of in-depth analysis of field semi-structured biographical interviews adopting Paul Thompson's oral history methodology. The target groups of the study were religious leaders and believers belonging to the two major religious groups – Orthodox Christians and Muslims – in the East Rhodope Mountains. The empirical data analysis has had a unique character not only because the chosen region has remained largely uninvestigated so far but also due to the interdisciplinary nature of the analysis which avoids conventional sociological models and instead applies anthropological views in the context of philosophy of religion and the specifics of inter-religious dialogue.

situations, the individual can more maturely and openly understand life as a whole more. Life is not just here and now, it is an existence that continues by its own intensity. The crisis must lead to the choice of a position in relation to reality. Its value is in this. Yet then the human becomes a free, responsible individual. The person is under the power of circumstances, which she cannot change, but she is free to take a reasonable position to them. If we reduce this to the theological arguments of an individual person, then the role of personal crises, aspirations and sufferings are debated in religion and theology. Religious belief is inseparably related to humility and inclination, with the acceptance of what happens and an agreement with it. The human tunes herself to humiliation in order to gain peace, firmness and a tolerant attitude to her own and someone else's imperfection. Only by accepting its existence is a personality changed. This perception of one's own limitation is associated with pain and suffering. To meet God, means to see you yourself as you are but not as you want to be or as the attitude of the others for us. Humiliation means the comprehension of personality, your own abilities.

The religion of the Bulgarian Mohammedans is rooted in a tradition that is oriented to conceptually important questions and has the power of an authority and a historical being. The religion becomes actual through the religiosity of people. This religiosity is the reality of religion, since it includes its essence, existence and materialization in the life of the social group and the person.

However, Bulgarian Mohammedans also confess a local version of Islam, with additional pagan and Christian ritual elements and practices. For this reason, the Turks in Turkey do not consider the Mohammedans as Turks but this does not impede them as they continue their assimilative policy in relation to this part of the Bulgarian population. As a lecturer in the Middle Spiritual Muslim School in Momčilgrad told me, "A Muslim and a Turk can be synonyms in Bulgaria but they are not similar from a religious point of view since there are people in Turkey who are Christians. Unfortunately, immediately after saying Turk this is equal to a Muslim in Bulgaria."

The Greek government has the same aspirations and aims to separate this part of the Mohammedans as the 'Greek Thracian population', which can lead to a predefinition of the currently existing ethnical model.

In the past, the Russian vice-consul in Plovdiv (1857–1877) Nayden Gerov knew well Russian sensitivity to the activity of the Polish emigration in the district of Odrin and alerted the Russian government that Polish emigrants were starting an active propaganda campaign concerning the idea, first announced in the 1850's in the pages of the Carigrad Bulgaria journal, that the Pomaks are Polish. In this way, Polish patriots hoped to win over the Bulgarian Mohammedans in their struggle against Russia for the cause of the captive Poland[6]. So, this part of the Bulgarian population is viewed this way during the years in the context of the transforming identity.

Also today, the Christians in the Rhodopes try to theorize the regional names 'Ahrijani' and 'Pomaci' without a large consensus of their opinions for the semantics and the origin of these words. According to some people, the name Pomak is given to the people who forcefully accepted Islam, but 'Ahrijani" (which is unknown in other places) symbolizes the people who accepted it voluntarily. The origin of the word 'Ahrijani' is associated by the Bulgarian Mohammedans with the Medieval region of Ahrida in the Rhodopes but its etymology is deduced from the Slavic root 'rid' (a mountain elevation)[7].

A woman who is Bulgarian from Zlatograd remembered one more term – when she was a child, the Christians called them 'Kauri', but she could not remember the reason for this. All separatist efforts to isolate them in a separate ethnicity will lead to a misbalance in this region.

The Rodina movement – an idea for reviving the Bulgarian Character

From the beginning of the 1890's and especially in the 1920's and 1930's a continuous campaign in the press encouraged public opinion to differentiate religious affiliation from ethnic affiliation and to accept the Pomaks as part of the Bulgarian nation. The most eager followers of this idea are the representatives of the small educated elite among the Pomaks (mostly teachers) who aim to rise the economic and

[6] See Rayčevski, Stoyo 1992: The Polish idea to incorporate the Bulgarian Mohammedans. In: The Rhodopes, Vol. 4.

[7] See Damijanov, Nikolay 1999: The medieval Necropolis near to the village of Arda, the region of Smolyan. In: Rhodopica, Vol. 1.

cultural level of their community and to extricate it from increasing marginalization. In the 1960's there was a growing pressure to integrate the Bulgarian Muslims (the Pomaks) into the community of ethnic Turks but this is the same time when the ethnic Turks were using the privileges of communism, of which they were gradually deprived later.

In 1937 the cultural-educational organization Rodina (1937–1944) was established. Its main purpose was the revival of the lost ethnical/national consciousness of the Islamized Bulgarians and the separation of the nation from religion.

The statute of the organization was worked out like those of the Rhodope cultural organizations in Asenovgrad, Plovdiv and Sofia. Art 2 of the Statute said that the goal of the organization is to: 1) contribute to the mutual acquaintance, friendship and support between the Bulgarian Mohammedans and Bulgarian Christians in the Rhodope mountains region; 2) keep awake the national spirit of the Bulgarians professing the Muslim religion. They requested the Christians to support the Mohammedans in their cultural elevation so they could become one inextricable whole under a common sceptre. According to them, there was no question of religion but only of a cultural upsurge and restoration of national awareness. At that time the Rodina organization was popular among the local population as 'Kulturata' (Kulturasa). However the new ideas of Rodina members were not accepted wholeheartedly by everyone: two opposing streams emerged in favor and against Kulturasa. Equally problematic was the turmoil in the souls of the Bulgarian Mohammedans who were faced with the dilemma whether to open their hearts wide and break off the century-long darkness and ignorance or stake their future on what was well-known and deep-rooted in their conscience during the years of slavery. For the younger, the die was cast more easily and they declared their determination to go ahead. However the struggle in the souls of many had been shaken since it was not the government but some youngsters who demanded from them to cast away their fezzes.

This concept of cultural assimilation and the related discourse as well as the character of the activity of Rodina have an essential importance when examining the obvious continuity with the later assimilation campaigns toward the Mohammedans in the 1960's and 1970's, and also the most popular international campaign against the Turkish speaking Muslims in Bulgaria or the so-called ethnical Turks in the second half of the 1980's. The activity of this organization spreads mostly in the Central and West Rhodopes and it does not achieve success in the East Rhodopes. For seven years, the organization performed worship in the Bulgarian language in Mosques, translated the Koran into Bulgarian, created a Bulgarian-Mohammedan Association, which was independent of the Turkish Association and which encouraged the creation of a local elite and helped the Bulgarian Mohammedans to register in middle and high schools. The first course for teaching illiterate Bulgarian Mohammedans started in 1939. The first volume of the organization's printed organ – Rodina Collection – was published in 1000 copies in 1939.

This organization also tried to reform everyday life rejecting traditional folklore clothes and improving the state of women – a female fraction of the organization was established in April 1939 during the second cooking course, with 17 members. In 1944, the organization started a campaign to rename Bulgarian Mohammedans, encouraging Bulgarian names, albeit non-Christian ones. It is calculated that as of September 1944, two thirds of the Pomak population in the Central Rhodopes changed names. In 1941−1942, in the context of the common euphoria that embraced the Bulgarian population after the return of Egeijan and Vardar Macedonia to Bulgaria, the government decided to accelerate processes in the organization and even misappropriate its name as the accent was already put on the separation of the Turkish ethnicity by the change of inferior signs such as names, but their economic development was put aside. Immediately after World War II, the Rodina association was disbanded on the pretext that it was a Bulgarian nationalistic, retrograde and racist organization. The Muslim names of the population were returned in 1945. Indeed, the Mohammedans, unlike the Turks, experienced three of the so-called revival processes in relation to names in 1912, 1942 and 1985, with a similar practice in the present as in the past[8].

The lack of political wisdom resulted in setting back the clock to the times and actions of a reaction-

[8] The first was in 1517, the second in the end of the 17 c. including mainly the Central Rhodopes. In the Middle and South Rhodopes, two more mass shifts to Mohammedan (1705 and 1720) took place (the Bulgarian science uses this term to make a difference with the so-called shift to Turk, in which one loses both the language and religious affiliation.

ary government of 1914. Branding the organization as harmful to society led to charges of blasphemy and brought to court its leaders which was a disgraceful act. Although the activity of the Rodina is controversial, as well as the estimations of it (from an ultimate idealization to full denial), its efforts can be considered as an attempt to overcome existing religious differences through a language of unity and to replace or at least subordinate the dominating religious identity to an ethnical/national consciousness.

The field work (2006-2010)

The period of democracy in Bulgaria (after 10 November 1989) put to new test the people from the Rhodopes. During meetings or in mass-media, people spoke again about the insulting sense of 'Pomaks' and religious fanatics gained confidence. The Hodžas maltreated this part of the Bulgarian population and refused to bury the dead who died with Bulgarian names. The representatives of the Islamic religion started to claim again that only Muslims live in the Rhodopes but not Bulgarian Mohammedans. The distribution of the so-called resounded Islam (tapes with lectures in illegible Arabic) was activated with the aim to attract these people to other ethnicities and communities.

Two groups of the examined are most affected by the speculations about ethnic-confessional self-identification: the Bulgarian Mohammedans (Pomaks) and the Bulgarian Alians (Kazălbaši).

This provoked the scientific interest of the researchers from the Institute for Philosophical research to develop a scientific project where empirical study was financed by the Fund for Scientific Research of the Ministry of Education and Science. The region of the East Rhodopes was chosen since it has its own specific portrait of a religious, ethnic variety, in which the elements are interlaced, related to dramatic and changeful historical events, affecting fatefully the life of many generations.

The research took place in the context of the philosophy of religion and also social and political philosophy. The philosophical approach of the analysis was used in performing the fieldwork. Cognitive abilities were discovered in the analogy between different objects: language, speech, traditions, belief. These were related to being, a priori structures of human existence. In the spirit of the philosophy of Heidegger, understanding was not understood ascomprehension but it was viewed as a way to experience the world. Special attention was turned also to the ethno-sociological and cultural-anthropological approaches as well as the techniques of biographical interview (Oral History). To fully reach the designed purposes, we had to prepare a survey form, which was addressed to 1000, examined by the team participants in the towns from this region. All the requirements in relation to the representation of people of a different ethnical, religious, sexual, age and social state were fulfilled.

The so-called Pomaks in the region (Smolyan, Haskovo, Kărdžali) declare that they define themselves as Bulgarians who confess Islam. Unlike ethnic Turks, who define strongly as Turks (98.7%), the Bulgarian Mohammedans define themselves ethnically either as Bulgarians or Pomaks (Bulgarian Mohammedans – 86.5%) and only 7% as Turks. Therefore, we cannot speak about the relations between the two ethnicities. Some of the Bulgarian Mohammedans have never entered a Mosque. Many of them show a complete illiteracy in relation to speaking the Turkish language and knowing the Koran. 98% of the Bulgarian Mohammedans speak Bulgarian at home, and 100% communicate in Bulgarian with their colleagues and friends and also in public places. This is completely opposite to the Turkish ethnicity who speak Turkish at home (97.3%) but speak the same language with colleagues (55.7%) and friends (67.1%). The knowledge that their grand-mothers and grand-fathers know is not fully given to the younger generation, so the relations started to disappear. Both the religious and cultural traditions dissolved with time. To this one must add also the dilution of religious differences during past 50 years in which a new generation grows, a generation that perceives itself as non-religious while the religious aspect remains only in the sphere of traditional customs. 88% of the ethnic Turks strongly define themselves as being Sunni Muslim since the same etymology of the term 'Muslim' means believer. It is not the same situation with the religious self-determination of the Bulgarian Mohammedans. Their picture is strongly abated. The largest proportion (32%) are self-determined as atheists who claim to respect the religious traditions of the others; for example 6% are atheists respecting Christian traditions. 11.5% of the Bulgarian Mohammedans define themselves as believing Christians. 13.5% define themselves as Sunni (i.e. representatives of the traditional Islam), 8.5% as Muslims and 15.5% as Muslims (they do not self-determine as Shii), which eloquently speaks about ignorance of Islam as a religion. Even when defining religious affiliation, the proportion of atheists and Christian believers is bigger (49.5%) among the Bulgarian Muslims than those who self-determine as Muslims (37.5%).

The life and way of thinking of the young people in the region forms under the influence of postmodern values. Many of the young people in these regions live together without marriage. 53% of the Bulgarian Mohammedans find this morally acceptable compared to 32.7% of ethnic Turks. 46% of the examined Bulgarian Muslims find marriage an anachronism, despite the still existing patriarchal spirit of education, which determines the opinion of the respondents in relation to divorce. Both the ethnic Turks (71.3%) and Bulgarian Muslims (71.9%) are categorically against it. Despite the building of new Mosques, the young people from the region do not see a reason to visit a temple, do not understand worship and do not see a reason to participate in religious life. Especially after the years of the political transition after 1990, the lack of religious needs and tradition increases among both the Bulgarian Muslims and Bulgarian Christians. Today the young people are more interested in personal, individual development of postmodern society than the traditional life of their own society. The family, health, industry and material welfare are important.

On the other side, religious customs continue to mix with suspected pagan folklore holidays which are celebrated together by the religious communities in Bulgaria. The ethnic Turks, Christians and Bulgarian Mohammedans celebrate Gergijovden (Hădrelez). The Bulgarian Mohammedans celebrate regularly the religious holidays of Christmas, Easter and Palm Sunday and the religious holidays of the Muslims (Ramadan, Kurban-Bajram). At that time, despite the atheistic self-consciousness of the large part of the population, an extreme respect to religious belief as a whole is observed, irrespective of whether it is Christian or Muslim belief. In so far as the belief is perceived in its quality of being a moral education and the only possible moral authority in forming human personality, the reverence is detectable in both the religious communities, and even among the non-believers, irrespective of whether the saint is related to the Christian or Muslim or other tradition.

Twenty years after the change, the state continues to abdicate its responsibilities for this clearly Bulgarian compact mass of the population, whose mother tongue is Bulgarian. The state does not pay attention to the poor education, the large unemployment rate, the lack of investments in these regions, the lack of infrastructure, or for discovering adequate and transparent way of financing the religious education of these people, or for providing for the need to participate actively in the processes of building civil society. The government not only neglects this mostly underprivileged part of the Muslim community but completely gave Turkey the care for the Muslim community. The children and adolescents who have never spoken Turkish today are forced to use it in their everyday life or to learn it in middle religious schools, which are financed by Turkish foundations and perform their education in Turkish. It has even gotten to the point that prayers from the Koran are translated from Arabic into Turkish to be more accessible to the bigger part of the population (who do not understand Arabic). In this way the Mosque also attracts the Mohammedan part of the Bulgarian population. Thanks to the rich archival materials we know that during the time of the Rodina prayers were translated into Bulgarian but the 'foresight' of the communist party shows itself by burning them after 1944. The biggest paradox is that today the number of the children of Mohammedans in middle Muslim spiritual schools is bigger than Turks. Due to poverty in the regions populated predominantly with a Pomak population, parents prefer to send their children right into these schools, which ensure full boarding and education to students. It is insisted in return for the discipline of Religion being allowed in the Bulgarian secular school the requirement to learn Turkish. These children grow up with the feeling of outcast.

Due to the lack of possibility to receive a diploma that is equal to other Bulagian higher schools from the Higher Islamic Spiritual Institute in Sofia, they turn their attention to Arabian educational centers, with the most visited being Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, which understand a deep religiosity as a sign of personal identity. In these schools they meet the ideas and practices of other Mashabs (religious-legal Islamic schools), which are strange to the religious and cultural traditions of the dominant Bulgarian Hanifizm. When they return to Bulgaria, they enter conflict with the older generation and start to impose a new way of prayer, introducing a split in the

Muslim community as a whole. On the one side, this means the fragmentation of leadership, which hides a potential risk of modelling new charismatic leaders, who are extremely attractive to the young generation and very quickly recruit their followers. "An Islamist lecturer is a very talented orator. If he, for example, enters the Mosque after 1 hour of speaking there he can change radically the situation, can predispose people as he wants. He can raise the whole Džamaat and make an army from it. There are such people…" Those were the words of the Mufti of the town of Momčilgrad.

However, this clash between the young and old leads also to changes in identity. The young are inclined to form a 'negative identity' in their aspiration to look radical, inversing the image that is built for them in society. In the meaning of Erikson, we can determine this as a way to dominate the situation when a positive identity cannot contain the multiple and various components that are mutually opposed to themselves. Bulgarian Mohammedans respondents (82.5%) show the presence of tension between the young and old. It is not the same situation for the ethnic Turks, where traditions and values are markedly preserved and are transferred from generation to the generation. 73.8% of them think that there is no tension between generations and only 22.1% know the presence of it.

This crisis became possible in the Bulgarian Mohammedans due to the loss of faith in the existence of moral norms and values. A conflict between Ego and the social Ego appeared in the years of communism and the transition. It is when the image of the other for me and my own image do not coincide that a crisis is provoked. In this regard, Hessle affirms that overcoming a critical identity is a guarantee for the progress of individuals and institutions[9].

Behind this tension between the young and old generations the Bulgarian Mohammedans (82.5%) and ethnic Turks (84.6%) are categorically in agreement that there is no tension between the ethnic communities in Bulgaria. 71.1% of the ethnic Turks and 65.5% of the Bulgarian Mohammedans are categorical that even after the acceptance of Bulgaria into the EU no changes in inter-ethnic relations took place. 93% of the Bulgarian Mohammedans and 77.2% of the ethnic Turks say that ethnic and religious tolerance is an important value for them.

In Bulgaria, Islam is a sign for civilization, tolerance and the possibility not just to cohabit with different religious values and cultures but to enrich them, without losing one's own significance.

The presence of a circle of close people, who are always ready to recognize the Self in the individual as something given and invariable, is very important for establishing one's own identity. This is present in the Bulgarian Muslims. The existence of people who can recognize them any time as such is a proof of the completeness of their internal essence.

I am prone to apply to this group of people the term of Leying – a complementary identity[10].

They need the identity of the Other as a starting point of their own Self, for their own ethnical unicity. From a hostile neutral position, it turns to a condition, without which one cannot construct one's own identity. This need causes a conflict between their own internal essence and the external need of self-expression, when they must self-determine. Otherness is transformed in the limit of their own essence and makes possible their self-identification to an apophatic attribute: Ego – this is not the Other. In their essence is set the essence of a dialogical Ego. Right in the process of identification, the crisis of identity takes place that is a stage needed for the reconstruction of Selfness in order that it can exist!

The ethnic Turks in this region (59.3%) are categorical that under the conditions of democracy it is not necessary for Bulgarian Muslims to have a separate Mufti Office and that they do not disagree with the policy that the Head Mufti be an ethnical Turk. Practically, this style of Islam managed to persist in Bulgaria, to which restoration more moderate Islamic leaders call. The trust in the Head Mufti Office and Bulgarian Patriarch managed to preserve themselves as the spiritual institutions among the ethnic Turks (73%) and the Bulgarian Muslims. Only 35.7% do not trust in the head Mufti Office and 47.3% do not trust in the Bulgarian Patriarch.

That is why Bulgaria must not turn its back on its own historic and cultural experience and imitate the models of a moderate/traditional Islam, Euro-Islam and progressive/liberal Islam. The local Muslims, especially the older generation, are afraid of new Islamic influences and look for support in the tradition. The young, with the characteristic enthusi-

[9] Hessle, V 1994: The crisis of individual and collective identity. In: Philosophical Questions, №10.

[10] Leying, 2002: Me and others. Moscow.

asm of any young people, want reforms – this leads to isolation and alienation between Christians and Muslims, a situation which previously never existed in Bulgaria. We do not need to search for some internal model of imitation to solve critical situations. We must resurrect our own rich historic, philosophical and cultural experience of cohabitation. We must develop a civil tolerance, which is directly dependent on the rate of building a civil society in Bulgaria, and must not allow the replacement of the uniqueness of the Balkans by another culture, value or model.

A sensible difference continues to be seen in the educational and routine level of the Turks, Pomaks and Gypsies compared to the Bulgarian population. 60.4% of the ethnic Turks have a primary education, 29.5% middle education, 8.1% without completed education, and only 1.3% with high education. The same situation is found among the Bulgarian Muslims – 34% with middle education, 46% with a primary education, 1.5% without completed education and only 3–5% with high education.

Democracy and its characteristic party-political pluralism determine and stimulate the possibility that an ethnic party, such as the DPS (The Movement for Rights and Freedoms), can gain a monopoly in the regions with a mixed population, to determine the dynamics and the development of the agenda of the local social-political, cultural and communal life. In the years of transition, the DPS surely gained a centrist position, following the trend in the last two decades in the Arabian world following the growth of the movements which keep right of Islamic centrism. This trend provoked a change in the modern Islamic ideological map, which many researchers define as the 'third link' in the almost centurial history of 'political Islam'. Their purpose is to offer a political influence by seeking a solution to the problem of religion/state as a part of the epistemological discourse. They are remarkable with a fine, keen political insight and have staked their future completely on a new image. For this reason, they go out of the parameters of the scale of moderate/radical Islam, which is often used for the classification of Islamic movements. Their tool is political competence – they use the knowledge, experience and practices of European institutions (the DPS is not an exception with its quote for Euro-deputies), to which they have unlimited access and manage to impose their ideas for democracy and civil rights as a non-contradictive and inseparable part of the Islamic religion. In fact, they turn religion into a coordinate system, which is used to define both themselves and others. The policy becomes a steppingstone for a religious proselytism, a specific civilizational incubator, which combines political, ideological and religious differences, forming a unique relation between government and society. They propose a new 'modernist' project for a cultural identity and relation to the other, defending civil rights and the rights of women and winning in places where the secular, nationalistic and other ideologies lose. They propose an intellectual flexibility, young cadre potential, fresh and non-trivial ideas. Individual and social rights are equally important and the former cannot be neglected on account of the latter. The universality of Islam as a religion, Islam as a civilizational model to be followed, is the central idea in the platform of this party. This formulation escapes from the need forcefully or by confrontation to reconcile the requirement for the preservation of a unique identity and cultural features with the challenges of globalization and modernization, since the same concept of 'universality' includes universal human principles. Practically, the common religious postulates that do not impede their democratic tasks are hidden in every civil program. Instead of a cultural isolation, the clever management of various social factors and social-political abilities is present. Their main instrument: the religious moral, Islamic values and spirituality in the global world of a spiritual crisis and eroded values.

The growth in the career, the movement of cadres and the essence of managerial work in the regions with the Bulgariam Mohammedans are always set through the prism of the strategically-tactical interests of the DPS.

In the years of a democratic transition, the government allowed a liberal regimen to develop a different foreign religious foundation, a part of which was directly/indirectly related to radical Islamist organizations and structures, for which prohibition to their penetration and distribution of activity is present in other countries. Simultaneously with these the efforts to penetrate in these regions are also made by the part of legally or illegally acting creeds, which are associated with Protestantism, different Evangelical churches or even with various other religious sects, cults, esoteric communities. The presence and active work of similar institutions in regions such as the East Rhodopes are especially dangerous to the social peace in this population and the national security.

Contemporary background

The increasingly globalized world in the beginning of the 21st century raises a protective mechanism in each European nation aspiring to the establishment and demonstration of a national identity. These societies became more sensible to any violation or the least threat to their national identity and reacted in their own way to any potential threat. At the same time, the process of destroying the unity of already built communities and nations takes place to reach concrete political aims. The Balkans appeared as a beneficial territory for the experiments in the sphere of applied ethnology as the Bulgarians showed themselves as the least immunized against this aggression (Rayčevski 1998).

The Bulgarian Mohammedans today are an object of manipulations and false suggestions in the territory of their own country. The clash of people from different cultures and societies inevitably leads to controversies, stereotypes, opinions about the Other, the Bad, the Strange, which quite groundlessly are imposed on the bearers of the true religiosity – the Bulgarian Mohammedans. With obsession, they are represented to us as the 'negative image' of the local people. The efforts to isolate them in a separate minority party such as the party of the Pomaks continues today from the past.

The waves of migration from of this part of the population into Turkey allow us to speak also of the existence of a 'trans-etatic community'[11]. It is characterized by the conservation of religious practice, endogamy and valorisation of auto-values (perceiving one's own culture as 'pure and true'). Migration is of a special importance as a 'compact accommodation' plays the key role in the preservation of the 'old' traditions. Building 'emigrant topoi' (religious buildings, markets, shops, restaurants) is an effort to reconstruct the old way of life. What was brought by the country-donor prevails also in free time. They speak a 'different language'. This is an Old Bulgarian dialect, which remained unchanged and conserved in its archaic type during centuries. Within the framework, they continue to speak right by this language.

Religious affiliation is of essential importance. They find that they confess a local version of Islam, with different practices and behaviours. In the consciousness of immigrants, the different religious system makes them feel like being 'aliens' between relatives and not accepted by the local Turkish community. Often, the choice of identity depends on social welfare. The bifurcation between Bulgaria and Turkey, two different cultures and civilizations, turns the new-comers into migrants. Two types can be defined: re-emigrants (they are not able to adapt, the leading place in their identity takes the fact that Bulgaria is their fatherland and the Bulgarian national identity is dominating) and 'naturalized' (as a result of acculturation, they forget that are emigrants, their ethnic affiliation coincides with their citizenship, and the Bulgarian language is forgotten). Such integration hides the risk of erasing cultural features and destroying traditional opinions about the community of the Bulgarian Muslims – emigrants.

Conclusion

The usage of the political situation to support scientific, cultural and educational projects is not the patent of the former communistic world only. The question about political co-partnership in producing knowledge (emotions) needs to be adequately described and theorized, but this does not mean that we must stop to problematize and analyse this theme.

In modern times the term 'Bulgarian Mohammedans' is replaced by the dogmatically correct term 'Bulgarian Muslims'[12]. However this dilutes to some degree the opinions for these of our compatriots who are known in the historic literature as the 'Bulgarian Mohammedans.' It combines them with the rest of the Muslim population of the Balkans, whose mother tongue is Turkish or something other.

The problems associated with identity, cultural integration and ethnic tolerance in the modern world with growing dynamics of cultural interactions and

[11] This is the community of emigrants who formally belong to two countries and permanently move between them, in their effort to preserve their old cultural model and to look for better possibilities for wordly realization. As a whole, the Mohammedans do not participate altogether in the emigration waves to Turkey. The main reason is that they do not know the language and do not have relatives there (Maeva 2006:272).

[12] The term 'Mohammedans' supposes some form of deifying the Prophet Mohammed, which contradicts to one of the five columns of the Islamic religion – Allah is one.

increasing cultural variety bring to the fore the need to search for these local and national mechanisms that will teach us how to live in this new, mutually-dependent world.

For 97% of the Bulgarian Mohammedans, Bulgaria is their fatherland. This is their home, this is their country, where they live; a country in which the religious (unifying) principle dominates on account of the ethnical (dividing) one. The empirical analysis shows that this model of existence can play the role of an explanative principle, with the corresponding practical application for united Europe and the construction of its new international relations, as together with ethnic, cultural and religious determinism as well as other consolidating and mobilizing factors, which proved their effectiveness and applicability, these are searched for.

The modern trends of globalization and the complex symbiosis between traditions and cultures complicate the preservation of the original Bulgarian heritage. In this sense, it is necessary to preserve the existing connectedness between cultural, ethnic and religious components in our country. Depending on the degree of their development, the corresponding dominating role in relation to the other is marked and the level of the general progress of our society is determined. Any effort to ignore the Bulgarian national values and this model of cohabitation will lead to an opposition on the ethnic and religious signs, a risky situation.

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THE CONCEPTUAL RECONSIDERATION OF IDEOLOGY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

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Abstract:

Starting from the marginal status allotted to ideology in the present day field of political philosophy, caused both by what I consider to be a “semantic narrowing” and by what I call “semantic contamination”, this article points to the possibility of a conceptual reconsideration of ideology within contemporary political philosophy. In line with Michael Freeden, my standpoint is one according to which the concept of ideology can be recovered by political philosophy as an analytical tool, because it plays not only an important normative role, situated at an abstract level, but also a very important role when it comes to explaining political reality. This requires, of course, an interdisciplinary approach, bearing in mind the influences that political philosophy itself receives in our time. Virtually, I believe that the political-philosophical perspective on ideology should open, in an interdisciplinary manner, towards related fields such as political sociology, political anthropology or discourse analysis, specific to communication sciences.

Key words: ideology, political philosophy, conceptual reconsideration, ideological conventions, interdisciplinarity.

Introduction

The conjecture I intend to describe in this article refers to the situation of a concept which, throughout its intellectual course, developed along with modernity and has encompassed many avatars. From one school of thought to another, from one epistemological direction to another, from one hermeneutical tradition to the next, the *concept of ideology* has been subject to a wide series of semantic infusions which, beyond the fact that they can be contextualised in space and time, are also able to provide explanations regarding the causes whose main effect was the role that has come to epitomise ideology, mainly during the last century but also today. Without pretending to offer an all-encompassing view on this evolution, the idea supported in this article is that, within the area which is epistemologically delimited by the political philosophy specific to our time and from a conceptual perspective, ideology is still assigned a marginal role.

In order to plea in favour of this supposition, in the first section of this article I discuss the *issue of conceptual contestability*, a matter which refers directly to the normative and empirical status of ideology. As I am going to show, this is also the case of other political concepts. Following Michael Freeden, my standpoint is one which claims that the concept of ideology can be recovered by political theory as an analytical tool, because it plays not only an important normative role, situated at an abstract level, but also a very important role in explaining political reality.

Assuming the challenge implied by this understanding of the normative situation of ideology, in the following two sections I attempt to describe how I envisage the marginality of ideology within the framework of political philosophy. As a result, in the first place, I refer to what I call *marginalisation through semantic narrowing*, which I see as a type of discourse strategy that aims to emphasise the narrow part supposedly played by ideology within the field of philosophical-political approaches, a fact which, as I am going to show, also reaches the field of political science.

In the second place, I also consider *marginalisation through semantic contamination*, seen as a discourse strategy whose intention is to constantly highlight the negative nature of ideology – when it does not involve underlining a downright pejorative nature – based on a Manichaeism that is discernible both in the case of continental and Anglo-American political theory, and, through a very interesting "imitation effect" (associated with a seemingly justified ideological rejection of the term "ideology"), in the Romanian area of the still frail debates in this respect.

Finally, the concluding part of this article shows that it is possible to conceptually recover ideology in the field of contemporary political theory if we use an integrated view that would allow for it to be methodologically used both at the normative level and empirically. This requires, of course, an interdisciplinary approach, bearing in mind the influences that political philosophy itself receives in our age.

Ideology and the issue of conceptual contestability

It is somewhat paradoxical that, although it has been the topic of hundreds of papers and thousands of articles within political philosophy itself – including here the political theory of the continental tradition –, the concept of ideology may be qualified as one which is affected by marginality within this field. Yet, this paradoxical state vanishes, from my viewpoint, as soon as we understand that, despite the variety of article titles that have focused on it, the concept of ideology was either rejected, demoted, limited or, even worse, considered useless from a methodological viewpoint by many influential theorists and political philosophers. Unlike other concepts used in the epistemic approach specific to political philosophy, the concept of ideology comes, as its intellectual history shows us, from outside this area of thought. And although it is a history that is barely two hundred years old, it has not been enough to stop the flow of meanings which have been given to ideology since this concept entered the sphere of influence of political thought. Having, initially, a clear epistemologically delimited connotation – such as it was defined by the French encyclopaedists during the 18th century – ideology has gathered, in time, a wide variety of meanings; however, even from the moment when it began to be approached exclusively from the perspective of political philosophy, or, later on, from that of political science, it has not ceased to be associated with a type of thinking which is presumably opposed to a "scientific" sense of the manner in which we should relate to reality. Starting from here, we could observe that even the initial meaning of the concept has attracted a constant suspicion from the part of political thinkers, since a fact which is also visible today is that, "when positioning ideology on an epistemological dimension, its antecedents reflect the 19th century positivist legacy ..." (Freeden 2007). In contemporary political theory, for instance, a very influential author such as Giovanni Sartori does not hesitate to describe ideology from a perspective which, although different from that of Karl Marx, still bets on its situation under the sign of the error caused by the concept's lack of appetite for the logical rigour specific to the notions which can be verified by referring to the empirical (Sartori 1999). In other words, because it presumably stands for a set of beliefs which cannot be validated through the criteria implied by positive logic, ideology seems to be stuck within the scope of the non-intentional or, in the best case, of indefiniteness. Such a position was specific not only to the political philosophy of the first part of the last century but also to the initial phase of the development of political science, a field of study which emerged, as we know today, under the influence of behaviorism, which surfaced after World War II in North-America. Moreover, it could not be attenuated even after the normative-oriented reflections came back in force in the area of political theory debates in the 1970s and 1980s and continued, for the most part, to treat ideology as a concept that one needs to avoid if one wants to explain and understand in a "scientific" way the manner in which political reality is crystallized. During this period, such considerations got intertwined with the announcement of "the end of ideology" (Bell 2001), which was meant to stop any attempt of political modernity to find itself again in an age that seemed to promise a radical separation from the past, the disappearance of "totalising meta-narrations" (Lyotard 1993) and a reconfiguration of political thought in agreement with the new historical developments.

However, we can observe today – after, worldwide, we have witnessed the overcoming of another "end", that of "history" (Fukuyama 1992), proclaimed along with the fall of the Eastern-European communist regimes – that even when it was placed in an area of ambiguity, and when it was downright declared "dead", the concept of ideology has continued to express the existence of a particular type of reality. A reality which, par excellence, – although this has not always been acknowledged as such –, benefited from a direct connection with the political on a theoretical level, and with politics on an empirical level.

On the other hand, we may also notice that such attitudes transformed ideology into a *marginal concept* within the field of philosophical-political research. From my point of view, the marginality of ideology within the context of political philosophy – a situation which is also visible today – becomes understandable when we discern two main strategies used by the political theorists who encouraged this standpoint (either voluntarily or involuntarily): on the one hand, a conceptual restriction of ideology either to aspects of political life which are seen as unfathomable – such as, for instance, beliefs or emotions –, or to the so-called "isms" which, in the language of political theory and practice, conventionally stand for particular values embraced by social groups; on the other hand, the concept has been constantly given a negative meaning (if not a pejorative one), a phenomenon which went as far as to transform ideology into that "something which should not be mentioned". I shall come back to these two strategies and attempt to detail their intellectual mechanisms in the next two sections.

For now, I would stress that neither of these was able to confirm the disappearance of ideology from the political reality of our time. In the former case, to limit the meaning of the concept does not mean to remove the possibility that it expresses a reality that is much wider than that given to it; in the latter, neither the "play upon words" of negative discourse nor that of unspeaking the concept are able to annul the existential attribute of the political reality expressed by ideology. Maybe precisely for this reason, the recent attempts to recover the political and epistemological facets of ideology emphasize the fact that studying that part of its content which has usually been attributed to the unconscious or the irrational could also offer a "surplus of understanding", just like accepting the normal nature of its ambiguity (or of its conceptual indefiniteness) could open new ways of methodological exploration within the field of political philosophy (Freeden 2007). In this respect, Michael Freeden, for instance, puts forth the exploitation of the notion of "essentially contestable concepts" in order to allow for ideology to be recovered from a perspective that would serve its establishment as an essential ingredient of the political. Moreover, this author talks about "effective contestability" in order to show that ideology not only holds an extremely important conceptual role, situated *in abstracto*, but also a very important role in explaining political reality (Freeden 2004). Normative and empirical, therefore, the concept of ideology has always had, *de facto*, a position that only now tends to become recognizable *de jure*. Even when it was marginalised within the area of manifestation of philosophical-political enterprises or purely and simply unidentified (deliberately or not), the ideological element has always been present. Starting from this idea, in what follows, while tracing the main strategies that I consider responsible for turning ideology into a marginal concept of political philosophy, I am interested in revealing the fact that the alternatives advanced by these strategies are not themselves sustainable, because they are either incapable of seizing conceptually the actual political reality or prone to create a theoretical confusion which would be difficult to clear particularly in those areas where political research does not have an authentic tradition.

Marginalisation through semantic narrowing

As I have already mentioned, a first type of strategy which leads to the conceptual marginalisation of ideology is that of semantic narrowing. Both at the epistemological and at the philosophical-political level, ideology has been given – from Marx up to the contemporary theorists who are either following in the footsteps of Marxist thought or opposing it – a limited meaning. Epistemologically, the meaning of ideology has been narrowed to that which cannot be validated based on experience; from a political viewpoint, its signification has also been narrowly circumscribed to everything that cannot be rendered operational based on the categories of rationality, being attributed, as a result, to the irrational, in the sense embraced, for instance, by the psychological theory of the political when it talks about "masses" or "crowds", about "manipulation" or about the "collective unconscious". Yet, is ideology more than this? From my viewpoint, the answer is definitely positive and it is based on an understanding that stresses the positive valences of ideology (Şandru 2009), those of integration-identity (Ricoeur 1996), visible at the level of political reality and intelligible at the philosophical-political level when it comes to groups or even communities and the manner in which they envisage reality. And this is because ideology "... must work both practically and theoretically, and discover some way of linking these levels. It must extend from an elaborated system of thought to the minutiae of everyday life" (Eagleton 1991). Precisely for this reason, ideology cannot be limited exclusively to a world of abstractions: clearly, it also operates at the level of political reality, having the role of guiding the actions, the attitudes and the behaviours of the people who are members of a community, in agreement with given shared conventions (Şandru 2010); in general, ideology outlines the functioning style of a community, in a non-prescriptive manner, but based, in Richard Rorty's terms, on an "unforced agreement" (Rorty 2000). For the same reason, ideology cannot be exclusively limited to everything within the scope of the unconscious, emotions and affections: although, undoubtedly, it may involve such elements, it cannot be characterised solely on their account, since it "... form(s) our conception of ourselves as persons and outline(s) the sense of the appropriate way to associate and live" (Manning 1989), requiring, therefore, the presence of the basic attribute of rationality.

Marginalisation through semantic contamination

Another strategy used to marginalise ideology that is identifiable within the sphere of political philosophy is that which is based on semantic contamination. In the well-established area of Western political philosophy, this strategy originates mainly in the negative conception that Karl Marx managed to impose as the landmark of a veritable tradition. Labelled as a "deformation of reality", associated with the interest of the ruling class, and constantly regarded as an instrument serving the establishment of power relationships, up to now, the concept of ideology has been unable to escape this defining context. Neo-Marxist attempts – among which one of the most outstanding is Karl Mannheim's (1968) "neutralisation" – did not manage to diminish the appetite of political theorists, be they non-Marxist or anti-Marxist, for attributing negative or even pejorative features to ideology. For most of these theorists, to put ideology in a negative conceptual light was, as Freeden pointed out (2001), a reaction to the havoc created by totalitarianism in the 20th century; they were forms of manifestation that "... have created in the Western world a coalition of convenience with Marxist critics of ideology – a coalition eager to assume a world immune to, and transcending, the noxious distortions of ideology". Virtually, either when they refer to the general, normative framework of ideology, or when, focusing on the empirical side, they look at particular ideologies, designated with "-isms", political thinkers use precisely the Marxist definition of ideology. And at this point there happens the same thing that also happened to Marxism: such approaches end by becoming ideological themselves. It is important to notice this phenomenon, since such philosophical-political enterprises and even analyses situated within the sphere of interest of political science usually claim to be characterised by an otherwise delusive "objectivity". In fact, Marxism itself claimed to be "scientific" and "objective", in contrast with what it regarded to be the "bourgeois ideology". As I have stated, this manner of referring to ideology was also duplicated in the case of non-Marxist political philosophy, and also in that of the political thinkers or analysts positioned against Marxism. Thus, the concept of ideology had to deal with another type of marginalisation, created by its being exposed in the "forbidden show case" of political philosophy.

The situation here described is all the more visible in the Romanian area, where the authenticity of a tradition of political theorisation, be it normative or empirical, is still uncertain. Thus, besides the fact that they have fallen into what is known as "Marx's trap", most Romanian political specialists and intellectuals interested in the history of political ideas, political commentators or journalists often prefer to avoid using the concept of ideology. Let us analyse each of these aspects. First, what does "Marx's trap" mean? If we have in mind, for instance, the topic of anti-communism, recurrent in post-totalitarian Romania – which is perfectly justified, I should add, since the exercise of memory is completely necessary – we may observe that the ideology of communism, whose founder is rightfully believed to be Karl Marx, is defined with the due dose of negativity (given the totalitarian reality implied by it) based on precisely the manner in which Marxism understands ideology – as a deformation of political reality to the profit of a ruling class or of a ruling group: in this case, the nomenclature and its repressive system (Tismăneanu 1999, 2004). Thus, even anti-communist non-Marxists are contaminated by Marx, of course, without becoming Marxists due to this fact. In what regards those who discuss the phenomenon outside the field of philosophy or political science (but rather, from the perspective of the history of ideas) they seem not to question at all the meaning that they assign to ideology, falling, perhaps unintentionally, into the same "trap" (Şiulea 2003). Yet, as a result, ideology suffers from a form of conceptual marginalisation, being used exclusively in order to express the negative identifiable in social reality. Why are we confronted here with a marginal status of the concept discussed? The answer is, in my opinion, because ideology is thus deprived of the possibility to become lucrative, from a methodological perspective, for political philosophy and science. However, marginalisation goes *in extremis* in the second case, that is, when the critical minds from the Romanian area plainly avoid using the concept. For instance, in one of the most honourable editorial enterprises undertaken in the field of political theory during the last two post-communist decades, this refusal is visible right from the title (Mungiu-Pippidi, 1998). It is true, the volume's editor provides a justification for this approach: "In Romanian, the term «doctrines» is usually preferred to that of «ideologies», which is given a negative connotation due to its former career in «scientific materialism» and communist propaganda". Yet, more recent attempts do not make any concession in this respect, as they continue to prefer using concepts such as "doctrine", "school of thought", "political philosophy", "political orientation" (Sterpan, Aligică 2011) and so on, instead of the term of *ideology*, which would be much more adequate for political theory.

Coming back to the idea of the "totalitarian" load, there is, of course, particularly after *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, an association between ideology and terror, an association which is regarded as one of the basic features of totalitarianism (Arendt 2006), but – as some contemporary political theorists claim – this definition "... provides no philosophical foundation for her restriction of the concept of ideology to Nazism and Stalinism. In the last resort, this restrictive use owes more to liberal prejudice than to any clearly developed philosophical position" (O'Sullivan 1989). Clearly, Nazism and communism were particular ideologies which used terror and which became unchallenged expressions of absolute political evil. But the use of terror is not a defining trait of ideology, neither in the epistemological sense of the concept (as a form of social knowledge specific to a community or a group), nor in its political sense (of integration-identity, in total agreement with universal ethical norms). There emerges a necessary difference between *ideology* and *propaganda*, but it is not my intention to describe it here. In my opinion, what should be noted here is that Romanian theoretical-political approaches are situated within a framework which, although it is justified with reference to the totalitarian past, risks leading either to a limitation of the concept's applicability to given phenomena whose ideological interpretation would bring more insight into the matter, or to a state of conceptual confusion.

The recovery of ideology in political philosophy

Bearing in mind the phenomena described above, a new question seems to emerge at the end of my analysis: given its marginal status, how would it be possible to recover ideology in the field of contemporary political philosophy? In my case, I bet on a reinvention of ideology, whose main premise is the idea that

> a general concept of ideology not only provides a more solid framework for a critical approach, but also allows comparison among different kinds of ideologies, the changes of ideologies from systems of resistance to systems of domination (or vice versa), and a more coherent and complete study of the embedding of ideologies in social cognition as well as in social structure (van Dijk 1998).

More specifically, I therefore have in mind a methodological use for this concept. Within such a framework configured by a prospective *integrated theory of ideology* (Şandru 2010), the tool which would be adequate for the research of social and political reality is represented by *ideological analysis*. Obviously, it can be carried out either from a general perspective, either from the particular standpoint of some established "-isms" (for instance, such as liberalism, socialism or conservatism), if we take into account the fact that

> ... ideologies are ideas, but they are not some disconnected ideas one might have or not have; rather, they are ideas that (necessarily or at any rate systematically) exist and evolve under particular conditions. Ideologies are systems of beliefs, but they have practical consequences. They have a practical effect and are themselves effects of a certain social practice (Jaeggi 2009).

In order to capture this dynamic reality, both at the normative and at the empirical level, the philosophical-political perspective on ideology should open, in an interdisciplinary fashion, towards related fields such as epistemology, political sociology, political anthropology or discourse analysis, specific to communication sciences. Thus, anthropological analysis can reveal the influence that the figures of the social imaginary – among which the most important are ideology, myth, and utopia – have on social-political reality. Being the sum of the discourse-symbolical elements that belong to a community, the social imaginary ideologically articulates a reality which allows the integration of individuals, providing them with a sense of identity and thus "ontological security". From a theoretical-political perspective, this analytical enterprise focuses on the role of a "strong" figure within the social imaginary which can be attributed to ideology and, subsequently, to particular ideologies, that is, those ideologies configured at the crossroads between the ideas, the beliefs, and the values shared by individuals, social groups or by a particular society at large. Ideologically conveyed at the level of the collective mind of each society, the system thus configured contributes to the constitution of an epistemic context, identifiable, from a socio-political and historical standpoint, in what represents the "thinking practice" of an age, through an epistemological analysis. The latter is able to reveal the manner in which, owing to their quintessentially social existence – and, implicitly, to the inter-individual and inter-group relationships that they develop – the members of a community build up a common ground based on which they are able to explain reality. Simultaneously, they can thus take part in the construction of this reality, sharing a common symbolical and epistemic universe. What results from here is the fact that the relationship between ideology and society is bi-univocal: as a central figure of the social imaginary, ideology institutes a particular type of society and, accordingly, a particular type of socio-political reality, becoming, at the same time, an instrument in the understanding of this reality; yet, in its turn, ideology is also influenced by the social progression that it motivates. Another possible observation would be that social and political reality is an ideological product based on this epistemic context, which makes possible the inter-relationship between the individuals' subjective and inter-subjective beliefs. For this reason, a socio-anthropological analytical perspective can characterise the manner in which *ideological conventions* are instituted. In the study of the manner in which these ideological conventions – which may be general, but also particular, according to a particular community, a particular political regime or a particular socio-historical age – contribute to the understanding of social meaning, an important support may be provided by discourse analysis, specific to communication science. Finally, another aspect which should be taken into account by the integrated model of ideological analysis refers to social change. The latter is possible along with the emergence of new socio-political meanings at the level of the epistemic context, meanings which influence both the already established conventions, eventually by modifying or destabilising them (in agreement with the new challenges to which a community must respond), and ideology as such (or, at a particular level, ideologies), in its quality as a constitutive factor of political reality.

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